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Everyday we are faced with many decisions and choices. These can be simple 
choices, such as when to get up or what to wear, or more consequential ones, such 
as whether to buy a house together, or to accept a job abroad. Many of these 
daily-life decisions include uncertainty about what the outcome will be. More 
specifically, a risky decision involves a choice between gambles or options in 
which the probabilities of the outcomes are known, but the outcome is uncertain 
(Knight, 1921). Choosing whether to undergo a risky operation with a 70% chance 
of survival, is an example of a risky decision people can face. Often these decisions 
are influenced by the context in which a decision takes place, for instance prior to 
making the decision we might have experienced good or bad financial outcomes, 
or the decision to be made could involve others. Choosing on behalf of another 
person or oneself (which I refer to here as agency), for example, or trusting an 
advisor with one’s money, can influence our preference and choice, which we 
might call a social context. These seemingly relevant contexts are often ignored 
when studying risky decision-making. The willingness and reluctance to take risk 
has a major impact across many domains, including health, finance, and politics. 
Governments spend millions to cut back practices such as smoking, gambling, 
and taking out high-risk loans. Moreover, it has even been claimed that the 
current global financial crisis has been instigated by irresponsible risk-taking by 
people in the higher levels of financial institutions. It is thus of high importance 
to better understand why individuals display this risk-seeking behaviour, and 
how different contexts can influence risk decisions. 
 The aim of this thesis is to study how different social and non-social contexts 
influence our preferences and choices concerning risk. More specifically, I will 
investigate how different types of contexts, unrelated to the choice outcome 
itself, can influence decision-making behaviour. I will address this by examining 
human behaviour, and also how the brain evaluates contextual information prior 
to a risky choice. 
Decision-making under risk
It has been well established that people dislike choice options with outcomes that 
are uncertain or risky. That is, they shy away from options with increased risk, 
even when the expected value one receives from choosing an option is equal or 
higher than the non-chosen option (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992). For instance, 
given a choice between a certain €20, or a gamble to win €45 determined by a coin 
flip, i.e. heads you win €45, tails you win nothing, people overwhelmingly prefer 
the certain €20. This aversion to risk when the risky option offers higher value is 
inconsistent with classical models of decision-making under risk. These models 
have been of major influence to the study of risk-taking.
209895-L-bw-vermeer
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Models of risky decision-making
According to classical economic models of decision-making under risk (e.g. 
normative decision theory), “good” decision-making involves choosing the option 
that maximises one’s expected value, assuming full information is available and 
one has the capacity and motivation to make the choice. Expected value is a 
quantity obtained by multiplying the “payoff” or magnitude of the outcome with 
the probability of this outcome occurring (Baron, 2007). This theory states that 
choice preferences should be independent of the context in which a decision is 
presented, and should be transitive, i.e. people should always choose the option 
that yields the highest objective value. Although this model sounds reasonable, in 
reality people do not consistently choose the option with the highest expected 
value (Platt & Huettel, 2008). For example, many choices contain different 
commodities (e.g. buying a new computer vs. choosing where to go out to) that are 
difficult to compare (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Baron, 2007). 
 Moreover, Bernoulli (1738) proposed the concept of marginal utility, which 
means any increase in wealth (quantity of goods), will result in an increase in 
utility that is inversely proportional to the quantity of goods already possessed, 
and thus, wealth is not simply its monetary value. In other words, the subjective 
value of a gain or a loss is determined from a particular starting point or current 
state, i.e. reference dependent. Additionally, this value marginally diminishes. For 
instance, an increase of €100 provides more utility (i.e. looms larger) to a poor 
person than it does to a wealthy person. 
 To overcome this problem, Expected Utility (EU) Theory emerged (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). This theory introduced utility as a common 
currency to compare choices. It can be seen as a subjective value of goods whereby 
people should choose the options that maximise their expected utility (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Defining the highest expected ultility typically 
involves the probability multiplied by the subjective utility, based on Bernoulli’s 
marginal utility. 
 Thus, the aversion to risk in the above example can be explained by the 
findings that the additional value of the gamble does not provide much more 
subjective value to overcome the reluctance to take a risky choice. 
Context-dependent risky decision-making
An intriguing observation is that peoples’ preferences to avoid or take risk are 
quite unstable, and that the context of the decision can influence peoples’ risk 
preferences. That is, while people are generally risk-averse, after experiencing 
losses they typically become markedly risk-seeking. These shifts in risk preferences 
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have been observed in many daily scenarios, such as in trading (Brown Harlow & 
Startls, 1996), betting at racetracks (Hausch, Ziemba & Rubinstein, 1981), health 
decisions (Levin Gaeth, Schreiber & Lauriola, 2002), as well as with populations 
such as pathological gamblers (Campbell-Meiklejohn Woolrich, Passingham & 
Rogers, 2008). In fact, studies have demonstrated peoples’ willingness to shift 
their risk preferences depending on prior gain and loss outcomes (contexts), even 
when these outcomes are independent of the choice outcome (Barkan & Busemeyer, 
1999, 2003; Xue, Lu, Levin & Bechara, 2011; Hytönen et al., 2014). 
 Decades of behavioural work in psychology (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
have convincingly demonstrated that outcomes unrelated to the decision at hand 
(e.g. financial gains or losses) play an important role in determining our choices. 
One of their influential examples shows how decisions framed as gains or losses 
influence choice. For instance, participants were asked to choose between two 
treatment programmes to combat a hypothetical Asian flu that was expected to 
kill 600 people. They proposed this problem in either a positive or a negative 
context (frame). Programme A would save 200 lives for certain, whereas with 
programme B, 600 lives would be saved with a one-third chance. The other group 
was told that they could either choose programme C, whereby 400 people would 
die for certain, or programme D whereby there would be a two-thirds chance that 
all 600 people would die. Interestingly, these subjects showed a preference 
reversal when the frame changed, even though the expected value of these four 
options is equal. Here, people showed an aversion to risk in the positive framed 
problem and preferred programme A with a certain gain of 200 lives. In the 
negative framed problem, in contrast, people were more risk-seeking and preferred 
programme D, taking the risk (i.e. two-third) that everybody would die (at the 
same time taking a chance of one-third to save everyone). This phenomenon, 
known as the framing effect, was one of the findings that led to an alternative 
descriptive theory to the expected utility theory, called Prospect Theory. To this 
day, this is still one of the most successful behavioural models of decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty. 
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) proposes that people tend to evaluate 
the outcomes of a decision to a change from a flexible reference point. Therefore, 
gain and loss outcomes are evaluated relative to this reference point rather than 
in absolute terms. Moreover, in line with Bernoulli‘s marginal utility (1738), 
independent of the current state, the impact of a change in value diminishes 
marginally with the distance from a relevant reference point. Additionally, it has 
been theorized that people weigh losses more heavily relative to gains of similar 
value. For instance, people typically reject gambles that offer a 50/50 probability 
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of gaining or losing money, unless the amount that could be gained is about twice 
the amount that could be lost (e.g. a 50/50 probability to either gain €100 or lose 
€50) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This phenomenon is illustrated by a steeper 
slope for losses than gains in the value function, and is referred to as the concept 
of loss aversion. The disproportionate evaluation of losses and gains makes people 
more sensitive to losses of money or objects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981, 1986), and highly motivated to avoid them. This explains why 
people become risk-seeking in case of a choice concerning losses.
 The main interest of this thesis is to understand how risk preferences are 
altered by different positive and negative contexts, contexts that are objectively 
independent of the risky choices themselves. Additional insight can be gained by 
examining how the brain evaluates different contexts and how these neural 
responses may predict subsequent risky decision-making. Examining both 
behaviour and brain processes would be beneficial for our understanding of risk 
preferences more generally. 
Neural correlates of decisions under risk
The neural mechanisms underlying risky decision-making depends on the 
anticipated subjective value (utility) one receives from probable reward and 
punishment outcomes. The brain processes inputs from multiple brain regions, 
and integrates and compares these to a final value signal that reflects a preference 
for one of the available outcomes. 
 Brain areas associated with the evaluation of gains/losses and with value- 
guided decision-making are, among others, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), striatum, and insula (Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale & Shizgal, 2001; 
Delgado Locke, Stenger & Fiez, 2003; Tom, Fox, Trepel & Poldrack, 2007; Rangel & 
Hare, 2010; Basten, Biele, Heekeren & Fiebach, 2012; Boorman, Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2013). These structures have also been important for risk (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio & Anderson 1994; Critchley, Mathias & Dolan, 2001; Campbell- 
Meiklejohn et al., 2008; Sanfey, Hastie, Colvin & Grafman, 2003; Shiv, Loewenstein, 
Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2005). In particular, the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), 
a part of the striatum, exhibited increased activity when anticipating risky gains, 
whereas insula activity increased when anticipating risky losses (Kuhnen & Knutson, 
2005; Knutson & Geer, 2008). The anterior insula (AI) has also been found in 
relation to the expectation of losses (O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley & Dolan, 
2003; Paulus & Stein, 2006) and risk-taking concerning gambles to win or lose 
double-or-nothing, both for using nonmonetary incentives (Paulus, Rogalsky, 
Simmons, Feinstein & Stein, 2003), and monetary rewards (Critchley et al., 2001). 
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 Some studies have explored the neural correlates of gain and loss contexts in 
risk-taking. Tom and colleagues (2007) observed that when people are confronted 
with a decision involving both potential gains and potential losses (i.e. mixed 
gain-loss gamble), risk-taking recruited the neural substrate involved in the 
approach of rewards, while risk-avoidance was correlated with the neural 
substrate involved in loss aversion. They suggested that the disutility to 
anticipated losses kept people from accepting the gamble. However, other studies 
showed that both the disutility to losses and an increased emotional response 
correlated to the decision to avoid a potential loss outcome (Canessa, Motterlini, 
Alemanno, Perani & Cappa, 2013; De Martino, Camerer & Adolphs, 2010). 
Additionally, De Martino and colleagues (2006) demonstrated the susceptibility 
of risk preferences to different gain or loss framed choices, which induced a 
framing effect. They reported that subjects who were sensitive to the gain/loss 
context frame exhibited enhanced amygdala activity, indicating that the 
resulting behavioural framing effect was biased by emotional processes. 
 As described, there are many contextual forces that can have a large impact 
on our risk preferences. People are often not fully aware of their preferences, and 
therefore can be susceptible to influences that are in fact irrelevant to the choice 
at hand. These studies indicate that brain areas involved in anticipating and 
processing reward and punishment outcomes are critically involved in risk-taking 
decisions. However, empirical evidence remains limited about how different, 
unrelated, positive and negative contexts might influence risk preferences for 
identical sets of risky choices. This is an interesting question, since many real-life 
decisions in which we choose between a more or less risky outcome often takes 
place in different contexts which can be objectively unrelated and uninformative 
to the choice.
Decision-making under risk in social contexts
So far, I have discussed how reward and punishment contexts affect risk 
preferences on an individual level. Risky decisions can also take place in social 
contexts that are slightly different from standard reward and punishment 
contexts, such as a situation in which the role of agency changes (first- or 
third-person decision); for instance, deciding for a friend (Beisswanger, Stone, 
Hupp & Allgaier, 2003) or when representing a group (Reynolds, Joseph & 
Sherwood, 2009), but also decisions taking place in a social environment (deciding 
whether to trust another person with one’s money). Despite the apparent ubiquity 
of situations in which social contexts may influence individual preferences for 
risky and uncertain outcomes, there is a surprising dearth of research examining 
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choices made for another person for both social and non-social decisions. One of 
the open questions here is how positive and negative contexts may impact our 
preferences for risk and decisions when the outcome does not involve us directly, 
but the other person for whom we decide. Additionnally, how changing agency 
alters our social preferences in social risky choice settings.
Agency
A great deal of research on decision-making for others has been conducted in the 
context of medical decision-making, or surrogate decision-making. For example, 
the decision whether one’s parent should be taken into a care home, or whether 
one should undergo a risky operation, are decisions often delegated to another 
person. In this thesis I am interested in how risky decisions are actually taken 
when agency changes, that is, choosing on one’s own behalf (so-called first-person) 
and on behalf of another person (so-called third-party). Often these decisions 
involve outcomes that are uncertain or risky, due to the fact that the outcome of 
these decisions are also dependent on other peoples’ decision behaviour. Moreover, 
an additional undertainty that may arise when choosing for an anonymous 
person is not knowing their preferences.
 Currently, the literature on decision-making for others has not given a 
consistent view of how deciding for a third-party affects risk preferences. Risk- 
taking concerning monetary outcomes (Agranov & Bisin, 2011; Chakravarty, 
Harrison & Haruvy, 2011; Pollmann, Potters, Trautmann, 2014; Hsee & Weber, 
1997), or outcomes affecting others (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Wray & Stone, 2005) 
increased when choosing on behalf of a third-party. However, increased risk 
aversion on behalf of a third-party has also been observed for monetary (Eriksen 
& Kvaloy, 2010; Reynolds et al., 2009), medical (Garcia-Retamaro & Galesic, 2012) 
and social choices, although this was only observed in one-third of participants 
(Charness & Jackson, 2009). Furthermore, studies also demonstrated that when 
deciding for another person, loss aversion was attenuated (Polman, 2012). 
Additionally, some studies have not observed any difference between third-party 
decisions and decisions made by oneself (Stone, Yates & Caruthers, 2002). One 
reason for the inconsistent findings reported in the literature could be a result of 
examining different phases of the decision, as well as different types of decisions. 
For example, studies have looked at decisions concerning advising anonymous 
others or friends (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Lu, Xie & Xu, 2013), predicting others’ 
preferences (Hsee & Weber, 1997), and making actual choices on behalf of others 
(Civai, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Gamer & Rumiati, 2010; Chakravarty, Harrison, 
Haruvy & Rutström, 2011; Jung, Sul & Kim, 2013), either tested within- or 
 between-subjects, and for different choice outcomes, (e.g. concerning social or 
non-social outcomes, that were either hypothetical or real). Therefore, it remains 
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unclear how social and non-social contexts influence preferences for risk-taking. 
 One important process that may play a role in agency and risk is the extent of 
involvement of the decision-maker. Individuals who actively choose an option are 
also responsible for the outcome of their choice. Studies have shown that 
enhancing responsibility or even accountability can influence peoples’ preferences 
for risk in the direction that reduces the direct agency of the decision-maker 
(Charness & Jackson, 2009; Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2010; Reynolds et al., 2009; Vieider, 
2009; Pollmann et al., 2014). 
 Taken together, the literature on third-party decision-making demonstrates 
that choice preferences can alter when varying personal involvement, compared 
to when choosing for oneself. An interesting and important question to study is 
whether personal involvement in the decision and outcome alters the impact of 
reward and punishment contexts, and how this affects subsequent risky choices 
described earlier. 
Agency in social environments
Many decisions take place in social environments or contexts, that is, when others 
are also involved in the outcome. A type of decision that involves and affects 
others is cooperation. The decision whether to collaborate in recycling garbage for 
the benefit of the environment is a typical example of cooperative behaviour for a 
good shared by the public (i.e. public good). Cooperation is often perceived as a 
social dilemma, because one does not need to cooperate to still enjoy the public 
good. This characteristic provides the incentive to “free-ride”, and let others put in 
all the effort and costs. Given this knowledge, cooperation is then perceived as a 
prosocial behaviour that requires a person to make a trade-off between self- 
regarding preferences and other-regarding preferences, with a risk of potential 
free-riding. 
 Intriguingly, important cooperative decisions for a public good are often 
made by a representative of a group. An open question is whether decisions on 
behalf of others are made differently when placed in a cooperative context. 
Specifically, does personal involvement in the outcome of the public good influence 
this, or does personal involvement not matter? The previously described literature on 
risk and third-party decisions seems to suggest that third-party preferences differ 
from individual preferences. To know whether personal involvement affects 
cooperative and third-party decisions will help establish which psychological 
process is essential for cooperation, and third-party preferences. 
 Classical economic Game Theory – which mathematically models and aims 
to understand strategic behaviour in social interactive settings (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944) assumes that people should always choose the option that 
maximizes self-interest, specifically if all others also act out of self-interest. Work 
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in psychology has demonstrated that economic models do not always correctly 
predict individuals’ behaviour in social settings. It has been shown that people do 
not act out of pure self-interest, but also value others’ interest, demonstrated by 
cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher, Gächter S & Fehr, 2001), and in 
bargaining decisions (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Rilling & 
Sanfey, 2011).
 Cooperative decisions can be observed as socially uncertain decisions 
(Trautmann & Vieider, 2011), for example, not knowing what the other agents’ 
intentions are, and whether they will cooperate or defect (i.e. not cooperate). As 
described earlier, people are generally risk averse, and this could motivate 
individuals to not cooperate, but to choose the safest option for their own benefit 
(i.e. free-ride), despite that this may harm the collective in the long run. 
Psychological factors such as the ability to mentalize or view the decision from 
the other persons’ perspective (McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith & Trouard, 2001) 
have shown to influence the willingness to cooperate when deciding for the self. 
Moreover, theory-of-mind processes have shown to modulate other-regarding 
preferences (Janowski, Camerer & Rangel, 2012), which are associated with per-
spective-taking or mentalizing about others intentions, thoughts and beliefs 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006). Furthermore, other factors such as a 
desire to behave in line with social norms (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a) have shown 
to influence social choices. Most of these motivations influencing cooperation are 
inherently social. In situations where these decisions are delegated to others, it is 
unclear if and how these motives play a role. For instance, varying personal 
involvement might influence the ability to take the perspective of others, 
influencing the decision to cooperate. 
 A few studies that have examined third-party decisions in social contexts 
highlight potential differences and similarities in preferences relative to decisions 
made for the first-person, providing some helpful insights into how they may 
influence decisions in cooperation. One study showed that third-party decisions 
have higher preferences for risk averse choices in settings they were jointly 
involved in, such as deciding for both a partner and themselves in a stag-hunt 
game (Charness & Jackson, 2009). Fairness decisions did not show rejection rates 
for a third-party to differ from rejection rates for oneself (Civai et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, though not demonstrating a behavioural difference, the negative 
emotional response observed when receiving an unfair offer for oneself, was 
decreased when receiving an unfair offer on behalf of a third-party (Civai et al., 
2010). This suggests that the decision-maker’s role does have some impact. 
 In sum, these studies suggest that choice preferences when choosing for a 
third-party can differ compared to choices made for oneself, both behaviourally 
as well as in underlying processes. Specifically, the extent of the decision maker’s 
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personal involvement suggests that this plays an important role in preferences 
for risk and also preferences concerning outcomes related to other people. 
A possible role of perspective-taking in decisions involving others and third-party 
decisions may influence preferences in line with other-regarding preferences. In 
this thesis, I aim to explore how personal involvement affects our social 
preferences in risky settings.
Approach to study risky decision-making
In this thesis I aim to explore the basic processes of context-dependent risky deci-
sion-making for both self and third-party decisions, by adopting a neuroeconomic 
approach. This approach lies at the intersection of fields such as economics, 
psychology and neuroscience. I will briefly describe the how each discipline 
contributes to the science of decision-making.
 The aim of Economics is to specify simple models of human real-life choice 
behaviour in ways that predict optimal decisions. The purpose of these normative 
economic models is to describe choice behaviour of rational agents. The strength 
of this field stems from its many simple usable models and paradigms to examine 
decision behaviour in individual and social choice problems. In reality, however, 
people do not consistently choose the economic rational option (i.e. highest 
expected value or utility; Platt & Huettel, 2008), which has led to the formation of 
new theories from Psychology. 
 Neuroscience aims to understand how people make decisions and in particular, 
how the different decision variables are computed, compared, and integrated at 
the neural level. The strength of this field is that it enables real-time measurement of 
neural processes underlying decision behaviour, and can thereby, in combination 
with behavioural data examine more accurately how people make decisions. For 
example, in situations where the same behavioural output can be explained by 
two different processes that correlate to distinct neural processes, neuroscience 
can provide insights and generate new hypotheses regarding existing theories. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging ( fMRI) is one of the brain imaging 
techniques used in this discipline, and in this thesis (see Box 1). An issue in 
neuroscience is the labelling of a cognitive process to specific activated brain 
regions (i.e. reverse inference; Poldrack, 2006). Cautious inter pretations of brain 
data are therefore required, and by integrating other measures (i.e. behaviour, 
scales, existing theories about processes that have been associated with specific 
areas in a structure), neuroscience can provide substantial scientific insight.
 Psychology aims to understand choice behaviour by observing how humans 
make decisions, taking into account human motivations and limitations. This 
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discipline has built up an extensive dictionary of psychological factors that 
influences human behaviour and proposes many theories about behaviour (e.g. 
Prospect Theory). Their paradigms often contain high ecological validity. 
A limitation to this field is that many theories are based on simple self-report 
questionnaire measures or single choice or hypothetically based studies, which 
are often confounded by the human capacity to consciously report their behaviour 
and intentions. Besides these limitations, research in psychology has made major 
advances to the study of decision-making. Importantly, they have demonstrated 
that many decisions deviate from the classical economic models. They showed 
that people do not consistently choose the economic rational option (Platt & 
Huettel, 2008). This led to the formation of new descriptive models of decision- 
making (e.g. Prospect Theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). These models describe 
how people actually make decisions. They show that when choosing between 
different options people are not purely guided by the highest economic return, 
but also strongly guided by underlying emotions and other psychological factors, 
such as their sensitivity to losses, or responsibility for the outcome.
 In the 1990s, these disciplines were combined into a new discipline called 
Neuroeconomics. This discipline integrates theories from each discipline described 
above. Using the strengths and tools of each individual discipline, neuroeconomics 
aims to gain a richer understanding of decision-making (for a detailed overview, 
see Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr & Poldrack, 2009). A variety of methods are combined 
to studying decision-making, such as fMRI (see Box 1). Neuroeconomics has 
the potential to advance our knowledge of existing theoretical accounts by 
constraining models based on the underlying neurobiology, and can also be used 
to inform public policy debates.
Box 1   functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging ( fMRI)
fMRI is a non-invasive method that indirectly measures neural activity while the 
participant is performing a cognitive task. fMRI measures regional changes in the level 
of blood oxygenation, captured as a blood-oxygenated-level- dependent (BOLD) signal 
(Huettel, Song & McCarthy, 2008). Energy, in the form of oxygen, is bound to haemoglobin 
in red blood cells (oxygenated haemoglobin). Brain areas that exhibit more activity 
(e.g. while performing a cognitive task) have an increase in oxygen uptake, which 
results in increased levels of de-oxygenated haemoglobin in the blood and triggers the 
body to increase blood flow to that particular brain region (Buxton, Wong, & Frank, 
1998). The BOLD response is noisy due to the physiological properties and technical 
constraints, and therefore, multiple trials as repeated events are used and averaged to 
gain a single and less noisy signal (Huettel et al., 2008).
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Aims and outline of the thesis
The main aim of this thesis is to explore and gain more insight into the 
psychological and neural mechanisms underlying risky decision-making, both in 
social and non-social contexts. Previous literature uncovered important aspects 
of individual and social decision-making, particularly focusing on how these 
choices impact the decision-maker. Often, the context in which the decisions are 
made has been ignored when studying decisions. This thesis investigates both 
these aspects of decision-making, with the focus on how reward and loss contexts, 
and personal involvement can impact risk and social preferences. I examine how 
decisions for the individual and decisions on behalf of third-parties may alter 
fundamental risk processing, in social and non-social contexts. In order to address 
these issues, behavioural paradigms in combination with fMRI were used. The 
aims of this thesis were explored in 4 empirical chapters (Chapter 2 - 5). 
 The main question of the first two chapters is both how and what type of 
reward and punishment contexts affects peoples’ preferences for monetary risk. 
Chapter 2 examines how gain and loss contexts based on performance at an 
unrelated task affect subsequent risk choices for monetary gambles. Specifically, 
it explores the neural processes during the evaluation of moment-by-moment 
changes of gain and loss contexts prior to a risky decision situation. The aim is to 
gain greater insight into the mechanisms underlying risk valuation and 
preference, and demonstrating how these responses can predict and influence 
subsequent preference for either risky or safe choice options. To follow up on this, 
chapter 3 explores how different types of gain/loss contexts affect risk preferences. 
Often these prior gain and loss contexts are also related to the outcome of players’ 
actions, i.e. performance (chapter 2). Specifically, in this chapter, we aim to test 
whether contextual effects on risk are purely driven by the receipt of random 
monetary gains and losses (e.g. from a lottery), or whether risk preferences are 
affected by non-monetary contexts, such as success or failure in performance at a 
task. To address this aim, different types of rewards and punishments prior to 
identical sets of monetary gambles are directly compared. This chapter provides a 
better understanding how risk preferences may be altered by different, unrelated, 
contexts, and specifically gains a better idea whether these are primarily driven 
by the aversion to losses, or other factors (e.g. valence of positive/negative 
contexts)
 The main question of the following two chapters is how social preferences – 
when deciding for a third-party – may alter risk preferences for reward and loss 
contexts. Moreover, it examines how social preferences may alter decisions in 
social interactive contexts (e.g. cooperation). Chapter 4 specifically investigates 
the influence of monetary reward and punishment contexts on risk preferences 
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for a social other (using a similar design as chapter 2 and 3), and additionally 
investigates how varying degrees of responsibility can impact these preferences. 
Understanding how people make risk decisions on behalf of a third-party is a 
question of substantial interest for society and more generally for the under- 
standing how risk preferences are influenced. Chapter 5 examines whether 
cooperative decisions (i.e. a form of social risk) might differ when decisions are 
delegated to others (i.e. a third-party). The first aim is to gain a better understanding 
of how cooperative decisions may change as a function of whether the decision- 
maker is personally involved in the outcome or not. Also, we are interested in 
which direction these differences lie. Are third-party decisions more pro-social or 
more pro-self? Comparing third-party cooperative decisions with cooperative 
decisions on behalf of the self, allows for examining the importance of personal 
and economic involvement in the public good. The second aim is to specify which 
motives are important for third-party decision-making, and how these might 
impact the social preference of cooperation. To answer this, I examine how peoples’ 
willingness to cooperate on behalf of a third-party alters when playing in 
different social and non-social contexts, thereby varying the conflict between 
social motives and self-interested motives. 
 Finally, a summary of the main findings, contributions, and challenges to 
studying risky decision-making, and more broadly the existing field of neuro-
economics, are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Abstract
Studies of risky decision-making have demonstrated that humans typically prefer 
risky options after incurring a financial loss, while generally preferring safer 
options after a monetary gain. Here, we examined the neural processes underlying 
these inconsistent risk preferences by investigating the evaluation of gains and 
losses, and demonstrating how these responses can impact subsequent preference 
for either risky or safe choice options. Participants performed a task while 
undergoing fMRI in which they experienced both gains and losses. Immediately 
following a gain or loss, participants decided to either play or pass on a “double-or-
quits” gamble. The outcome of the gamble could either double or eliminate their 
initial gain (from the time-estimation task) or redeem or double their initial loss. 
If they chose not to play this gamble, they retained the initial gain or loss. 
We demonstrate a shift in risk-taking preferences for identical sets of gambles as 
a function of previous gains or losses, with participants showing a greater 
preference towards riskier decisions in the context of a prior loss. An interaction 
between evaluating gain/loss contexts and subsequent behavioural risk pattern 
revealed an increased BOLD response in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC), with stronger responses for both gambling in a loss context and safety 
in a gain context. This suggests that the vmPFC is responsible for integrating 
these contextual effects, with these processes impacting on subsequent risky 
choice.
Based on: Losecaat Vermeer, A. B., Boksem, M. A. S. & Sanfey, A. G. (2014). 
Neural mechanisms underlying context-dependent shifts in risk preferences, 
NeuroImage, 103, 355–363.
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Introduction 
In daily life, people are typically faced with numerous risky decisions, for instance 
choosing whether or not to buy insurance on an expensive smartphone, or 
whether to invest money in stocks or save it for retirement. When deciding what 
to choose in a risky, uncertain environment, people generally exhibit risk averse 
tendencies, that is, they generally shy away from options with increased risk, 
even when the so-called expected value of the choice options are equal (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, 1992). That is, if given a choice between €10 for sure and a gamble 
with a 50% chance of €20 and a 50% chance of €0, people overwhelmingly favour 
the certain €10, and in fact the ‘winning’ outcome of the gamble usually needs to 
be considerably higher to induce players to choose the risky option. Classical 
models of economic decision-making (e.g. utility theory and its variants) also 
assume that these individual choice preferences should be consistent over 
situations in which the same choice set is offered. For example, the decision to 
purchase a €5 lottery ticket should not be affected if you had previously either just 
found €5 on the street, or if alternately you had unfortunately just lost €5 from 
your wallet – the choice to spend the money to buy the lottery ticket should in 
theory be independent of these two events. However, several decades of behavioural 
work (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) have convincingly demonstrated that 
outcomes unrelated to the decision at hand (e.g. recent financial gains or losses) 
do in fact play an important role in determining our choices. For example, Xue and 
colleagues (2011) had participants play a task where they decided to play or pass 
on a gamble consisting of one cup with a large gain and multiple cups with small 
losses, varying in expected value. They showed that participants decided to play 
the gamble more often after they lost the gamble on the previous trial, whereas 
when they won the gamble on the previous trial they were more reluctant to play 
the gamble. 
 In fact, when deciding between relatively risky and a relatively safe options, 
individuals typically have higher preferences for riskier options when the choice 
is made immediately after experiencing a financial loss (which we term here a 
loss context), while they generally prefer safer options when the choice takes place 
after experiencing a financial gain (i.e. gain context) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
This phenomenon can occur even when faced with a choice set presented as either 
gains or losses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; De Martino et al., 2006; Porcelli & 
Delgado, 2009). 
 In the current study, we are interested in exploring the neural processes 
underlying these inconsistent risk preferences following gains and losses 
respectively. Specifically, we aim to gain greater insight into the mechanisms 
underlying risk assessment and preference, by investigating the neural substrate 
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during the evaluation of gains and losses prior to a risky decision situation and 
demonstrating how these responses can predict and influence subsequent 
preference for either risky or safe choice options. 
 Vitally important for decision-making is an adequate evaluation of gains and 
losses, as these outcomes usefully inform us whether or not to continue a 
particular behavioural strategy (Barto & Sutton, 1997). Brain areas associated 
with the evaluation of gains/losses and with value-guided decision-making are, 
among others, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), striatum, and insula 
(Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2003; Tom, Fox, Trepel & Poldrack, 2007; Rangel 
& Hare, 2010; Basten et al., 2012; Boorman et al., 2013). For instance, Tom and 
colleagues (2007) observed that when participants were presented with a mixed 
gamble offering an equal chance of a monetary gain or loss, BOLD responses in 
striatum and mPFC increased with the size of the monetary gain; in contrast, 
BOLD responses in the insula increased with gambles containing greater losses. 
Similar effects were found when gain and loss outcomes were anticipated (Breiter 
et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), or when the gain and 
loss were not monetary but instead delivered in the form of primary incentives, 
such as tasty versus nontasty liquids (see also Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013). 
Different decision parameters (e.g. outcome evaluation, choice riskiness, 
magnitude) are believed to be integrated via a common network in the assessment 
of choice preference and guiding subsequent behaviour. Interestingly, this 
network, in particular the vmPFC may play an important role in integrating the 
gain/loss outcomes and in light of choice options to assess their subsequent 
preference. 
 Moreover, studies have shown that the vmPFC is also involved in the 
prediction of choice. Studies found that while viewing different goods the vmPFC 
response correlated with the actual preference for those goods, even in the 
absence of choice, suggesting that the vmPFC also reflects a choice preference 
signal prior to making a choice (Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion & Pessiglione, 
2009; Levy, Lazzaro, Rutledge & Glimcher, 2011). Specifically with regard to 
value-based decision-making, the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and vmPFC, 
including striatum and insula, exhibit a significant increase in signal for options 
yielding higher expected value, and a significantly reduced signal for options 
yielding lower or negative expected value (e.g. loss) (Platt & Huettel, 2008; Rangel, 
Camerer & Montague, 2008; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Tom et al., 2007). Options that 
have ultimately been chosen, with respect to those that have not been chosen, 
also correlate with the value response of the vmPFC (Boorman et al., 2009). 
 In particular, the vmPFC has been suggested as a general “hub” for value- 
guided decisions. This area has strong connections with other reward- and 
 control-related areas (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011). It has been suggested that vmPFC 
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guides the valuation process (Plassmann, O’Doherty & Rangel, 2010; Rangel et al., 
2008), taking into account the decision-makers goals and the current context, by 
integrating information signals related to the valuation of rewarding and aversive 
outcomes, choice signals, and signals from regions involved in cognitive control 
(e.g. IFG, lateral PFC; Hare, Camerer & Rangel, 2009; Weller, Levin, Shiv & Bechara, 
2007; Rosenbloom, Schmahmann & Price, 2012). The aforementioned studies 
imply the vmPFC may be a key region that operates in shaping preference for 
which choice option to pursue. However, a relevant question is how different 
values related to each phase of the decision are integrated and updated, and 
subsequently impact the decision process. More specifically, it is important to 
understand how appraisals of the context (i.e. gain and loss) of choice guide 
subsequent decision-making. 
 We hypothesize here that in the light of different gain and loss contexts prior 
to making a risky choice, engagement of the vmPFC may mediate risk preferences 
in line with the behaviour described by previous studies, that is, a stronger 
involvement for risk avoidance in the gain context and for risk seeking in the loss 
context. 
 To investigate this, in the present study we varied the delivery of monetary 
gains and losses preceding a risky choice. We expected that this contextual 
change would in turn alter risk preferences, even though the actual choice facing 
the participant was the same in each event. We expected that the engagement of 
the vmPFC reflected a combined value of the appraisal of the current gain or 
loss by the subsequent anticipated choice and outcome, and that this relative 
engagement would be potentially predictive of the degree of riskiness of 
subsequent decisions in the context of gains or losses. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants
Thirty undergraduate students participated in the study. All provided written 
informed consent and were financially compensated via a flat fee (25 Euro) for 
completion of the task. In addition, they also had the opportunity to win a bonus 
on top of this participation fee, a maximum amount of 10 Euro. Exclusion criteria 
were self-reported claustrophobia, neurological or cardiovascular diseases, psychiatric 
disorders, regular use of marijuana, use of psychotropic drugs, or metal parts in 
the body. Four participants were excluded due to technical problems during 
scanning. Data is therefore reported from twenty-six participants (14 men and 12 
women, M = 22 years, SD = 2.68, range = 19 to 27 years, all right-handed). The study 
was approved by the local ethics committee. 
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Task design and procedure
We developed a novel paradigm in order to study risk-taking behaviour in the 
context of prior gains and losses. Each trial began with a simple time-estimation 
task in which participants either won or lost money depending on their 
performance (Boksem, Kostermans & De Cremer, 2011). The purpose of this task 
was to induce either a gain or a loss context. Directly after the gain or loss feedback 
from the time-estimation task, participants received a mixed (50/50 chance, gain/
loss) gamble (see Figure 1), which they could decide to either pass or play. If they 
decided to pass on the gamble they would simply retain their gain or loss from the 
preceding time-estimation trial, which would then be added to the total balance 
of the money won so far. However, if they decided to play the gamble, the gamble 
was resolved for them and the corresponding win or loss amount was added to 
their total experimental balance. The mixed gamble contained either a positive 
expected value (‘+ EV’), a negative expected value (‘- EV’), or an equal expected 
value (‘0 EV’) by varying the gain or loss outcome from €1.00, €1.20, to €1.40 as 
compared to the ‘pass’ option (i.e. choosing to keep the €1.20 gain or loss) (Table 1). 
We created these three different gamble types to assess whether participants 
were attending and sensitive to the expected value of the gamble.  
This study differs in important ways from previous efforts to assess contextual 
influences on risky decision-making (such as the ‘framing effect’; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; De Martino et al., 2006). The current 
task design allowed us to disentangle the context from the decision itself. In other 
words, the current task design enables us to test how a gain/loss context influences 
risk preferences for identical choice sets. Other tasks (Porcelli & Delgado et al., 
2009) have not been able to purely disentangle the choice from the context, as the 
gambles were not of comparable value, but contained either only losses or only 
gains. Other studies (De Martino et al., 2006) have manipulated the decision 
Table 1  Mixed gambles by expected value (EV) and EV type .a 
 
50|50 mixed gamble Expected value (EV) Gamble type
- €1.40  | + €1.20 -0.10 - EV
- €1.20  | + €1.00 -0.10 - EV
- €1.20  | + €1.20 0 0 EV
- €1.00  | + €1.20 0.10 + EV
- €1.20  | + €1.40 0.10 + EV
a All gambles contained of a 50-50 probability to lose-win money
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options by phrasing them either as a gain or a loss, even though the outcome of 
the options always had a positive expected value (i.e. contained an expected 
gain). To avoid this confound, we implemented a task design where we can always 
compare the decision play or pass on a gamble using the same gambles across 
both gain and loss contexts. Other studies (Xue, Lu, Levin & Bechara, 2010, 2011) 
have used mixed gambles too, however not by separating them from the 
respective context, as these studies only looked at previous outcomes of these 
gambles on subsequent behaviour for other mixed gambles. As shown by these 
studies, the presentation of a choice can substantially affect how people perceive 
risk, and subsequently how much risk they decide to take. The current design 
therefore provided a more precise measure of the effect of gain/loss context 
on subsequent risky decision-making. The gain/loss context in our design is 
unrelated, in the sense that it is an outcome related to a different, independent, 
task. 
 
Procedure
Participants first performed two practice sessions of 5 minutes each while lying in 
the MRI scanner. In the first session participants practiced the time-estimation 
trial. Here, participants were required to estimate a one-second time duration. 
After a cue on the screen changed colour, they were instructed to wait exactly one 
second and then press a response button, with their precise response times 
recorded. We used the minimum and maximum response times to determine an 
initial allowable response time-window in the experiment, which in turn was 
used to give feedback on whether the time-estimation was correct or incorrect. 
The second session gave participants the opportunity to practice the gambling 
task. This session was run concurrently with the collection of an anatomical scan. 
After these practice sessions, the experiment lasted for one continuous run of 
approximately 60 minutes, while collecting fMRI data. 
 Before beginning the task, participants were instructed that their goal was to 
win as much money as they could, and that their final balance would be paid out 
as a bonus (with a maximum amount of €10) in addition to their participation fee 
(a flat fee of €25) for completion of the task. Hence, participants total payment at 
the end of the experiment would range between a minimum of €25 and a 
maximum of €35. At the start of each trial, participants saw a red visual cue that 
changed in colour to white after 1200 ms (Figure 1). Participants were then 
required to press the response button exactly one second after this colour change. 
Responses to this time-estimation task were considered correct when they were 
within an allowable time-interval. For correct responses, participants gained 
€1.20. Participants lost €1.20 if their response was not within this time-interval, 
i.e. either too fast or too slow. 
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The allowable response-interval was initially calculated based on their 
performance in the practice run and then covertly adjusted throughout the task 
as a function of the variance in response time of the participant, in order to ensure 
an equal number of gains and losses on this task. Therefore, if participants 
responded within the allowable response-interval, this interval was shortened 
by 5 ms; if they responded either too quickly or too slowly, the interval was lengthened 
by 5 ms. Importantly, although the number of gains and losses was manipulated, 
the feedback was contingent upon participants’ performance. What differed 
between participants was the time-interval within which responses were 
considered correct (see Boksem et al., 2011). 
 In the gambling section of the task, participants were given the opportunity 
to play a gamble on 75% of trials. They were forewarned on each trial about this by 
the presence of a specific visual cue, namely a pair of dice. On these trials, after 
receiving the feedback from the time estimation task (gain or loss), participants 
could choose to either play or pass on a mixed (50/50 chance, gain/loss) gamble. 
Playing the gamble led to two possible outcomes: 1) A win outcome which added 
€1.00, €1.20 or €1.40 to their overall experimental balance, or 2) a loss outcome 
which subtracted €1.00, €1.20 or €1.40 from this balance, dependent on the type of 
gamble offered (see Table 1). Alternatively, the participant could decide to pass on 
the gamble, thereby keeping the earlier gain or loss (i.e. +/- €1.20) from the time- 
estimation task. The gamble outcomes were independent from the performance 
on the time-estimation task. 
Fig. 1  Task design. The structure of a single trial is presented. Each picture represents a 
screen in the experiment. The trial started with a time-estimation task, where participants 
were required to press a button exactly 1 s after the dice colour changed to white. Feedback 
on performance was shown as a monetary gain of €1.20 if correct, or a loss of €1.20 if 
incorrect. Following this feedback, participants had the opportunity to choose a mixed 
gamble with a 50/50 chance to either gain or lose money. If participants decided to gamble, 
the gamble was played and the outcome then presented. Average duration of a trial is 9-13 
s, jittered between time-estimation response and feedback context and decision screen. 
fMRI analysis was time-locked to the feedback onset prior to the gamble (grey shaded area).
[1000 ms]  [max. 5000 ms]  [2000 ms]  [1000-2000 ms]  
Feedback Context 
(Loss, Gain) 
Decision 
(Play, Pass) 
 €6.00  
Too fast: - €1.20  
€6.00  €4.80 
YES  Do you want to gamble? NO 
- + 
+ €1.20 
 
Time-estimation Outcome 
[1200 ms] Jitter 
[1200 ± 1000 ms] 
Jitter 
[1200 ± 1000 ms] 
Jitter 
[1200 ± 1000 ms] 
€6.00 
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 All gamble outcomes (both gains and losses) immediately updated the total 
running balance for each participant. This balance was displayed on the screen 
at all times. Participants were informed that they would be paid this balance 
(if positive) as a bonus at the end of the experiment. 
 In the remaining 25% of trials, participants were not presented with a gamble 
after receiving feedback on the time-estimation trial. These “no-gamble” trials, 
indicated in advance by a specific visual cue (cubes instead of dice), were employed 
to potentially prevent participants using a fixed strategy, e.g. always or never 
gambling, and to enhance engagement in the gamble trials, as well as to allow for 
more rapid transitions through the sets of experimental balances. Time–estimation 
performance on these trials did however affect the experimental balance. 
 During the task we manipulated the experimental balance to create phases 
of “neutral” (total balance range of €-5 to €5), “negative” (range €-5 to €-17), and 
“positive” experimental balances (range €5 to €17) (For specific details about the 
phase transitions, see Boksem et al., 2012). The order of these three phases of 
experimental balance was counterbalanced. By adding these different phases we 
could also examine if this overall balance would affect individual risk preferences, 
in addition to the effect of immediate gains and losses incurred on that particular 
trial. 
 Each trial varied between 9-13 seconds, jittered (1200 ms ±1000 ms) between 
time-estimation response and the feedback context and the gamble presentation. 
The interstimulus-intervals are relatively short in comparison to other studies 
looking at brain responses reflecting subsequent behaviour. The rationale for 
using these short time-intervals was to ensure that the gain/loss feedback was as 
close in time as possible to the gamble decision, to ensure maximal framing 
impact. Moreover, by using multiple short random jitters, we reduce correlation 
between the different task phases and therefore improve the ability to tease 
these apart. In total, participants played on average 240 experimental trials 
(approximately 60 “no-gamble” trials (range = 42 trials, SD = 7.77) and 180 “gamble” 
trials (range = 24 trials, SD = 7.19). The design contained a nested structure 
including on average a total of 90 gain and 90 loss trials, these gain/loss outcomes 
were presented contingently on the participants’ behaviour. Within each set of 
these 90 trials, we had 30 negative EV, 30 zero EV, 30 positive EV gambles randomly 
presented. Within the 180 total trials 60 occurred with a positive running balance, 
60 with a neutral running balance, and 60 with a negative running balance, 
counterbalanced across participant. The large amount of trials was employed to 
ensure adequate power to examine both play and pass decisions, since we cannot 
control participants’ choice behaviour. The task was presented in Presentation® 
software (Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc., Version 14). After scanning, the 
participants were debriefed. 
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Behavioural analysis
In order to assess the degree of risk-taking following gains and losses respectively, 
we used the percentage of gambles played as the dependent measure. We then 
performed a within-subject repeated measures ANOVA with ‘feedback context’ 
(loss, gain), and ‘running balance’ (positive, neutral, negative) and the ‘gamble 
type’ (+EV, 0EV, -EV) as independent variables. All behavioural analyses were 
performed in SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 19.0.).
fMRI data acquisition and analysis
Imaging was performed at the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging, 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands, using a 3-Tesla head-dedicated MRI system (Magnetom 
TrioTim; Siemens Medical Systems). Functional MRI (fMRI) images were acquired 
using a 32-channel head coil, with a standard multi-echo imaging pulse 
T2*-weighted sequence [field of view (FOV), 224 mm; 64 x 64 matrix; repetition 
time (TR), 2390 ms; echo times (TE), 9.4 ms, 21.2 ms, 33 ms, 45 ms, 56 ms; flip angle, 
90°, 0.5 mm slice gap]. Using a multi-echo sequence provides a better signal- to-
noise ratio for brain areas susceptible to dropout, while allowing for scanning of 
the whole brain (Poser et al., 2006). Thirty-one ascending slices were acquired 
(thickness of 3.0 mm; voxel size 3.5x3.5x3.0 mm) of the whole brain. High-resolution 
anatomical T1-weighted image (MPRAGE; 192 slices; TR 2300 ms, voxel size 1x1x1 
mm) was acquired for anatomical localization. Participants’ heads were lightly 
restrained with tape loosely placed on their head and the coil within the scanner 
in order to limit movement during image acquisition. The task consisted of a 
single run of 60 minutes; a standard high-pass filter (cut-off 128 s) was used 
during the GLM analysis to account for possible slow-frequency drifts. 
 fMRI data analysis was performed using SPM8 (Statistical Parametric 
Mapping; Wellcome Department, London, UK). Prior to preprocessing we combined 
and realigned the five read-outs acquired via the multi-echo sequence by using 
standard procedures described by Poser et al., (2006). Preprocessing consisted of 
realignment, slice-timing to the middle slice, co-registration of the functional 
images to the anatomical images, segmentation of the functional and anatomical 
image, and normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template 
using the segmentation parameters. Functional images were then smoothed 
with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at half maximum (FWHM). The first 30 
volumes, acquired prior to task initiation, were used to estimate the weighted 
echo time per voxel for optimal echo combination (Poser et al., 2006) including 
allowing T1 equilibration effects, and discarded from the analysis. Motion 
parameters were stored and used as nuisance variables, including the quadratic 
effect and second derivatives, in the generalized linear model (GLM) analysis. 
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 For the statistical analyses of the brain data, we performed a GLM for each 
participant consisting of four regressors of interest (1. Gain Play, 2. Gain Pass, 3. Loss 
Play, 4. Loss Pass) that were time-locked to the feedback of the time-estimation task 
(see Figure 1), with ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ referring to the time-estimation outcomes and 
‘play’ and ‘pass’ to the participants’ choice in the risk task. The GLM also included 
the regressors’ temporal derivatives, and the eighteen motion regressors of 
non-interest. We also performed a GLM containing a breakdown of running 
balance (Positive, Neutral, Negative), feedback context (Gain, Loss) and decision 
(Play, Pass), resulting in 12 regressors. This GLM did not yield significant voxels nor 
cluster of voxels by adding the running balance. Moreover, with this analysis 
procedure six out of the 26 participants contained missing data points for the 12 
regressors, resulting in a substantial loss of power. Additionally, the experimental 
running balance did not show a significant effect on behaviour, and all of the 
three gamble type conditions demonstrated similar behavioural effects on 
risk-taking. Therefore, and to maximize sensitivity in subsequent brain analysis, 
we collapsed across three running balance conditions and gamble type conditions 
for fMRI analysis. We performed a full factorial 2x2 analysis at the group-level, 
with Feedback context (loss, gain) as the first factor, and Decision (play or pass on 
gamble) as second factor. All reported coordinates are presented in MNI space.
Results 
Behavioural data
Gambling behaviour following gains and losses
A significant main effect of feedback context (F (1,25) = 6.95, p = 0.01, h2 = 0.22) was 
observed (Figure 2), that is, participants played the gamble significantly more 
after a prior loss (M = 46.2%, SE = 4.7, 95% confidence intervals (CIs) [36.6, 55.8]) 
than after a prior gain (M = 36.6%, SE = 4.3, 95% CIs [27.8, 45.5]).  Participants were 
also sensitive to the expected values of the gambles, where participants decided 
to play the positive EV gamble the most and the negative EV gamble the least (M 
+EV = 62%; M 0EV = 41%; M -EV = 21%; F (1,24) = 23.73, p < .001, h2 = 0.49).  The expected 
value of the gamble did not affect risk preferences differently following gains and 
losses (Feedback context x EV gamble: F (2,24) = 2.44, p = 0.10, h2 = 0.09). 
 The different phases of experimental running balance did not significantly 
affect behaviour (M positive = 40%, M neutral = 40%, M negative = 44%; F (1,24) = 0.88, 
p = 0.40, h2 = 0.03), nor did it interact with the feedback context (F (2,24) = 3.27, p = 0.05, 
h2 = 0.17). In line with the assumption that people evaluate risky choices with respect 
to small changes to their asset position (i.e. an immediate gain or loss), rather 
than their absolute total wealth (i.e. cumulative gains and losses; mental 
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accounting: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) we find that immediate gains or losses 
shift risk preferences. 
Reaction times of decision to play or pass on a gamble following gains and losses
We tested whether type of decision and feedback context affected reaction times 
for decision to play or pass on a gamble, which could imply a difference in difficulty 
in processing the decision depending on the context. A main effect of type of 
decision on reaction times was found, F (1,25) = 5.49, p = 0.027, h2 = 0.18, that is, 
participants who decided to play the gamble took significantly longer in 
confirming their choice than when deciding to pass on the gamble (M Play = 1219 
ms, SD = 332 ms; M Pass = 1129 ms, SD = 306 ms). However, and importantly, there 
is no effect of the gain/loss feedback context on the decision time, F (1,25) = 0.03, 
p = 0.87, h2 = .001, nor is there an interaction between feedback context and 
decision on reaction time, F (1,25) = 0.68, p = 0.42, h2 = 0.03. Hence, the gain/loss 
feedback did not affect the how long participants took to make a decision to play 
or pass the gamble.
Fig. 2  Behavioural results. Mean percentage (estimated marginal mean) of trials in which 
participants chose to play a gamble after a loss (black bar, M = 46.2%, 95% CIs [36.6, 55.8]) 
and after a gain (white bar, M = 36.6%, 95% CIs [27.8, 45.5]), Error bars represent +- SE, ** p = .01.
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fMRI data
Feedback context (Gain and Loss) and Decision (Play or Pass)
We found expected brain response patterns for feedback to gains. Brain regions 
exhibiting increased activity for Gain as opposed to Loss feedback (Gain > Loss) 
were the bilateral dorsal striatum (putamen and caudate), PCC (posterior cingulate 
cortex), superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and activity in the mPFC, areas typically 
associated with reward processing. No suprathreshold voxels were found for Loss > 
Gain (see Figure 3a and Table 2 for details of areas). These analyses were corrected 
for multiple comparisons (p FWE  < 0.05, cluster voxels > 10).
Fig. 3  fMRI activation to Context and Decision. a) Gain feedback > Loss feedback revealed 
stronger activity in the mPFC (-1,49,-5), PCC (-1,-32,38), MFG extending into SFG (-22,32,48), 
and bilateral striatum (-15,11,-8; 13,11,-8), see Table 1 for more details not shown here. There 
were no significant voxels for the context Loss > Gain. b) fMRI activation to Decision: Decision to 
play the gamble > decision to pass on the gamble showed increased dmPFC (6,35,38), ACC 
(10,39,10), AI overlapping IFG (31,25,-5; -33,21,-5), bilateral striatum (-8,7,-1; 10,11,-1), midbrain 
(-5,-28,-5) and visual cortex (27,-70,-8) to be increased. When participants decided to take the 
pass option (i.e. avoid risk) over the decision to play the gamble, an area consisting of the 
lateral parietal lobule / STG (45,-67,27) was increased (not shown here, for more details see 
Table 3). Thresholds are at p FWE < 0.05 with extended threshold of > 10 voxels.
a) Context: Gain > Loss  
b) Decision: Play > Pass  
AI dmPFC  /
ACC 
vmPFC  
Striatum 
AI / IFG 
Y = 28  X = -2  Z= -6  
PCC 
SFG 
Striatum 
Y = 25  X = 7  Z= -4  
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 Comparing the decision to take risk with the decision to avoid risk (the main 
effect of decision, time locked to the feedback of the time-estimation task), we 
found increased activation of IFG extending into AI, and also in dmPFC extending 
into ACC, the striatum, midbrain, thalamus, and visual cortex. When participants 
chose to avoid risk, lateral parietal lobule extending into superior temporal gyrus 
(STG) (Brodmann area 39) showed increased activation (both at p FWE <0.05, cluster 
voxels > 10) (See Figure 3b, Table 3 for details of areas).
Context-dependent risky decision-making
To test how the observed preference shift towards risky choices in loss as compared 
to gain contexts is instantiated in the brain, we tested for an interaction between 
Feedback context (Gain, Loss) x Decision (Play, Pass): (contrast Gain Pass + Loss Play) 
– (contrast Gain Play + Loss Pass). The interaction revealed increased activity 
specifically in the ventral parts of the mPFC (cluster corrected on whole-brain for 
multiple comparisons, p FWE  < 0.05, with prior threshold of Z > 3.21, see Figure 4a 
and Table 4). This area is particularly active when individuals receive a gain and 
subsequently decide to choose the option to pass, as well as when they decide to 
play the gamble after receipt of a loss. We did not find any significant voxels that 
reflect to gain and loss feedback preceding the opposite behavioural performance: 
(Gain Play + Loss Pass) - (Gain Pass + Loss Play). 
 Beta values for each individual participant, extracted from the vmPFC cluster 
for each main regressor (Feedback context by Decision), showed an opposing 
response of the vmPFC for risk-taking following gains and losses respectively: 
Table 2  Brain activations for Context (Gain, Loss)
Anatomy Hemisphere MNI Clustersize Z
 L/R x y z [voxels]  
Gain > Loss
Putamen L -15 11 -8 149   Inf
Putamen R 13 11 -8 166   Inf
PCC L -1 -32 38 53 5.68
MFG L -1 49 -5 90 5.27
Middle Frontal Gyrus L -22 32 48 53 5.18
IPL / Precuneus L -47 -60 41 81 5.09
Loss > Gain
No suprathreshold voxels       
Note: Regions listed exceeded threshold of p < 0.05, family-wise corrected, with at least 10 contiguous 
voxels. Z-values for each peak are given. Abbreviations: L, left; R, right; Inf, Infinite; ACC, anterior 
cingulate cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; MFG, medial frontal gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus.
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relatively high vmPFC responses following gains were associated with subsequent 
safe choices (i.e. pass on the gamble), while relatively high vmPFC responses 
following losses were associated with subsequent risk-taking (see Figure 4b). 
Within the gain context, vmPFC activity significantly differed for Decision, with 
higher values for pass as compared to play (t (25) = 3.34, p = .003). For the loss 
context this pattern was reversed, showing higher values for play as compared to 
pass (t (25) = 2.54, p = 0.018). Activity for the decision to pass was significantly 
higher in the gain context then in the loss context (t (25) = 5.43, p < .001), with no 
significant differences in vmPFC response for the decision to play between the 
gain and loss contexts (t (25) = 0.71, p = 0.487) (see Figure 4b). To test whether 
observed differences in vmPFC activation truly resulted from differential 
processing of gain/loss information, without contamination from activity related 
to the subsequent choice, we performed a time-course analysis. Figure 4c 
illustrates the mean time course of the vmPFC cluster extracted from the 
interaction contrast for the four main regressors. For each participant, we ran a 
Table 3  Brain activations for subsequent Decision (Play, Pass)
Anatomy Hemisphere MNI Clustersize Z
 L/R x y z [voxels]  
Play > Pass
Fusiform gyrus R 27 -70 -8 1244 7.53
IFG / anterior Insula R 31 25 -5 52 6.35
IFG / anterior Insula L -33 21 -5 27 5.67
Globus Pallidus L -8 7 -1 34 5.61
Caudate R 10 11 -1 29 5.38
Midbrain / Thalamus L -5 -28 -5 35 5.11
IFG / dlPFC L -40 7 24 13 5.04
Superior Parietal Lobule L -29 -53 48 12 4.98
dmPFC / ACC R 6 35 38 15 4.9
ACC R 10 39 10 10 4.83
Pass > Play
LPL /  STG R 45 -67 27 44 5.58
Lateral Occipital Cortex L -43 -77 31 10 5.11
Note: Regions listed exceeded threshold of p < 0.05, family-wise corrected, with at least 10 contiguous 
voxels. Z-values for each peak are given. Abbreviations: L, left; R, right; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; 
dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; dmPFC, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; 
IPL, inferior parietal lobule; MFG, medial frontal gyrus; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; LPL, lateral 
parietal lobe ; SFG, superior frontal gyrus.
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Fig. 4  a) fMRI activation maps of the interaction contrast Context x Decision [(Loss Play + 
Gain Pass) - (Loss Pass + Gain Play)]. The activation patterns show a cluster of vmPFC (sgACC 
extending into mPFC (-8,35,-1)) activity correlating to subjects’ behavioural tendency to 
choose to play the gamble after they have experienced a small loss, and to pass on the 
gamble when they have experienced a small gain. Cluster-level p FWE < 0.05 on whole-brain, 
with extended threshold > 100 voxels at Z>3.21. b) Parameter estimates (beta values) of 
vmPFC for context (Gain, Loss) by decision (Play, Pass). c) Time series of the vmPFC of each 
regressor from the interaction contrast. The time courses were estimated with the finite 
impulse response model from the onset of the delivery of the gain/loss feedback, for a 
length of 24s. A significant difference between gain and loss feedback and the decision to 
play and pass on the gamble is shown from timebin 2 (~2.4 s after feedback onset). See Table 
5 for detailed statistics. Error bars show ± SE.
b) Parameter estimates (beta values) vmPFC  a) Context (Gain, Loss) x Decision (Play, Pass)  
X = -7  
c) Time course vmPFC   
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single finite impulse response (FIR) time course model on the vmPFC for a length 
of 24 seconds, creating 10 time bins each with a length of one TR (2.39 s). This 
analysis showed that vmPFC responses following gains and losses differed 
between decisions to play or pass already within one TR after the feedback onset 
(Between Play-Pass: tbin2 (25)  = -4.429, p < .001 following the gains, and tbin2 (25) = 
2.046, p = 0.051 following losses, between Gain-Loss for decision to Pass: tbin2 (25) = 
3.525 p = .002, and for decision to Play: tbin2 (25)  = -0.243, p = 0.810), indicating that 
it is the differential processing of gains and losses that drives subsequent choices 
(also see Figure. 4c and Table 5).1
 The processing of gains and losses could of course potentially be affected by 
the outcome of the gamble. To investigate this, we ran a separate GLM to analyse 
the BOLD response to feedback processing based on the outcome of the gamble. 
This GLM contained the regressors for Feedback context (gain, loss) by Gamble 
outcome (won, lost) time-locked to the feedback context onset. This GLM also 
included a regressor for the Gamble outcome (won gamble, lost gamble, no gamble) 
time-locked to the gamble onset, and 18 realignment parameters of non-interest. 
This analysis showed no significant differences in gain and loss processing related 
to the outcome of the gamble. Furthermore, we also investigated whether the 
BOLD response of the vmPFC observed for the interaction contrast (feedback 
context by decision) could reflect the signal of the event preceding the receipt of 
the gain and loss outcome (i.e. white dice cue). We ran an additional GLM 
analyzing the BOLD response to the onset of the white dice cue based on 
interaction contrast feedback context by decision. The interaction did not reveal 
any significant voxels or cluster of voxels at the onset of the white dice cue. 
1 The FIR model estimates an average effect of the vmPFC seed region, at the time of the onset of the 
feedback onset. The model assumes that overlapping hemodynamic response functions linearly add up. 
Therefore, the current time course can contain some activity related to the onset of the decision event, 
because of the short interstimulus-interval. However, in addition there is a trial-by-trial short, however ran-
domly jittered interval in between the feedback context and decision event, the time-course would mostly 
reflect the pattern of the vmPFC response towards the onset of the feedback outcome.
Table 4   Brain activations for the interaction Feedback Context (Gain, Loss) x 
Decision (Play, Pass)
Anatomy Hemisphere MNI Cluster size
L/R x y z [voxels]
vmPFC/sgACC L -8 35 -1 226
Note: Regions listed exceeded threshold of p < 0.05, family-wise corrected on cluster-correction of 
whole-brain, with at least 100 contiguous voxels. Abbreviations: L, left; sgACC, subgenual anterior 
cingulate cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
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Hence, the results show that the vmPFC is associated with context-dependent 
risky  decision-making, broadly following the observed behavioural choices. 
Discussion 
The current study identified brain mechanisms that are engaged in the evaluation 
of monetary gains and losses, showing that these areas are associated with 
patterns of risk preference, even though these choice patterns are inconsistent 
with classical economic models of decision-making. Exploring the brain 
mechanisms that underlie how gain/loss contexts can lead to a switch between 
risky or safe choices when presented with the same gamble can provide useful 
insights into how valuation processes can exert a strong effect on our evaluation 
of risk, and in turn on the likelihood of players to select risky or safe choice options. 
 Here, we showed that participants’ risk attitudes for identical mixed (50-50, 
gain-loss) gambles were significantly affected by the receipt of either a small 
monetary gain or a loss immediately prior to the risky decision itself. Interestingly, 
and importantly for theories of economic preference, this effect was evident even 
within subjects, with our participants displaying inconsistent risk patterns, for 
the identical sets of gambles, across the entire span of the experiment. As 
expected, and in line with previous literature on preference shifts for risk (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1979, 1981, 1992; De Martino et al., 2006; Tom et al.,, 2007; Xue et 
al.,, 2011), participants who had experienced a gain typically decided to 
subsequently choose the safer option (i.e. passing on the gamble), thereby showing 
an aversion to risk. In contrast, when participants had just experienced a loss they 
showed a shift in preference towards the risky gamble, now exhibiting increased 
risk-seeking tendencies as compared to when gains preceded the choice. 
Additionally, these effects were observed using real, consequential choices, where 
decisions were paid out at the conclusion of the experiment, in contrast to other 
studies that have used either hypothetical rewards (Gonzalez et al., 2005) or 
chosen one trial at random for payment (Venkatraman et al., 2009; Porcelli & 
Delgado, 2009; Christopoulos et al., 2009 (exp. 2); Sokol-Hesner et al., 2012a 
(selecting 10 random trials)). In the current study the context induced by the 
time-estimation feedback is a monetary gain or loss and always associated with 
either successful or unsuccessful performance on the task. 
 In terms of brain activation, we found significant reward-related activity for 
gains as compared to losses in bilateral dorsal striatum, mPFC, SFG, and precuneus. 
These areas are consistent with those previously found for reward-related activity 
(Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2003; Tom et al., 2007). We did 
not find any significant differences in BOLD response for losses as compared to 
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gains at this time point. Previous studies have reported increased activity in areas 
such as AI, amygdala, ACC, and lOFC while evaluating losses, implicated as a 
function of negative stimulus aversion, error detection, or loss aversion (Breiter et 
al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2003), though these activations are not always observed 
(Seymour et al., 2007) and have even shown to overlap to some extent with the 
receipt of rewards as well as of punishments (Bartra et al., 2013). 
 Also in accordance with previous work, a significant main effect in the BOLD 
response for the choice to play as opposed to pass on the gamble was observed in 
the dmPFC/ACC, AI overlapping IFG, IPS, caudate, and thalamus. A large number 
of studies have reported activity in these areas correlating with risk-taking 
behaviour (e.g. Paulus et al., 2003; see Mohr et al., 2010 for overview). Conversely, 
when participants chose to pass on the gamble, hence avoiding subsequent risk, 
increased activity of the lateral parietal lobule and STG (BA 39) was observed. 
These areas have been previously associated with promoting safe behaviour over 
risk-taking, and have been reported when selecting a safe over a risky option 
(Matthews et al., 2004). 
 The primary goal of the study was to determine how the evaluation of prior 
gains and losses may affect preferences for risk, as has been shown behaviourally, 
by studying the underlying neural mechanisms associated with the evaluation 
and integration of gain and loss information which in turn can potentially predict 
risk preferences. We hypothesized that when experiencing gains and losses we 
engage in value-computation and integration of these appraisals, and when a 
subsequent gamble is offered these processes have a differential impact on 
preferences for risk.
 Supporting this hypothesis, we found a strongly significant interaction between 
the monetary outcome of the previous - unrelated - time-estimation task (i.e. gain 
or loss) and the subsequent decision to play or pass on the gamble in the risky 
decision task. This interaction was associated with enhanced activation in the 
ventral part of mPFC. This vmPFC region responded more strongly when individuals 
experienced a €1.20 gain prior to selecting a safe option (i.e. passing on the gamble 
and accepting the current state) as compared to selecting a risky option (i.e. 
playing a mixed “double-or-quits” gamble). Conversely, the same area responded 
more strongly at the time individuals experienced a €1.20 loss, though only when 
they then decided to select the risky option as compared to selecting the safe 
option. Importantly, this interaction was found within-subjects for identical sets 
of choices, that is, when the gambles comprised of the same probabilities and 
outcomes, and was in line with the observed decision behaviour; choosing the safe 
option to retain the gain, and choosing to play the gamble to compensate for the 
loss. These results therefore suggest that the same area that has previously been 
shown to be important for encoding value, regulation, and control of affect and 
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guidance of subsequent choice behaviour (Urry et al., 2006; Koenigs & Tranel, 
2007; Hare et al., 2009; Rushworth et al., 2011; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012a; 
Rosenbloom et al., 2012) is also associated with preference for either taking or 
avoiding risk depending on the current context. 
 A plausible explanation for these findings is that the vmPFC functions in a 
regulatory capacity, providing a mechanism to allow for adaptive decision- 
making behaviour as a function of the current (monetary) context, that is, one of gain 
or loss. Greater contribution of the vmPFC when experiencing a gain stimulated 
safer subsequent behaviour, suggesting an inhibition of the temptation to gamble, 
hence ‘locking-in’ the current gain. When experiencing a loss, the contribution of 
the same area switches, and now greater activation stimulates riskier behaviour, 
potentially as a means to attempt to recover from the prior loss and break-even on 
the trial. The vmPFC seems thus to respond differently as a function of whether 
the current context is one of immediate gains or losses, consistent with its role in 
value encoding. In other words, these results suggest that vmPFC may not be 
solely tracking and evaluating how desirable a current outcome and subsequent 
risky choice is, but rather that it may be executing a more complex function: 
assessing the specific choice response (play or pass behaviour) that seems most 
adaptive given the particular situation. By “adaptive” here we refer to the ability 
of individuals to flexibly adapt their preferences in order to obtain a particular 
outcome that is most valued at the given time, and which is reflected in their 
decision behaviour itself. 
 An alternative explanation for the current findings is that when vmPFC 
responds more strongly towards the gain or loss, in a positive and negative way 
respectively, then safer rather than risky behaviour is more valued. When the 
vmPFC response for the same gain or loss is relatively weak, risky behaviour 
follows. This explanation would suggest that the vmPFC may engage control or 
regulatory strategies that inhibit risk-taking, and when this control is absent then 
there is the temptation to gamble. However, brain activity observed at the cue 
preceding the feedback does not seem to support this explanation, as these results 
did not reveal overlapping significant voxels with the observed clusters for the 
feedback processing, nor did it reveal significant voxels of regions associated with 
affective nor cognitive control. Previous research has implicated the dlPFC in 
reflecting flexibly adaptive behaviour, via a strong indirect coupling with the 
vmPFC (Hare et al., 2009; Christopoulos et al., 2009). The dlPFC, implicated in 
self-control and impulsivity, indirectly modulates the vmPFC value signal to 
guide goal-directed behaviour (Hare et al., 2009). The relatively weak valuation 
signal of the vmPFC prior to the decision to play the gamble may be a result of a 
lack of self-control and therefore modulation by the dlPFC on the value signal of 
the vmPFC, resulting in choosing to play the gamble. It would be interesting to 
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examine how self-control may interact with gain/loss contexts for risky choice 
sets in guiding risky choice. 
 The current results extend our knowledge of vmPFC functioning in decision- 
making, supporting previous work suggesting this area is involved in several 
processes in addition to pure value computation. For example, this area has been 
shown to be active during emotion regulation and extinction to aversive stimuli 
(Phelps, Delgado, Nearing & LeDoux, 2004; Urry et al., 2006). Other studies have 
also reported a role of the ventral parts of the forebrain in behavioural and 
affective control (O’Doherty et al., 2003; Di Pellegrino et al., 2007; Etkin, Egner, 
Peraza, Kandel & Hirsch, 2006; Etkin, Egner & Kalisch, 2011; Roy, Shohamy & 
Wager, 2012). Additionally, lesion studies have shown that patients with vmPFC 
damage were unable to evaluate and integrate so-called ‘somatic markers’, 
hypothesized to be an affective response to aversive stimuli, when attempting to 
choose from advantageous and disadvantageous options when playing the Iowa 
gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994). In other studies, vmPFC patients showed 
increased risk-taking following losses, a behaviour which they were unable to 
inhibit (Sanfey et al., 2003; Shiv et al., 2005), and an insensitivity to differences in 
expected value between choices of gains and losses (Weller et al., 2007; Clark et 
al., 2008). The above studies support an important role of the vmPFC in integrating 
contextual appraisals (gain or loss) and linking this to specific patterns of 
behaviour and autonomic responses (Rosenbloom et al., 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 
2012b). 
 In short, we show here that risk-taking behaviour is strongly modulated by 
the gain or loss context of the decision. This modulation has its neural basis in the 
vmPFC, which appears to integrate and represent the contextual value of a 
stimulus in light of subsequent choice in order to adaptively guide the decision- 
making process for risky prospects. That is, vmPFC activation supported safe 
behaviour after a monetary gain, and risky behaviour following a monetary loss. 
How the integration of decision context (i.e. gain and loss) by the vmPFC may vary 
by different expected values of gambles is still an interesting open question for 
understanding the adaptive role of the vmPFC in combining the different values 
in guiding risk behaviour. The current design does not allow us to disentangle 
whether the behavioural effects are driven more by the receipt of monetary 
gains/losses or by performance-based success/failure independent of monetary 
reward. For future studies, it would be interesting to test whether the behavioural 
effects are specific for performance feedback or for the receipt of monetary reward. 
 In conclusion, our study extends the existing literature by examining the 
specific brain networks involved in risky decision-making involving gains and 
losses. At the same time it emphasizes the importance of disentangling the 
different phases of the decision-making process. Finally, our study demonstrates 
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that choice cannot be studied in isolation, but that the broader context the choice 
is placed in has an important role to play. 
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Abstract
Generally people avoid gambles with mixed outcomes due to loss aversion. 
In fact, preferences for risky choices have been well established as unstable and 
context-dependent. It has been demonstrated that gain/loss outcomes influence 
subsequent risk preferences. That is, people typically prefer risky options after a 
financial loss, while generally preferring safer options after a monetary gain. 
However, these gain/loss outcomes can be confounded by participants’ 
performance, and therefore it is unclear whether these effects are purely driven 
by monetary gains/losses, or rather by success or failure at the task. In this study 
we therefore separated monetary gains/losses from performance success/failure 
prior to a risky choice. Participants performed a task in which they experienced 
different types of contexts: 1) monetary gain or loss received based on participants’ 
performance, 2) a pure monetary gain or loss that was randomly rewarded, and 
crucially independent from performance, and 3) success or failure feedback based on 
the participants’ performance, but without any monetary incentive. Immediately 
following a positive/negative context, participants decided to either play or pass 
on a monetary gain-loss gamble. If played, outcome of the gamble would be 
presented and added to the participants running balance. If decided to pass on, 
nothing would happen. We found that risk preferences for identical sets of 
gambles were biased by positive and negative contexts containing monetary 
gains and losses, but not by contexts containing performance feedback 
independent of monetary feedback. This data suggests that the observed framing 
effects are driven by aversion for monetary losses and not simply by the valence 
of the context. Furthermore, the lack of framing following pure performance 
feedback suggests that positive or negative moods do not underlie framing 
effects. These results highlight the specific context dependency of risk preferences. 
Based on: Losecaat Vermeer, A. B. & Sanfey, A. G. (under revision). The effect of 
positive and negative feedback on risk-taking across different contexts.
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Introduction
We often make decisions that entail some level of uncertainty about what the 
final outcome will be. For example, choosing which restaurant to pick for dinner, 
deciding to place a bet on who will win the World Cup, or whether to go on a blind 
date. It has been found that in general people dislike risky or uncertain outcomes 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992). For example, when offered a choice between a 
certain €10, or to play a gamble to win either €20 or €0 with equal probabilities, 
the vast majority of people choose the certain €10 option. In fact, our preferences 
for risky choices have been well established as unstable and context-dependent. 
Whether or not we place a large bet to win the World Cup pool may depend on 
whether we have just won or lost money, even though the current bet is 
independent of this previous outcome. Similar behavioural effects have been 
observed in many everyday scenarios, such as in trading (Brown et al., 1996), 
betting at racetracks (Hausch et al., 1981), health decisions (Levin et al., 2002), as 
well as with clinical populations (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008). 
 Research has shown that choices between relatively risky and relatively safe 
options made immediately after experiencing a financial loss, typically lead to a 
higher preference for the riskier options (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Barkan & 
Busemeyer, 2003; Xue et al., 2011; Hytönen et al., 2014). For example, one study 
(Xue et al., 2011) showed that deciding to either play or pass on a gamble was 
influenced by the outcome of prior gambles. Participants decided to play the 
gamble more often following a loss on the previous gamble trial as compared to a 
win beforehand. In a prior study by our group (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014) we 
found individuals’ risk preference to be sensitive to a preceding monetary gain 
and loss outcome. These gain and loss outcomes were based on correct or incorrect 
performance respectively on a time-estimation task. Importantly, these perfor-
mance-based monetary gain/loss outcomes were unrelated and independent of 
subsequent gambles. Immediately following these gain/loss outcomes, 
individuals decided to play or pass on a 50-50 mixed (gain-loss) gamble. We found 
that individuals chose the gamble more often after receiving the perfor-
mance-based monetary loss than after receiving a performance-based monetary 
gain. In other words, outcomes independent of the decision at hand (e.g. recent 
gains or losses) can influence risk preferences in determining our choices. 
 In the aforementioned studies, shifts in risk preferences following monetary 
gain and loss contexts were also related to the outcome of players’ actions. In 
other words, outcomes were based on either the individuals’ decision to play a 
gamble previously (Barkan & Busemeyer, 2003; Xue et al., 2011), or were based on 
the individuals’ actual performance on an unrelated task (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 
2014). Hence, the observed behavioural effects on gambling behaviour following 
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gain/loss outcomes could be related to either the monetary outcomes or to the 
performance measures themselves (i.e. whether the task was a success or a 
failure). In the current study, we aimed to clarify whether gain/loss context 
effects are driven by monetary feedback or by performance-based feedback.
 Pure monetary gain and loss outcomes have previously been shown to affect 
risk preferences for gambles. The susceptibility to pure monetary gains and losses 
have been most strongly observed for mixed gambles, that is, those offering a 
chance to both win and lose money, such as a 50/50 chance to either gain €50 or 
lose €50. People typically choose to avoid playing such gambles, even when the 
expected value is equal to or even higher than the option to not play the gamble. 
This behaviour has been explained by the concept of loss aversion of Prospect 
Theory (i.e. peoples’ greater sensitivity to losses than to gains of equivalent value) 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1992). This also holds for choice 
outcomes that have been framed as either gains or losses of equal expected values. 
For example, given a choice between keeping €20 out of a €50 for certain, or a 
gamble with an opportunity of keeping the total €50 or instead keeping nothing 
(i.e. gain frame), people prefer the certain €20. Conversely, when offered a choice 
between accepting a loss of €30 out of a €50, or gambling with a risk of losing the 
total €50 or losing nothing (i.e. loss frame), people tend to prefer the gamble 
(framing effect, Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Thus, pure monetary gains and 
losses affect risk preferences. However, whether pure monetary gains/losses 
independent of active choice affect risk preferences in a similar direction is 
unclear. 
 Evaluation of rewards and punishments, or performance-based success and 
failure, usually informs us whether to continue or adapt behavioural strategies 
(Barto & Sutton, 1997). It is to date less clear whether performance feedback per se 
influences subsequent risk in a similar direction as pure monetary feedback. 
Earlier functional neuroimaging findings suggest that performance-based 
feedback might recruit similar processes to monetary feedback. For example, 
positive performance feedback has been found to induce appetitive motivational 
behaviour similar to monetary rewards (Daniel & Pollmann, 2014; Delgado, 
Stenger & Fiez, 2004), with the latter shown to be also associated with financial 
risk-taking (Knutson et al., 2001; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). Negative feedback (i.e. 
errors or failures in performance) has been found to recruit brain structures also 
related to the salience and avoidance of aversive outcomes and fear (Carter et al., 
1998; Breiter et al., 2001; Shackman et al., 2011; Tom et al., 2007). These studies 
suggest that different types of contexts might be based on the same psychological 
processes. However, it is unknown whether these effects extend to choice 
outcomes occurring in a different context, for instance, whether successful 
performance can enhance subsequent risk-taking by reinforcing reward-seeking, 
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or whether failure feedback would signal avoidance of bad outcomes in the 
context of monetary losses. 
 There are a few studies that have demonstrated preference shifts for financial 
risk following unrelated, non-financial, outcomes (Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen & 
Winkielman, 2008; Stanton & Reeck, 2014). For instance, incidental mood, induced 
via affective stimuli, has shown to influence risk preferences for mixed gambles 
(Knutson et al., 2008), as well as enhance monetary framing effects (Stanton & 
Reeck, 2014). Positive arousing stimuli (i.e. erotic pictures), unrelated to the task at 
hand, increased participants’ preference for a high risk option, but the effect was 
not observed following display of neutral (i.e. household appliances), or negative 
pictures (i.e. snakes or spiders) (Knutson et al., 2008). Similar behavioural results 
were found for framing effects involving monetary gains or losses, with 
accentuated framing effects found following positive film clips (i.e. inducing 
happiness) as compared to negative film clips (i.e. inducing sadness). These studies 
indicate that preference shifts for monetary risk are highly context-dependent 
and can be influenced by loss aversion, but also by mood effects. Performance- 
based feedback prior, but unrelated, to the choice might affect risk preferences in 
a similar vein as these unrelated, non-financial, outcomes.
 The current study directly compares performance and monetary contexts 
prior to, and independent of, identical mixed gambles. The aim of this study is 
to examine whether context-dependent preference shifts that were observed 
for mixed gambles following performance-based monetary rewards and 
punishments (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014), are purely driven by the receipt of 
monetary gains/losses, or rather by performance-based success/failure feedback, 
independent of monetary reward. This will provide a more thorough under- 
standing of how risk preferences may be altered by different, unrelated, contexts, 
and specifically gain a better idea of the possible role of loss aversion underlying 
each type of context. To examine this question, participants were presented with 
identical sets of mixed gambles following different types of positive and negative 
feedback. We investigated three different types of contexts: 1) monetary gain or 
loss based on participants’ performance, as in our previous study (Losecaat 
Vermeer et al., 2014), 2) a pure monetary gain or loss that was randomly distributed, 
and crucially, was independent of performance, and 3) success or failure feedback 
based on the participants’ performance, but without any monetary consequence. 
Immediately following each of the aforementioned context types, participants 
decided to either play or pass on a mixed gamble, offering a monetary gain with a 
probability of 0.5, and a monetary loss with a probability of 0.5. If they chose to 
play, the outcome of the gamble would be presented and added to the participants 
running balance. If they decided to pass on the gamble, the next trial would 
immediately begin. 
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 Based on prior work (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014), we expected performance- 
based monetary gains/losses to influence risk preferences, that is, increased 
risk-taking following a monetary loss, and decreased risk-taking following a 
monetary gain. Based on loss aversion, we hypothesized that individuals also 
increase risk-taking, after receiving randomly distributed losses versus gains. 
However, we expected that the behavioural effect observed for performance-based 
gain/loss outcomes might be even stronger than after incidental monetary gain/
loss outcomes. Monetary gains/losses that are earned (by performance) might 
enhance the sensitivity to losses (i.e. endowment effect; Thaler et al., 1980) as 
compared to incidentally receiving monetary gains/losses. Furthermore, we 
explored whether performance success and failure feedback influences risk 
preferences for monetary gambles. We speculate that if performance feedback 
does not affect risk preferences differently, then the observed framing effects in 
the previous study are purely driven by monetary gains/losses, and not, or less, by 
unrelated contexts, such as mood effects potentially induced by successful or 
unsuccessful performance (Henkel and Hinsz, 2004). 
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 75 undergraduate students participated in the study. All gave written 
informed consent and either received research credits for participation or were 
financially compensated via a flat fee (10 Euro) for completion of the task. They 
also had the opportunity to win a bonus in addition to the participation fee, up to 
a maximum amount of 10 Euro. Exclusion criteria were self-reported regular drug 
use of marijuana, or use of psychotropic drugs. Three participants were excluded 
as they did not respond to a substantial number of trials (>20%). Data is therefore 
reported from 72 participants (Men = 21, M = 21.86 years, SD = 3.46). The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee. 
Task design and procedure
We adapted a previous paradigm (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014) in order to study 
risk-taking behaviour in the context of prior rewards and punishments of 
different types. The task contained three different experimental trial type 
conditions; monetary trials, performance trials, and combined performance/
monetary trials. 
 Each of these trials was designed to induce either a positive (reward) or 
negative (punishment) context. In the monetary trials, either a positive (+€1.20) or 
negative (-€1.20) monetary amount was randomly awarded on each trial. In the 
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performance trials, participants were told they had either successfully or 
unsuccessfully completed a simple task. And finally, in the combined trials, 
participants saw both performance feedback as well as monetary feedback, with 
successful performance accompanied by a monetary reward (+€1.20) and failure 
accompanied by a monetary punishment (-€1.20).
 In the monetary condition, each trial began with a pair of dice displayed on 
the screen. Based on the total sum of the dots visible on the dice, participants 
would either win or lose €1.20. If the total sum of dots was between 7-12 participants 
would win €1.20, however, if the total sum of dots was 2-6 they would lose €1.20. 
The total sum of dots on the dice was presented randomly on each trial, to ensure 
approximately 50% wins and 50% losses.
 In the performance condition, each trial began with a time-estimation task in 
which participants received feedback based on their ability to successfully 
estimate a time duration of a second, adapted from a previous paradigm (Losecaat 
Vermeer et al., 2014). Each trial began with a pair of red dice that changed colour 
to white. When the dice turned white, participants were then required to respond 
exactly one second later by pressing a key. If they responded within an allowable 
window then the trial was a success, otherwise it was a failure. The purpose of 
the task performance trials was to induce either a positive or negative context, 
that is one purely based on performance and not monetary reward, to enable a 
test of whether subsequent shifts in risk behaviour are driven by task perfor-
mance-related success or failure. 
  In the combined trial type condition, we used the same paradigm that was 
for the performance condition, with the addition of monetary feedback. That is, if 
the time-estimation task was successfully performed participants additionally 
received a monetary reward and if unsuccessful on the time-estimation task then 
participants took a monetary loss, identical to the original paradigm (Losecaat 
Vermeer et al., 2014). 
In all the three trial type conditions, immediately following the positive and 
negative feedback contexts described above, participants then were shown a 
mixed (50/50 chance, gain/loss) gamble (see Figure 1), which they could decide to 
either play or pass. If they decided to pass on the gamble the trial immediately 
ended. However, if they decided to play, the gamble was resolved and the 
corresponding win or loss amount was added to their total experimental balance. 
Participants did not see this running balance until the end of the experiment, and 
had been informed that they would be paid this balance (if positive) as a bonus. 
 The mixed gamble contained either a positive expected value (‘+ EV’), a 
negative expected value (‘- EV’), or a zero expected value (‘0 EV’) by varying the 
gain or loss outcome from €1.00, €1.20, to €1.40 as compared to the ‘pass’ option (i.e. 
choosing to keep the €1.20 gain or loss) (see Table 1). We created these three 
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different gamble types to assess whether participants were attending to, and 
sensitive of, the expected value of the gamble.  
In addition, we included a control trial, which served to measure participants’ 
baseline risk level. Each control trial began with a pair of blue dice that changed 
colour to white. Participants were required to watch these cues and not respond, 
similar to the monetary condition. However, participants did not receive any 
feedback following these cues. After the presentation of the white cue, participants 
received a mixed gamble which they could decide to either play or pass, identical 
to the other three conditions as described above (Figure 1).  
Procedure
Participants first performed two short practice sessions. In the first session 
participants practiced the time-estimation trial. Here, participants were required 
to estimate a one-second time duration. After a cue on the screen changed in 
colour, they were instructed to wait exactly one second and then press a response 
button, with their precise response times recorded. We used the minimum and 
maximum of these recorded response times to determine an initial allowable 
response time-window for the performance-based trials in the experiment. The 
second practice session gave participants the opportunity to observe the gambling 
task and experience the different trial type conditions. After these practice 
sessions, the experiment lasted for approximately 30 min including a short break 
halfway through the task.  
 Before beginning the task, participants were instructed that their goal was 
to win as much money as possible, and that their final balance would be paid out 
as a bonus (with a maximum amount of €10) in addition to their participation 
fee (a flat fee of €10, or participation credits) for completion of the task. Hence, 
participants’ total payment at the end of the experiment would range between 
€0 and €10 if they participated for credits, and between €10 and €20 if they 
Table 1  Mixed gambles by expected value (EV) and EV type .a 
50|50 mixed gamble Expected value (EV) Gamble type
- €1.40  | + €1.20 -0.10 - EV
- €1.20  | + €1.00 -0.10 - EV
- €1.20  | + €1.20 0 0 EV
- €1.00  | + €1.20 0.10 + EV
- €1.20  | + €1.40 0.10 + EV
a All gambles contained of a 50-50 probability to lose-win money
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participated for money. At the start of each trial, participants saw a visual cue 
with the instruction to either “Watch” or “Play”. When it said “Watch”, participants 
were required to just watch the screen and see the cue change to either a different 
colour (control trial), or to a pair of dice (money trial). Depending on the total sum 
of dots on the dice, participants won or lost money (see task design). When the 
trial said “Play” participants were required to perform a time-estimation task, 
that is, they had to press a response button exactly one second after a red cue 
Fig. 1  Task design, showing Play and Watch trials. Each picture represents a screen in the 
experiment. A) The combined monetary and performance (MP) trial; Trial began with a 
time-estimation task, where participants were required to press a button exactly 1 s after 
the red dice changed in colour to white. Feedback on performance was given as “Correct” 
with a monetary gain of €1.20, and if incorrect as “Too fast” or “Too slow” with a loss of €1.20, 
B) The performance (P) trial; Trial structure was the same as A. However, only success and 
failure feedback on performance was given, as “Correct” and if incorrect as “Too fast” or 
“Too slow”, C) The monetary (M) trial; Trial began with a white cue that changed to a pair of 
dice. Participants only had to passively watch, as instructed on top of the screen. They were 
instructed that if the total sum of dots on the dice was higher than 6, participants gained 
€1.20, if the total sum of dots was 6 or less, the participant lost €1.20, D) Control trial; Trial 
began with a blue cue that changed in colour to white. Participants only had to passively 
watch, as instructed on top of the screen, no feedback or incentive was given. For all trial 
types, immediately following feedback or no feedback (i.e. D), participants had the 
opportunity to choose to play or pass on a mixed gamble with a 50/50 chance to either gain 
or lose money. If participants decided to gamble, the gamble was played and the outcome 
was presented. Average duration of a trial is 9-13 s.
Watch Watch 
Watch Watch 
Play Play 
Play Play 
Too fast 
Play 
Too fast 
- €1.20  
Play 
Watch 
Watch 
YES  Do you want to gamble?  NO 
- +
+ €1.20
+ €1.20   
Feedback Decision 
(play/pass) 
Outcome 
A 
B 
C 
D 
[1200 ms]  [2000 ms]  [1000 ms]  [max 5000 ms]      [1000 - 2000 ms]  
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changed colour to white (Figure 1). Responses on this time-estimation task were 
considered correct when they were within an allowable time-interval. For correct 
responses, participants received positive feedback either in the form of “correct” 
(task performance trial) or in the form of “correct” including a gain of €1.20 
(combined trial). When a response was not within this time-interval, participants 
either received negative feedback as “too fast” or “too slow” (task performance 
trial), or received the same negative feedback with an additional loss of €1.20 
(combined trial). 
 The allowable response-interval of these “Play” trials was initially calculated 
based on their performance in the practice run and then covertly adjusted 
throughout the task as a function of the variance in response time of the 
participant, in order to ensure an equal number of positive and negative feedback 
on this task. Therefore, if participants responded within the allowable response-in-
terval, this interval was subsequently shortened by 50 ms; if they responded 
either too quickly or too slowly, the interval was then lengthened by 50 ms. 
Importantly, although the amount of positive and negative feedback was 
manipulated, the feedback was contingent upon participants’ performance. Thus, 
the time-interval was adjusted individually based on the participant’s actual 
response behaviour (see Boksem et al., 2011). 
 Immediately following the feedback on both the “Watch” and “Play” trials, 
participants could choose to either play or pass on a mixed (50/50 chance, gain/
loss) gamble. Playing the gamble led to two possible outcomes: 1) A win outcome 
which added €1.00, €1.20 or €1.40 to their overall experimental balance, or 2) a loss 
outcome which subtracted €1.00, €1.20 or €1.40 from this balance, depending on 
the type of gamble offered (see Table 1). Alternatively, the participant could decide 
to pass on the gamble, thereby keeping the earlier monetary gain or loss (i.e. +/- 
€1.20) in case of the money and combined trials. The gamble outcomes were 
independent from the performance on the time-estimation task and the outcome 
of the money trials. All gamble outcomes (both gains and losses) immediately 
updated the total running balance for each participant. 
 In addition to the four trial types discussed, 12.5% of the total trials were 
“no-gamble” Play trials. In these trials, participants were not presented with a 
gamble after receiving feedback on the time-estimation trial. The time-estima-
tion feedback was only performance-based or in combination with a gain or loss 
of money. The no-gamble trials were indicated in advance by a specific visual cue 
(cubes instead of dice), and were employed to potentially prevent participants 
using a fixed strategy, e.g. always or never gambling, and to enhance engagement 
in the gamble trials. These trials were not included in the analysis, since they did 
not contain a gamble. Time–estimation performance on these trials did however 
affect the experimental balance, in case they would receive money. 
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 In total, participants played on average 140 trials (approximately 12.5% 
“no-gamble” trials). The design contained a nested structure. 75% of the trials 
were experimental gamble trials (M, P, MP), that each contained approximately 
50% positive and 50% negative feedback. Following each set of these positive and 
negative feedback, 1/3 of the trials had a negative EV gamble, 1/3 a zero EV gamble, 
and 1/3 a positive EV gamble, all randomly presented. Furthermore, 12.5% of the 
total trials were “control” trials that did not contain feedback, but contained the 
same distribution of the EV gambles. Each trial in the game varied between 9-13 
seconds.  The task was presented in Presentation® software (Version 14, www.
neurobs.com).  
Analysis 
In order to assess the degree of risk-taking following positive and negative 
feedback contexts respectively, we assessed the number of gambles played/
passed as a binomial dependent measure. We had three within-subject factors: 
‘context type’ (three levels: Monetary (M), Performance (P), Combined (MP)), 
‘feedback context’ (two levels: Positive, Negative), and ‘gamble type’ (three levels: 
positive EV, zero EV, negative EV). The Control trials did not have positive or 
negative feedback and were used to assess a baseline risk attitude, and were not 
entered into the main model. All behavioural statistics were computed using the 
R statistical package (R Development Core Team, R version 3.1.2 (Pumpkin Helmet), 
2014). A generalized linear mixed effect model was performed, to avoid 
aggregating the data and due to the data being slightly unbalanced. For this, we 
used the mixed function of the package (afex, v.0.12-135) for Analysis of Factorial 
Experiments (Singmann, 2014), running on lme4 (v.1.1-7) (Bates, Maechler, Bolker 
& Walker, 2014). The model contained the three within-participant factors as 
fixed effects to predict participant’s decisions to play or pass on a 50-50 mixed 
gamble (binary variable). To account for the repeated-measures and nested nature 
of the data, in the model we included random adjustments to the fixed intercept 
(“random intercept”) for participant, including within-unit random slopes for 
context type, feedback context, gamble type, and an interaction term between 
feedback and gamble type within participant, allowing random correlations 
among random effects (e.g. Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Barr, 2013; Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers & Tily, 2013). P values were determined using Likelihood Ratio Tests as 
implemented in the mixed() function (Singmann, 2014), and for all post-hoc 
pairwise multiple comparisons we used the general linear hypothesis test (glht) 
function of the multcomp package (v.1.3-8), suitable for generalized linear mixed 
effects models (Bretz, Hothorn & Westfall, 2008). Reported means are the 
least-squares means and confidence intervals (CI) are set at 95%, obtained using 
the lsmeans function of the lsmeans package (v.2.13) (Lenth, 2014).
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Results 
Gambling behaviour following different types of positive and 
negative feedback 
Our main question of interest was to examine individuals’ inconsistent risk 
preferences to gain and loss contexts by different types of feedback; monetary 
reward and punishment (M), performance success and failure (P), and 
performance success and failure in combination with a monetary reward and 
punishment (MP). Supporting previous findings (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1992; Weber & Camerer, 1998; Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014), 
we find that participants’ risk preferences were in general sensitive to positive 
and negative contexts (χ² (1)=16.91, p < .001). Participants took more risks after 
previously experiencing negatively-valenced feedback as compared to previously 
experiencing positively-valenced feedback, irrespective of the prior context 
(M negative = 0.396, CI =[0.264, 0.546], M positive = 0.224, CI =[0.122, 0.376]). 
 In terms of our primary question of interest, context type (M, P, MP) 
significantly influenced participant’s risky behaviour following reward/
punishments (χ² (2)=28.62, p < .001). Experiencing incidental monetary gains 
and losses shifts subsequent risk preferences most strongly; M M loss = 0.471, CI 
=[0.332, 0.614], M M gain = 0.192, CI =[0.103, 0.327], z = 8.998, p <.001), experiencing 
performance-based monetary gains and losses also caused a significant shift in 
risk preferences, M MP loss = 0.366, CI =[0.232, 0.525], and M MP gain = 0.209, CI =[0.109, 
0.363], though significantly weaker than pure monetary gain/loss feedback 
(χ² (2)=6.31 p = .01). However, risk-taking behaviour following performance- based 
success did not significantly differ to that following failure (M P failure = 0.355, 
CI =[0.222, 0.514], M P success = 0.280, CI =[0.152, 0.457], z = 2.160, p = 0.257) (Fig. 2). 
In the control trials participants gambled, on average, 30% (CI =[0.189, 0.440]). 
 Examining the data more closely, we find that participants take more risk 
after a ‘pure’ monetary loss than after experiencing a monetary loss based on 
performance failure (Loss: M – MP, z = 3.436, p = .008), and as compared to 
performance failure only (Loss: M – P, z = 3.804, p = .002). In the positive context 
we find the opposite pattern. Participants took more risk after receiving success 
performance-based feedback than after ‘pure’ monetary gain (Gain: P – M, z = 
3.246, p = .015), but not more than success performance-based feedback in 
combination with a monetary gain (Gain: P – MP, z = 2.545, p = 0.111). There was no 
significant difference in risk-taking whether participants received a ‘pure’ 
monetary gain or whether participants received a monetary gain in combination 
with success feedback (Gain: M - MP, z = -0.735, p = 0.978), and also not after 
receiving failure performance feedback, with or without a monetary punishment 
(Loss: MP – P, z = 0.320, p = 1.0). Overall participants did not take different 
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proportion of risk following the different types of context (M MP = 0.281, CI =[0.165, 
0.435] M M = 0.315, CI =[0.198, 0.461] M P = 0.316, CI =[0.189, 0.478], χ² (2)= 2.48, p = 
0.289).
 Participants were sensitive to the expected values of the gambles, with the 
greatest willingness to play the positive EV gamble and the lowest willingness 
to play the negative EV gamble (M +EV = 0.768, CI =[0.581, 0.888], M 0EV = 0.295, 
CI =[0.161, 0.478], M -EV = 0.056, CI =[0.029, 0.107], χ² (2) = 44.50, p < .001). 
The expected value of the gamble also affected risk preferences differently 
following gains and losses (Feedback context x EV gamble: χ² (2) = 14.40, p = .001). 
For all expected values, participants gambled more following a loss compared to 
a gain. The type of context did not affect risk preferences for gambles with 
different expected values (χ² (2) = 2.45, p = .654).
Fig. 2  Estimated marginal means of proportion gambles played following different types 
of positive and negative feedback contexts. MP = performance feedback including monetary 
reward/punishment, M = monetary gain/loss, P = performance success/failure. * p <.05, *** 
p <.001
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Discussion 
In the current study, we investigated whether context-dependent shifts in 
financial risk preferences are driven purely by the delivery of monetary gains/
losses, or are rather due to performance-based success/failure, independent of 
monetary gains/losses. To examine this, we directly compared performance and 
monetary contexts prior to, and independent of, identical mixed gambles. Firstly, 
we replicated the framing behaviour for performance-based monetary gains and 
losses which we observed in our previous work (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014). 
Secondly, incidental pure monetary gains/losses affected risk preferences in the 
same direction, as did performance-based monetary gains and losses. Thirdly, we 
found that performance success and failure, independent of monetary gains/
losses, did not differentially affect individuals risk preferences for subsequent 
gambles. In the fourth place, we found that incidental monetary gains and losses 
caused the largest shift in risk preferences, significantly more so than after 
 performance-based monetary gains and losses. Finally, for all context types, 
people were equally sensitive to the expected values of the gambles, playing the 
highest expected value gambles more than the zero and negative expected value 
gambles. Moreover, the typical framing effect was observed for all gambles.  
 The finding that risk preferences are susceptible to prior positive and negative 
contexts, though only when these preceding contexts involve monetary gains 
and losses, is consistent with previous research (Barkan & Busemeyer, 2003; Xue 
et al., 2011), and can potentially be attributed to loss aversion (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Loss aversion, the finding that losses loom larger than equivalent 
gains, can lead us to pass on a mixed gamble which contains the possibility of 
losing money. However, in a situation in which we have already just lost money, 
either randomly or due to poor performance, a mixed gamble that offers a chance 
to redeem this loss becomes more preferred. Together, one possible explanatory 
process to the observed findings of the typical shift in risk preferences for mixed 
gambles following unrelated monetary reward/punishments, either randomly 
rewarded or based on performance, is our innate tendency to avoid losses. 
 A possible effect of experiencing performance success or performance failure 
feedback could be a difference in mood (Henkel & Hinsz, 2004) that might in turn 
influence preferences for risk. Prior studies examining the effect of positive and 
negative mood on risk preferences, found that incidental positive mood influenced 
subsequent preferences for high risk gambles (Knutson et al., 2008), and enhanced 
framing effects (Stanton & Reeck, 2014). In the current study, we did not find a 
difference in risk preferences following pure performance success/failure, 
independent of monetary gains and losses. A potential mood effect seems 
unlikely to underlie the observed effects in risk. Moreover, performance success 
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and failure feedback was based on participants’ actual performance, which is 
different to experiencing incidental monetary gains and losses used in this study, 
or incidental affective stimuli in other studies (Knutson et al., 2008; Stanton 2014). 
Performance as such, could be too unrelated to the subsequent gamble decision in 
order to be integrated into the valuation of subsequent choice. This is consistent 
with the compatibility effect (Slovic, Griffin & Tversky, 2002), which suggests that 
outcomes that are compatible with the output of choice are given more weight. 
Monetary gains and losses are compatible with the outcome of mixed gambles, 
whereas performance success and failure are less so, leading to a stronger impact 
on behaviour for the former. Nevertheless, when comparing the different context 
types for positive and negative valence separately, we find that success feedback 
does indeed increase subsequent risk-taking, but only compared to pure monetary 
gains. It should be noted, during the Play trials, participants did not know in 
advance in which trials they would receive only performance feedback, and in 
which trials they would receive performance feedback with a monetary reward 
or punishment. These different context types were randomized across Play trials. 
The lack in behavioural difference for risk following performance-based feedback 
could have resulted in this possible confound. That is, compared to receiving a 
monetary reward when successful in performance, when solely receiving 
successful feedback, a participant might feel disappointed due to not receiving a 
monetary bonus in addition, and vice versa for negative feedback. As a result, 
positive and negative performance feedback might cancel each other out by the 
lack of monetary feedback; therefore do not influence risk preferences differently. 
 The finding that behavioural framing effects for incidental monetary gains 
and losses were stronger relative to performance-based monetary gains and 
losses, suggest that these framing effects are primarily driven by the receipt of 
monetary outcomes, and not, or less so, by success and failure, as shown by pure 
performance-based contexts. Additional feedback about performance success or 
failure may reduce loss aversion. It is likely that receiving a ‘random’ monetary 
loss may feel less acceptable and unfair, due to not having any control over the 
outcome. Receiving an incidental monetary loss may therefore enhance the 
willingness to gamble this money back, which the current data supports. 
Conversely, incurring a loss based on erroneous performance might be more 
justified, and therefore might result in less strong framing effects. For both pure 
monetary gains as well as performance-based monetary gains, we found a 
similar degree of risk aversion for mixed gambles. 
 The differential effects we found for pure performance-based success/failure, 
and performance-based success/failure in combination with monetary gains/
losses, have also been observed with functional neuroimaging data. Monetary 
reward and punishments exhibited more enhanced activity in overlapping brain 
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regions compared to pure performance-based success and failure (Daniel & 
Pollmann, 2010; Lutz, Pedroni, Nadig, Luechinger & Jäncke, 2012; Aron et al., 2004; 
Tricomi, Delgado, McCandliss, McClelland & Fiez, 2006). These areas have also 
been associated with anticipation of reward and financial risk-taking (Knutson et 
al 2001; Delgado et al., 2003, 2004; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005). The stronger 
response in the reward and punishment-related network in the brain to monetary 
feedback relative to performance-based feedback supports our finding that 
monetary feedback influences subsequent choice more strongly than monetary 
feedback confounded with performance-based feedback.
 The current findings indicate that participants’ risk preferences in case of 
monetary gambles are very susceptible to monetary contexts, and that this effect 
does not extend easily to non-monetary contexts, or most likely non-compatible 
contexts. The observed context-specificity seems to reflect a compatibility effect 
(Slovic et al., 2002), along the lines that preceding monetary gain/loss outcomes 
(than success or failure by itself) are easier to integrate into the choice process to 
play/pass a gamble consisting of monetary outcomes. Hence, different positively 
or negatively valenced contexts do not affect risk preferences in a consistent way. 
Future studies could provide more insight into how these different types may 
affect our valuation of risky choice, by examining the underlying psychological 
and neural differences mediated by different reward and punishment contexts. 
Furthermore, examining whether contextual effects of different context types 
exist for risk choices containing non-monetary outcomes, e.g. health-related 
decisions, would be interesting to gain a better view of cross-context effects on 
risk. 
 To summarize, in the current study we showed that risky shifts following a 
prior positive and negative feedback seem to be differently affected by contexts 
that are based on money or on individuals’ performance. The risky shift (i.e. 
framing effect) is primarily driven by monetary gains and losses and not due to 
success or failure in an unrelated task. In other words, simply seeing the results of 
a lottery in which participants won or lost preceding a monetary mixed gamble, 
without performing any task, enhanced the current framing effect. On the 
contrary, when participants were just informed whether they were successful or 
unsuccessful in the estimation task, risk preferences for mixed gambles became 
consistent, and thus, framing disappeared. These results highlight the strong 
specific context-dependency of risk preferences and choices, and suggest that 
positive or negative valence or mood do not influence this, but that a process 
explaining the observed inconsistent risk preferences following gain and loss 
outcomes is our aversion to losses.
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Abstract
Living in a social environment entails that we not only make choices for ourselves, 
but also on behalf of others. Here, we explored how third-party decision-making 
can alter risk preferences as a function of prior gain and loss framing contexts, 
and furthermore how the level of responsibility for third-party choices impact 
these effects. Participants played a series of trials where they could either win or 
lose money depending on their performance on a simple reaction time task. 
Immediately following the respective gain or loss, the participant decided to 
either play or pass on a 50/50 mixed gamble that could either double or eliminate 
their gain (after a prior win) or redeem or double their loss (after a prior loss). If 
they chose not to play this gamble, they retained the initial gain or loss. 
Participants played the task either for themselves (“Self” Condition) or for another, 
anonymous, participant (“Other” Condition). Additionally, we manipulated 
between subjects the level of responsibility for choices in the Other condition, 
resulting in an Other-High and Other-Low responsibility group. Participants made 
more risky choices after incurring a loss as compared to a gain. While this shift in 
risk preferences occurred for both Self and Other choices, it was significantly 
smaller for Other choices, with the difference decreasing as responsibility for the 
decisions decreased. Reduced engagement of affective processes when deciding 
for others, particularly when responsibility is low, may underlie the increased 
consistency in risk preferences following gains and losses. 
Based on: Losecaat Vermeer, A. B., Boksem, M. A. S. & Sanfey, A. G. (under review) 
Third-party decision-making under risk as a function of prior gains and losses.
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Introduction
Living in a social environment entails that we not only make choices for ourselves, 
but also often on behalf of others. For example, parents make many decisions for 
their children, and sometimes children later choose on behalf of their parents, 
financial advisors make investment choices for their clients, and research 
supervisors may decide as to the direction of inquiry that their students undertake. 
Deciding for a third-party can also occur in a broader context, such as when a CEO 
makes choices directly impacting employees, or a politician deciding on public 
policy affecting millions. Despite this apparent ubiquity of situations in which 
the decision-makers themselves may not be directly affected by the outcome of 
their choice, there is a surprising dearth of research examining differences 
between choices made for oneself and choices made for another. 
 The majority of research in the area of third-party decision-making has been 
conducted in the context of medical choices, with the canonical example of a medical 
doctor deciding between potential treatments for a patient when these options differ 
in risk and efficacy. In such situations, research demonstrates that doctors tend to take 
less risk when deciding on behalf of a patient considering a risky or a safer treatment, 
as compared to when they make the same decision for themselves (Garcia-Retamaro 
& Galesic, 2012). This suggests that risk preferences may be impacted by the degree 
to which one is directly affected by the decision outcome. 
 Understanding how people make decisions on behalf of a third party, 
particularly when these decisions entail some degree of risk, is a question of 
substantial importance for society. However, while interest in third-party 
decisions under risk is growing, there are still many inconsistencies in the 
literature. For instance, studies from a variety of fields have found evidence for 
increased risk-taking behaviour when deciding on behalf of another person. This 
increased risk-taking for a third-party has been observed for making choices for 
friends about romantic relationships (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Wray & Stone, 
2005), and for monetary choices involving risk, both real and hypothetical 
(Agranov & Bisin, 2011; Chakravarty et al., 2011; Hsee & Weber, 1997). Conversely, 
some studies have observed decreased risk-taking when deciding for another. For 
example, in an investment lottery game participants took less risk when playing 
on behalf of an anonymous other participant as compared to participants playing 
for themselves (Eriksen & Kvaloy, 2010), a result also shown when deciding on 
behalf of a group (Reynolds, Joseph & Sherwood, 2009). Further studies have 
found no difference in risk-taking between self and other (Stone, Yates & 
Caruthers, 2002). Given the importance of these decisions in real-life, these mixed 
findings regarding self-other discrepancies in risk-taking behaviour suggest that 
a better understanding of the nature of self-other differences for risk is required. 
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 A substantial amount of work has shown that risk perception and preferences 
are domain-specific (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Weber, Blais & Betz, 2002), and 
so a possible explanation for the inconsistent findings is that different contexts 
(i.e. social, non-social, hypothetical, and real) may induce different psychological 
mechanisms. For example, foundational work from Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 
1981) has shown that when a decision problem is described in a positive frame (i.e. 
focusing on potential gains), people tend to be risk averse, that is, they shy away 
from riskier options. However, when the same decision problem is presented in a 
negative frame (i.e. focusing on potential losses), people tend to relatively favour 
the risky option. Previous experience has also been shown to affect an individual’s 
preference for choosing a risky or safe option, with various studies examining 
how prior outcomes can change preferences for risky choice (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Weber & Camerer, 1998; Barkan & 
Busemeyer, 1999; Xue, Lu, Levin & Bechara, 2011). In a recent study (Losecaat 
Vermeer, Boksem & Sanfey, 2014; Chapter 2) we examined how prior gains and 
losses, unrelated to the task at hand, can change our preference for risky choice. 
Participants who had experienced a prior monetary loss subsequently chose to 
play a mixed 50-50 “double-or-quits” gamble significantly more often than 
playing an identical gamble after experiencing a prior gain. Importantly, this 
effect was observed within-subjects, that is, participants’ individual preferences 
for risk shifted as a function of prior outcomes. These studies illustrate the 
importance of taking into account the decision context (e.g. in this case the 
presence of prior outcomes) in understanding risk-taking behaviour. An 
interesting, and still open, question however is whether this pattern of 
inconsistent choice as a function of prior gains and losses is affected by the degree 
to which the decision-maker is directly influenced by the outcome (i.e. deciding 
for oneself or another). In the present study we attempt to better specify the 
conditions under which inconsistency in risk-taking may be influenced by 
deciding either for oneself, or on behalf of a third-party. 
 One important factor that may account for the aforementioned self-other 
differences in risky choice is the extent to which the decision-maker is responsible 
for the outcome of his or her actions (Beisswanger et al., 2003; Harkness, Debono 
& Borgida, 1985). One example is bankers’ excessive risk behaviour leading up to 
the financial crisis in 2008 - to some degree this has been attributed to a lack of 
responsibility for the outcomes of ill-advised investment strategies. Studies have 
shown that when a decision-maker is responsible for other individuals, or even an 
entire group, in addition to themselves, less risky strategies are often chosen 
(Charness & Jackson, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2009). Other studies have observed 
that self-other differences were a result of the opportunity to avoid taking 
responsibility by choosing an outcome determined by chance rather than 
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choosing the outcome, indicating here that participants responsibility aversion 
led to self-other differences (Leonhardt, Keller & Pechmann, 2011; Beisswanger et 
al., 2003). In addition, being evaluated or having to justify one’s decisions to the 
recipient (“accountability”, Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) increased risk-taking for mixed 
gambles when compared to purely being held responsible for the payoffs (i.e. 
when only the decision-makers’ ID was disclosed to the recipient) (Pahlke, Strasser 
& Vieider, 2012). In the latter study, decisions affected payoffs equally for the 
decision-maker and recipient. The aforementioned studies suggest that self-other 
differences in risk-taking could be a result of differences in responsibility, 
however, in which direction, and whether differences in responsibility can impact 
one’s susceptibility to a decision context in shaping risk preferences is still unclear. 
 In this study, our aim is to examine whether the extent to which someone is 
held responsible for deciding on behalf of a third-party affects self-other 
differences in risk preferences, in particular those risky choices taken immediately 
following gains and losses. To induce gain and loss contexts, participants played 
multiple trials in which they could either win or lose money depending on their 
performance on a time-estimation task. Immediately thereafter, the participant 
decided if they wanted to play a 50/50 mixed gain/loss gamble that could either 
redeem or double their loss (after an initial loss), or double or eliminate their gain 
(after an initial gain). If the participant decided not to play this gamble (i.e. pass), 
they would simply retain the initial gain or loss. In order to induce actual gain and 
loss contexts, participants played multiple trials. The critical manipulation was 
whether the participant played the task with the beneficiary as either themselves 
(“Self”) or another, anonymous, participant (“Other”). In addition, when choosing 
on behalf of the other, we manipulated the degree of information being disclosed 
about the decision-makers’ behaviour to the recipient. Participants were 
instructed that the recipient would evaluate this information and determine a 
potential bonus payment for the participant. This additional manipulation 
therefore allowed us to answer the question of whether the level of responsibility 
in the process of choosing for another changes preference for risk, with two 
different conditions examined: 1) the participants’ full choice history as well as 
the final monetary outcome of the task would be revealed to the recipient (“high 
responsibility”), and 2) only the final monetary outcome of the decisions would be 
revealed to the recipient (“low responsibility”). 
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Materials and Methods
Participants
 118 undergraduate students participated in the study. All gave written informed 
consent and received research credits for participation. Participants could earn a 
monetary bonus depending on either their own choices (Self condition, N = 41) or 
the choices of another player (Other condition, N = 77), with this bonus being €0, 
€5, or €10. Experimental exclusion criteria were a self-reported history of 
psychiatric disorders, regular use of marijuana, or use of psychotropic drugs. 
Three participants in total were excluded. One male was excluded because of 
reported regular drug use, and the two remaining males were excluded to enable 
an analysis of a homogenous sample in terms of gender. Data is therefore reported 
from 115 participants (all female, M = 19.76 years, SD = 1.64). The study was approved 
by the local ethics committee.
Design 
We used an existing paradigm (Boksem, Kostermans & De Cremer, 2011; Losecaat 
Vermeer et al., 2014) in order to study risk-taking behaviour in the context of prior 
gains and losses. Each trial began with a simple time-estimation task in which 
participants either won or lost money (€1.20) depending on their performance. 
The purpose of this task was to induce either a gain or a loss context on that trial. 
Directly after the respective gain or loss feedback from the time-estimation task, 
participants received a mixed (50/50 chance, gain/loss) gamble, which they could 
decide to either play or pass (see Figure 1). If they decided to pass on the gamble 
they would simply retain their gain or loss from the preceding time-estimation 
task, with this amount added to (or subtracted from) their total monetary balance. 
Alternately, if they decided to play the gamble, the gamble was then resolved and 
the corresponding win or loss amount was added to their total balance. As 
compared to the ‘pass’ option (i.e. choosing to simply retain the €1.20 gain or loss), 
each mixed gamble yielded either a positive expected value (‘+ EV’), an expected 
value of zero (‘0 EV’), or a negative expected value (‘- EV’), with these values 
reached by varying the gain or loss outcome between €1.00, €1.20, and €1.40 
respectively. These three different gamble types were created to assess whether 
participants were sensitive to the expected value of the gamble.
 The critical manipulation here was that participants either played the task for 
themselves (Self condition), in which case their total earnings would then be paid 
out to directly to them, or they played for another participant (Other condition), 
whereby a randomly selected, anonymous, experimental participant would 
receive the total earnings. It was made clear to participants in the Other condition 
that another experimental participant would also play for them, who would be 
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determined randomly at the end of the experiment, when all participants had 
participated. Moreover, participants were told at the beginning of the task that 
depending on their experimental condition they would be compensated based on 
their own behaviour, or of another participant, when the study was completed. 
 In addition, we manipulated the degree of responsibility within the Other 
condition to examine whether responsibility may also have an effect on 
risk-taking. Half of the participants (N = 39) in the Other condition were told that 
the recipient of the final balance would rate his or her satisfaction with the 
monetary outcome, which we refer to as the Other-Low responsibility (Other-L) 
group. The other half of the participants (N = 38) from the Other group were 
informed that both the final balance itself as well as the actual behavioural 
performance during the task (i.e. the sequence of choices they made) would be 
rated by the other recipient, which we refer to as Other-High responsibility 
(Other-H) group. The distribution of participants for the two Other conditions was 
done pseudo-randomly. An additional small bonus could be earned if the ratings 
of the recipient were positive. 
Procedure
Participants first performed two practice sessions of 5 minutes. In the first session 
participants practiced the time-estimation trials. Here, participants were required 
to estimate the duration of one second. After a cue on the screen changed in 
colour, they were instructed to wait exactly one second and then press a response 
button, with their precise response times recorded. We used a staircase procedure 
in which we adjusted the interval until we reached 50% accuracy for each 
participant, to determine the initial allowable response time-window per 
participant in the experiment, which in turn was used to give feedback on 
whether their response on the time-estimation task was either correct or incorrect. 
The second practice session gave participants the opportunity to practice the 
gambling task itself. After these practice sessions, the experiment began. It lasted 
for approximately 60 minutes, with a short break halfway. 
 Before the task started, participants were instructed that their goal was to 
win as much money as possible, either for themselves (Self condition) or for 
another random participant (Other condition). A small icon at remained at the top 
of the screen throughout the task to remind the participant of the experimental 
condition (see Figure 1). They were told that their final balance would actually be 
paid out to the respective recipient (up to a maximum of €10), in addition to the 
participation credits they would receive irrespective of condition or performance. 
In case of the two Other conditions, the total end balance that the participant 
earned during the experiment was randomly assigned to one of the other 
anonymous participants at the end of the experiment. At the same time, earnings 
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of an anonymous other participant was also randomly assigned to the 
decision-maker in the Other condition. The bonus payment in the Other-Low 
responsibility condition was determined by a positive satisfaction rate (between 
5-7 out of a 1-7 satisfaction Likert scale) of the receiver that was based on the total 
end outcome, whereas the bonus payment in the Other-High responsibility 
condition was determined by a positive satisfaction rate (between 5-7 out of a 1-7 
satisfaction Likert scale) of the receiver that was based on the entire choice 
behaviour during the experiment in addition to the total end outcome. At the end 
of the experiment, participants gave their ratings online (Qualtrics software, 
2013). All participants had to return to receive their payments, in both conditions. 
The only difference is that participants in the Self-condition already knew what 
they had earned at the end of the task.
Fig. 1  Task design. The structure of a single gain and single loss trial is presented. In this 
example the Other condition is shown. Each picture represents a screen in the experiment. 
The trial started with a time-estimation task, where participants were required to press a 
button exactly 1 s after the dice colour changed to white. Feedback on performance was 
shown as a monetary gain of €1.20 if correct, or a loss of €1.20 if incorrect. Following this 
feedback, participants had the opportunity to choose a mixed gamble with a 50/50 chance 
to either gain or lose money. If participants decided to gamble, the gamble was played and 
the outcome then presented. Average duration of a trial is 9-13 s. The task was the same for 
the Self condition with the exception of the icon displayed at the top of the screen.
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Task and Stimuli
At the start of each trial, participants saw a red visual cue that changed in colour 
to white after 1200 ms (Figure 1). Participants were then required to press the 
response button exactly 1 second after this colour change. Responses to this 
time-estimation task were considered correct when they were within an 
allowable time-interval. For correct responses, participants gained €1.20. 
Participants lost €1.20 if their response was not within this time-interval, i.e. 
either too fast or too slow.
 The allowable response-interval was initially calculated based on their 
performance in the practice run and then covertly adjusted throughout the task 
as a function of the variance in response time of the participant, in order to ensure 
an approximately equal number of gains and losses on this task. If participants 
responded within the allowable response-interval, this interval was subsequently 
shortened by 50 ms; if they responded either too quickly or too slowly, the interval 
was then lengthened by 50 ms. Importantly, although the relative number of 
gains and losses was manipulated, the feedback itself, and the associated gains 
and losses, was contingent upon participants’ performance (see Boksem et al., 
2011).
 Participants were given the opportunity to play a gamble on 75% of trials. 
They were forewarned on each trial by the presence of a specific visual cue, 
namely a pair of dice. On these ‘gamble’ trials, after receiving the feedback from 
the time estimation task (gain or loss), participants could choose to either play or 
pass on a mixed (50/50 chance, gain/loss) gamble (within 5 s.). Playing the gamble 
led to two possible outcomes: 1) A win outcome which added between €1.00, €1.20 
or €1.40 to their overall experimental balance, or 2) a loss outcome which 
subtracted between €1.00, €1.20 or €1.40 from this balance. Alternatively, the 
participant could decide to pass on the gamble, thereby keeping the earlier gain or 
loss (i.e. +/- €1.20) from the time-estimation task. The gamble outcomes were 
independent from the performance on the time-estimation task. 
 In the remaining 25% of trials, participants were not presented with a gamble 
after receiving feedback on the time-estimation trial. These “no-gamble option” 
trials, indicated in advance by a specific visual cue (cubes instead of dice), were 
employed to potentially prevent participants using a fixed strategy, e.g. always or 
never gambling, and to enhance engagement in the gamble trials. Time–
estimation performance on these trials did however affect the monetary balance. 
All gamble outcomes (both gains and losses) were reflected immediately in the 
total running balance displayed for each participant. This balance was shown on 
the screen at all times. Participants were informed that this would be the balance 
paid out (if positive) as a bonus at the end of the experiment. Furthermore, the 
running balance might also influence individual risk preferences, in addition to 
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the expected effect of immediate gains and losses incurred on that particular 
trial. To control for this, during the task and unbeknownst to the participants, we 
manipulated the overall running balance to create phases of “neutral” (total 
balance range of €-5 to €5), “negative” (range €-5 to €-17), and “positive” 
experimental balances (range €5 to €17). A similar staircase procedure for the 
time-estimation interval was used in order to transition through these running 
balances. To transition up to a positive balance, the allowable response-interval 
was shortened by 10 ms after a correct response, and lengthened by 100 ms after 
an incorrect response (i.e. too quickly or too slowly). The same adjustment to the 
window was realized to transition down to a negative balance, in the opposite 
direction. The transition trials consisted both of gamble-trials (33%) and no-gamble 
option trials (67%), and were not used as experimental trials for analysis. Only the 
trials during the three balance phases were included in the analyses (see Boksem, 
Kostermans, Milivojevic & De Cremer, 2012). The order of these three phases of 
running balance was counterbalanced.
 In short, every action the participant performed, their time-estimation 
performance and decision to play or not to play the gamble affected their total 
running balance (Self-condition), or the others’ total running balance (Other-con-
dition). With this manipulation we could test whether any direct (Self group) and 
indirect (Other group) wealth effects would influence risk consistency. Moreover, 
this made the task more engaging and realistic, as compared to other studies that 
use hypothetical scenarios or chose a random trial for payment. 
 In total, participants played on average 240 experimental trials (including 
approximately 60 “no-gamble option” trials). The factorial design included on 
average a total of 90 gain and 90 loss trials, these gain/loss outcomes were 
presented contingently on the participants’ behaviour. Within each set of these 
90 trials, we had 30 negative EV, 30 neutral EV, 30 positive EV gambles randomly 
presented. Within the total 180 experimental trials, 60 occurred with a positive 
running balance, 60 with a neutral running balance, and 60 with a negative 
running balance, counterbalanced across participant. The large amount of trials 
was employed to ensure adequate power to examine both play and pass decisions, 
since we cannot control participants’ choice behaviour. Each trial varied in 
duration between 9-13 s., resulting in estimated task duration of 60 min. The task 
was presented in Presentation® software (Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc., 
Version 14). 
Behavioural analysis
In order to assess the degree of risk-taking following gains and losses respectively, 
we assessed the number of gambles played/passed as a binomial dependent 
measure. We had three within-subject factors: ‘running balance’ (three levels: 
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Positive, Neutral, Negative), ‘feedback context’ (two levels: Loss, Gain), and 
‘gamble type’ (three levels: positive EV, equal EV, negative EV). The between- 
participants factor was the recipient of the final outcome and the degree of 
personal involvement (three levels: Self (N = 38), Other-High responsibility (Other-H; 
N = 38), Other-Low responsibility (Other-L; N = 39)). All behavioural statistics were 
computed using the R statistical package (R Development Core Team, R version 
2.15.3 (Security Blanket), 2008). A generalized linear mixed effect model was 
performed, using the mixed function of the package (afex, v.06-82) for Analysis of 
Factorial Experiments (Singmann, 2013), running with lme4 package (version 
1.0-4) in R (Bates, 2010). The model contained the three within-participant factors 
and recipient as factors to predict participant’s decisions to play or pass on a 50-50 
mixed gamble (binary variable). To account for the repeated-measures of the data 
(each running balance contained the fixed effect ‘feedback’ and ‘gamble type’), 
two random adjustments to the fixed intercept (“random intercepts”) were 
included in the model: one random intercept coding for participant, and one 
random intercept coding for participant crossed with running balance (e.g. 
Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). Within-unit random slopes were not included, 
due to non-convergence of the model. P values were determined using Likelihood 
Ratio Tests as implemented in the mixed() function (Singmann, 2013), and for all 
post-hoc pairwise multiple comparisons we used the general linear hypothesis 
test (glht) function of the multcomp package, suitable for generalized linear mixed 
effects models (Bretz, Hothorn & Westfall, 2008). Reported means are least-squares 
means and confidence intervals (CI) are set at 95%, obtained using the lsmeans 
function of the lsmeans package (v.1.10) (Lenth, 2013).
Results
As expected, and supporting previous findings (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Weber & Camerer, 1998) participants were more likely 
to accept a gamble when they previously experienced a loss as compared to a gain 
(M Loss = 0.571, CI = [0.513, 0.627], M Gain = 0.418, CI = [0.362, 0.476]; χ² (1) = 339.23, p < 
.001). Importantly, this feedback effect interacted significantly with the be-
tween-participant factor of recipient type (Self, Other-H, and Other-L; χ² (2) = 44.35, 
p < .001; see Figure 2), such that with an increase in the level of responsibility 
there was a larger difference in risk-taking for losses versus gains. Examining the 
means, this interaction appears largely driven by the differences in decisions 
after gains, even though pairwise comparisons of the gains were not significant 
(p = 0.253). For participants playing for another recipient, for both the high and 
low responsibility groups, the difference in risk-taking as a function of the 
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feedback context was significantly decreased as compared to participants playing 
for themselves (M Loss = 0.576, CI = [0.504, 0.644], M Gain = 0.459, CI = [0.389, 0.531] for 
Other; M Loss = 0.563, CI = [0.461, 0.660], M Gain = 0.344, CI = [0.258, 0.442], for Self; 
Feedback (loss, gain) by Recipient (Self, Other): χ² (1) = 35.39, p < .001). Specifically, 
responsibility impacted differences in risk-taking; participants in the low 
responsibility group were significantly less susceptible to the feedback context 
(i.e. a smaller difference between risk-taking following gains and losses) as 
compared to participants of the high responsibility group (For Other-H: M Loss-Gain = 
0.148; for Other-L: M Loss-Gain = 0.09; χ² (1) = 8.96, p = .003). 
 The results show that when deciding for oneself, participants are more 
susceptible to the context in which a decision is made than when participants 
make ostensibly the same decisions for another participant. When the participant 
knows that the recipient will be explicitly rating the participant’s decisions 
(Other-H), choices are more similar to those made for oneself than to those made 
when the decisions would not be rated (Other-L). Overall, across both gain and loss 
contexts, there was no significant difference in risk-taking between the groups 
(Self: M = 0.451, CI = [0.354, 0.552]; Other-L: M = 0.528, CI = [0.429, 0.625]; Other-H: M 
= 0.504, CI = [0.404, 0.604]; χ² (2) = 1.17, p = 0.557). 
Fig. 2  Risk-taking choices following gains and losses per group; playing for oneself (Self ), 
playing for a third-party in which both the participants’ choice behaviour and total 
outcome was disclosed to the other person (Other - High responsibility), playing for a 
third-party in which only the participants’ total outcome of the game was disclosed to the 
other person (Other - Low responsibility). *** p < .001.
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Furthermore, because of the length of the task due to the experimental design, we 
tested for possible time effects on risk-taking, as it is possible that performance 
changed over time. To test this we distributed trials over 3 timebins of 60 gamble 
trials each. The willingness to gamble across groups significantly decreased over 
time (MTimebin(1) = 0.530, CI = [0.465, 0.594]; MTimebin(2) = 0.491, CI = [0.426, 0.555]; 
MTimebin(3) = 0.464, CI = [0.400, 0.529]; χ² (2) = 6.82, p = 0.033), however, between 
groups there was no difference in risk-taking over time (group by time: χ² (4) = 
1.95, p = 0.746).
 Participants were sensitive to the expected values of the gambles, with a 
higher likelihood to play the positive EV gamble and a lower to play the negative 
EV gamble (M +EV = 0.722, CI = [0.672, 0.767]; M 0EV = 0.505, CI = [0.447, 0.564]; M -EV = 
0.260, CI = [0.217, 0.309]; χ² (2) = 2363.29, p < .001). Moreover, this effect was also 
observed within all groups (Other-H: M +EV = 0.771, CI = [0.690, 0.836]; M 0EV = 0.543, 
CI = [0.441, 0.642]; M -EV = 0.208, CI = [0.148, 0.284]; for Other-L: M +EV = 0.725, CI = 
[0.637, 0.798]; M 0EV = 0.528, CI  = [0.427, 0.627]; M -EV = 0.322, CI = [0.240, 0.416]; for 
Self: M +EV = 0.664, CI = [0.576, 0.750]; M 0EV = 0.446, CI = [0.347, 0.548]; M -EV = 0.259, 
CI  = [0.188, 0.346]; EV gamble by recipient: χ² (4) = 90.22, p < .001). 
 The different phases of experimental running balance did not significantly 
interact with recipient group (across groups: M positive = 0.465, CI = [0.401, 0.530], 
M neutral = 0.500, CI = [0.435, 0.564], M negative = 0.519, CI = [0.454, 0.583]; χ² (4) = 1.80, 
p = 0.772), but did significantly interact with feedback context (For loss-gains: 
M positive = 0.093, M neutral = 0.180, M negative = 0.184) (χ² (2) = 23.72, p < .001). When 
playing with a positive overall balance, participants were less, though still 
significantly, susceptible to the loss-gain context, in comparison to playing with 
a neutral or negative balance (Negative: z =13.02, p < 0.001; Neutral: z =12.55, 
p < 0.001; Positive: z = 6.55, p < 0.001). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that 
participants were differently sensitive to the losses and not the gains. That is, 
participants gambled significantly less often after a loss with a positive running 
balance, as compared to with both neutral and negative running balances 
(For Loss only: z (positive - negative) = -3.64, p = 0.003, z (positive - neutral) = -2.83, p = 0.045, 
no significant difference between a negative and neutral balance.).  
Discussion
In this study we examined the effects of making risky decisions for oneself versus 
for a third-party, in particular focusing on the degree to which risk preferences 
shifted following preceding monetary gains or losses. To investigate this, 
participants were assigned to choose either for themselves or for another, 
anonymous, person. Within the third-party condition, participants were further 
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divided into two groups, one in which the third-party recipient was viewed both 
the actual set of choices (the decision history) as well as the overall outcome, and 
one in which the recipient only saw the final outcome. In each trial, the 
decision-maker first received a small monetary reward or punishment (the gain/
loss frame) based on performance on a response-time task, and then chose to 
either play or pass on a risky “double-or-quits” gamble.
 Replicating earlier work on preference shifts for risk (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 
2014), when participants decided for themselves they were indeed sensitive to the 
prior gains and losses, choosing significantly more gambles when they had just 
incurred a small loss as compared to when they received a small gain. This 
demonstrates the reliable effect of a decision frame – we observe changes in 
individual risk preferences for identical sets of gambles as a function of a small 
preceding monetary gain or loss.
 The primary goal of the present study was to examine how choosing for 
either oneself or another, anonymous, participant could alter these preference 
shifts. Our findings indicated that when deciding for others, participants were 
significantly less susceptible to this gain/loss context, demonstrated statistically 
by a significant interaction effect between the gain/loss feedback and the 
recipient type. In other words, participants exhibited greater risk-taking after a 
loss then after a gain, with this difference larger when individuals were deciding 
for themselves as compared to for others. Additionally, people who were least 
responsible for their decisions, namely the group whose exact trial-by-trial 
decisions were not revealed, showed the smallest shift in risk preferences for gain 
and loss contexts. Overall then, when the level of responsibility was at its smallest, 
participants were most consistent in their risk preferences across gain and loss 
contexts, whereas when responsibility was maximal, when you choose for 
yourself, the impact of context on risk preferences is at its largest.
 Diminishing sensitivity to prior gains and losses when deciding for a third-party 
is in line with research examining loss aversion for decisions involving choosing to 
play mixed gambles for others as compared to for oneself. Loss aversion, the tendency 
to overweight losses as compared to gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), has been shown to be diminished when choosing on behalf of 
someone else (Mengarelli, Moretti, Faralla, Vindras & Siriguet, 2014; Polman, 2012). 
This behavioural tendency has been associated with the involvement of affective 
processes (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009), with individual’s degree of loss aversion to 
correlate positively with the involvement of affective processes. 
 Functional neuroimaging work has shown that when observing preference 
shifts for choices framed as gains or losses (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour & 
Dolan, 2006), or presented as mixed gambles (Tom, Fox, Trepel & Poldrack, 2007; 
De Martino, Camerer & Adolphs, 2010), or as mixed gambles followed by prior 
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gains or losses (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 2014), brain regions involved in affect- and 
reward-related processes are more engaged (i.e. amygdala, striatum, and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex) as compared to behaviour showing consistent 
risk preferences or the opposite direction of the typical shift in risk preferences. 
Moreover, decisions that were not influenced by this valence frame were related 
to greater engagement of regions involved in control and inhibition, i.e. anterior 
cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex (De Martino et al., 2006). The neural and 
psychological findings on loss aversion and framing indicate that people 
exhibiting diminished sensitivity to context framing rely less on affective 
processes, and therefore potentially more on cognitive control processes, when 
making choices under risk.
 These findings support the idea that a potential mechanism underlying the 
self-other differences in risk consistency for gain/loss contexts is one of reduced 
engagement of affective processes in evaluating the preceding gain and loss 
outcomes in deciding to take risk or not. In a similar vein, research in non-risk 
related decision-making has shown that deciding for a third-party attenuates 
emotional responses towards the context of the choice (i.e. unfair vs. fair offer, 
immediate vs. delayed rewards), which has in turn been related to reduced 
activity in reward and affect-related brain regions (Civai et al., 2010; Albrecht, 
Volz, Sutter, Laibson & von Cramon, 2011; Corradi-Dell’acqua, Civai, Rumiati & 
Fink, 2013). For example, one psychophysiological study showed that receiving 
unfair monetary offers on behalf of another player resulted in a reduced emotional 
response, whereas when the participant themselves was the recipient there was 
a large increase in the emotional response (Civai et al., 2010). 
 In our study, responsibility led to differences in the susceptibility to the gain/
loss context on subsequent risky choice. Greater responsibility for the decisions 
increased the impact of gains and losses on participants’ subsequent risk 
preferences, most evident when the participant themselves was the beneficiary 
of the choices, but also observed when the full decision history was shown to the 
third-party. One plausible explanation as to how responsibility affected risk 
preferences for gains and losses is that it enhanced the impact of choice outcomes. 
More specifically, the greater the responsibility on the decision-maker, the closer 
the outcomes will be to the self. The closer the outcomes are to the self, the greater 
their affective impact will be, and the stronger they will shift risk preferences. 
Responsibility is closely linked to self-referential emotions, such as the anticipation 
of guilt (Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje & Manstead, 2004; Chang, Smith, 
Dufwenberg & Sanfey, 2011) and regret (Camille, Coricelli, Sallet, Pradat-Diehl & 
Duhamel, 2004; Camille et al., 2010; Coricelli, Dolan & Sirigu, 2007) during 
decision processes. For instance, responsibility for negative outcomes increases 
regret, and in particular the aversion for regret and experience of regret elicits 
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orbitofrontal and amygdala activity (Nicolle, Bach, Frith & Dolan, 2011), a response 
that reoccurs just before the choice, possibly guiding on 17th June stated is 
behaviour away from regrettable choices (Coricelli et al., 2007). This is also in line 
with studies showing people’s tendency to avoid responsibility (Leonhardt et al., 
2011; Beisswanger et al., 2003), likely due to the desire to minimize guilt and 
regret. Therefore increasing the level of responsibility would presumably result in 
stronger emotional input that enhances the effect of the context on choice.
 The majority of studies investigating third-party risk decisions have mostly 
studied whether overall risk-taking is increased or decreased. Aggregating across 
feedback contexts (i.e. gains and losses taken together), we did not find any 
difference in risk-taking between deciding for the self and deciding for the 
third-party, and within the latter set for both cases of high and low responsibility, 
consistent with previous work (Stone et al., 2002). In other words, deciding for a 
third-party neither increases nor decreases overall levels of risk-taking, but it does 
significantly reduce the difference in risk preferences between gain and loss 
contexts in comparison to participants who made the same set of decisions for 
themselves. The finding that there was not an overall difference in risk-taking 
between the groups suggests that third-party risky decisions mainly impact the 
processing and weighting of the context, which in turn increases the impact of 
the context on subsequent risky choice. In line with this, previous studies have 
reported that negative and positive outcomes are processed less strongly when 
deciding for others (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999; Beisswanger et al., 2003). 
 The current findings provide several interesting avenues for future research. 
Decreasing one’s personal economic involvement (i.e. self versus other) and one’s 
level of responsibility for the decision may function as a form of regulating one’s 
responses to rewards and punishments that might otherwise alter the way the 
task is played. Alternatively, taking a third-person’s perspective may function to 
shift attention to the broader goal, thereby reducing context-dependent 
risk-taking. For example, loss aversion for individual choices decreased when 
individuals were instructed to “think like a trader”, that is, to observe each small 
individual outcome as part of a larger portfolio (i.e. greater context), as compared 
to observing each outcome in isolation (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009).  
 To conclude, in the current study we demonstrate that deciding for a 
third-party diminishes the inconsistency in risky choice for identical gambles 
following gains and losses. Furthermore, responsibility towards a third-party 
enhanced inconsistency in risk preferences, potentially by enhancing the 
emotional involvement in the choice process and thereby increasing one’s 
susceptibility to the contextual effects. The current study provides additional 
insight into the largely understudied field of third-party risk-taking, by revealing 
differential effects of context (gains or losses) on risky choice.
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Abstract
Decisions to cooperate are often delegated to an authority or third-person that 
decides on the group’s behalf whether they should either cooperate or not. Despite 
the importance and impact these decisions have on others, it is unknown whether 
these cooperative decisions are made differently compared to those made for 
oneself. In two studies we examined whether cooperative decisions might differ 
when decisions are delegated to others (i.e. third-party), and specify which 
motives are important for third-party social decision-making. Participants played 
multiple rounds of the Public Goods Game (PGG). In Study 1, personal involvement 
in the PGG was varied within-subjects, i.e. participants played a block for 
themselves (“Self”), a block for a third-party including oneself (“Shared”), and a 
block solely for a third-party (“Third-Party”). In Study 2, participants randomly 
played the PGG with either human players (i.e. social condition) or computer 
players (i.e. non-social condition), in blocks for themselves (“Self”), and solely on 
behalf of a third-party (“Third-party”). Participants contributed most when 
deciding on behalf of a third-party and when not personally involved in the 
outcome of the good, whereas participants contributed least when personal 
involvement was high (i.e. for Self). Additionally, these contribution amounts on 
behalf of a third-party were higher when playing with humans (social) as 
compared to when playing with computers (non-social). Differences in 
cooperation only occurred in the second block, when participants were able to 
base cooperation outcomes to a reference point, which was changed by personal 
involvement. Together, reducing personal involvement in the public goods game, 
when choosing for a partner or third-party, enhanced social interests, as shown 
by greater cooperation in social contexts as compared to non-social contexts. 
Furthermore, these higher cooperation amounts on behalf of a third-party might 
result from taking the other’s perspective, thereby increasing social preferences.
Based on: Losecaat Vermeer, A. B., Heerema, R. L. & Sanfey, A. G. (under review).
Third-party Cooperation: How reducing personal involvement enhances contributions 
to the public good. 
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Introduction
In 1997 representatives of multiple nations gathered together in Kyoto to negotiate 
a plan to combat global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Kyoto protocol that was produced by this meeting essentially enlisted all citizens 
of the participating countries to cooperate in reducing their CO2 levels, which of 
course in turn incurred financial costs to those citizens. However, at the same 
time, countries that did not sign this agreement could still enjoy the benefits of 
reduced global emissions (i.e. the so-called public good) without having to 
cooperate, outlining the risk of cooperation, namely that of being exposed to 
free-riders. This is just one of many examples that illustrates cooperative 
behaviour on a global scale, and demonstrates that these decisions generally 
involve evaluating different and conflicting motives, i.e. self-interest versus col-
lective-interest. 
 Interestingly, many of these types of decisions, like the example described 
above, are not made by individuals themselves, but instead are delegated to an 
authority that decides on the group’s behalf whether they should or should not 
cooperate. Despite the importance of these decisions and the often considerable 
impact that they have on each individual, the majority of research on cooperation 
has only studied how individuals make cooperative decisions for themselves. As 
illustrated in the example above, cooperative decisions can entail different levels 
of personal involvement in both the decision and the outcome of the public good. 
This can be full involvement (i.e. which we refer to as the “Self”), for example, 
deciding for oneself whether to cooperate in a public good such as reducing 
greenhouse gases, and personally reaping the benefits. A more moderate level of 
involvement would be the example of representatives of nations deciding to 
participate in the Kyoto protocol. These situations entail a joint involvement in 
both the decision and outcome of the public good. In other words, a person who 
decides whether to cooperate on behalf of another person or a group, which 
includes himself, we refer to here as a “Shared third-party” decision. Finally, there 
is the situation in which a person decides whether to cooperate solely on behalf of 
another person or group whilst having no personal involvement in the outcome 
of the decision; for example, a judge deciding how a divorced couple should 
cooperate in the fair division of property, which we refer to here as a “Third-Party” 
decision.  
 In this study, we are interested firstly in whether cooperative decisions are 
made differently when the decision-maker is making choices for a third-party, i.e. 
for another person, as compared to when making choices directly for themselves. 
Secondly, we are interested in which direction these differences lie; assuming 
they exist – are third-party decisions more pro-social or more pro-self? Finally, we 
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attempt to specify which motives are important for third-party decision-making, 
and how these might affect the social preference of cooperation.
 Whether cooperative decisions are made differently on behalf of a third-party 
is, to date, an open question. However, a few studies on risk-taking and social 
preferences highlight potential behavioural differences for third-party deci-
sion-making as compared to when similar decisions are made on behalf of the 
first-person (i.e. for the self), providing some helpful insights into how they may 
influence decisions in cooperation. 
 The majority of research in the area of third-party decision-making has been 
conducted in the context of medical choices, a good example of the decision-maker 
not being directly involved in the outcome. One typical study demonstrated that 
doctors tend to take less risk when deciding on behalf of a patient considering a 
risky or a safer treatment, as compared to when they make the same decision for 
themselves (Garcia-Retamaro & Galesic, 2012). Furthermore, third-party decisions 
concerning uncertain outcomes (i.e. monetary gambles) show different patterns 
of behaviour relative to first-person decisions. For instance, studies found that 
participants made more risk averse choices in settings in which they had joint 
involvement, such as for deciding for a partner and themselves (Charness & 
Jackson, 2009), or a group in which they were part of (Reynolds et al., 2009). 
Conversely, other studies found increased uncertainty-seeking in hypothetical 
settings concerning other peoples’ outcomes, which correlated with reduced 
responsibility (Leonhardt, Keller & Pechmann, 2011). These differences have been 
attributed to participants’ aversion to take responsibility when choosing on 
behalf of another person. In a prior study from our group (Losecaat Vermeer et al., 
submitted (chapter 4)), we examined how the degree of involvement in the 
outcome of the decision can alter risk preferences as a function of prior gain and 
loss framing contexts. We found that risk-taking preferences for monetary choices 
were less susceptible to prior monetary gain/loss contexts (i.e. a framing effect) 
when choosing for third-parties, with the susceptibility decreasing as involvement 
for the decisions decreased. This shows that personal involvement in the outcome 
of the decision can alter choice preferences, resulting in different decisions when 
personal involvement is low, i.e. choosing for a third-party, than when personal 
involvement is high, i.e. choosing for the self. Thus, this suggests that people may 
have different preferences for cooperation when deciding on behalf of a 
third-party.
 Some studies have examined if third-party choice alters social preferences 
(Pronin, Olivola & Kennedy, 2008; Beisswanger et al., 2003; Trautmann & Vieider, 
2011). For example, when deciding for others people demonstrate a preference for 
choice options with high desirable and low feasible outcomes (e.g. a better 
restaurant which is further away) rather than options with less desirable but 
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highly feasible outcomes (e.g. a lower quality restaurant, but close-by) (Lu et al., 
2013). In line with these results, for monetary gambles temporal distance was 
found to increase the influence of payoffs (i.e. desirability) and to decrease the 
influence of probability (i.e. feasibility) on preferences (Sagristano et al., 2002). A 
similar result has also been observed for choices between sooner smaller and later 
larger rewards, with greater preferences for the delayed reward for others than for 
oneself (Albrecht et al., 2011; Kim, Schnall & White, 2013). However, other studies 
have found no difference between third-party and first-person decisions (Stone et 
al., 2002; Civai et al., 2010; Corradi-Dell’acqua et al., 2013). For instance, decisions 
on behalf of a third-party regarding fairness demonstrated an equal preference 
for fairness to when the offer was directed to the individual herself (Civai et al., 
2010; Corradi-Dell’acqua et al., 2013). Though not yielding a behavioural effect, 
these studies did show a difference in the underlying neural processes, suggesting 
that the decision-maker’s role does indeed have some impact. For example, the 
strong negative affective response that occurs when receiving unfair offers for 
oneself was absent when receiving these offers on behalf of a third-party (Civai et 
al., 2010), and activity in reward and affect-related brain regions for third-party 
decisions was diminished relative to self choices (Civai et al., 2010; Albrecht et al., 
2011; Corradi-Dell’acqua et al., 2013). This suggests that affective and reward-related 
responses involved in social decision-making are weaker, or even absent, when 
the decision-maker is not directly involved in the outcome of the choice. Taken 
together, the research literature regarding third-party decision-making has 
shown that choice preferences can differ when choosing for a third-party 
compared to choices made for the self, both behaviourally as well as in underlying 
brain processes. Specifically, the extent of personal involvement of the 
decision-maker plays an important role in both preferences for risk as well as 
social preferences.
 In this study we were interested in examining whether the reported 
differences in the third-party literature also apply to cooperative decisions. One 
behavioural model is that cooperative decisions for third-party are the same as for 
first-person, in line with some previous research (Civai et al., 2010; Stone et al., 
2002). Third-party decisions might be taken with a self-perspective, that is, 
deciding for others as we would decide for ourselves. Alternately, third-party 
decisions may cause the individual to take the perspective of the other person, 
which might result in using different decision rules, and thereby altering decision 
preferences of cooperation. 
 To study this model of third-party cooperation, we used the Public Goods 
Game (PGG) (Samuelson, 1954; Andreoni, 1988). This is an experimental task 
adopted from classical Game Theory, which models strategic behaviour in social 
contexts via simple economic paradigms (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). In 
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the standard PGG (our “Self” condition), a group of players each receive a monetary 
endowment, and then all have to decide simultaneously how much, if any, of this 
amount they are willing to contribute to a public pot, keeping the remainder for 
themselves. The total sum of the pot is then multiplied by a reward factor (usually 
1.6) and this ‘public good’ is then redistributed equally across all players, 
irrespective of how much each individual has contributed. After all participants 
have decided, the payoff of the pot is revealed and a new round starts. Similarly to 
public goods in real life (e.g. clean air or public parks), all participants receive an 
equal share of the public good, regardless of how much each individual decides to 
contribute (i.e. personal cost) in providing the good. In the condition in which the 
decision-maker is jointly involved in the public good outcome (“Shared”), the 
decision-maker decides how much to contribute on behalf of a selected player, 
and shares both the endowment and outcome of the public good with their 
partner. In the “Third-Party” condition, the decision-maker also decides on behalf 
of a selected player, similar to the Shared condition, however in this case the 
decision-maker is not involved in the outcome of the public good. 
 A player who seeks to maximize his profit should contribute less than the 
average, or even nothing at all (free-ride), which typically results in receiving the 
highest payoff. Conversely, a cooperator is a player that accepts a higher personal 
cost for the benefit of the collective, by contributing the average amount or higher. 
A great deal of research using the PGG has demonstrated that people do not simply 
maximize their own economic gain (Camerer, 2003), but do care about others’ 
payoffs, and data indicates that people contribute on average around 40% of their 
initial endowment to the public pot (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 
2001). Thus, social motivations are important in determining cooperation. In 
situations when these decisions are made on behalf of others it is unclear if, and 
how, these motives influences cooperation. For example, third-party decisions 
may in addition elicit a form of responsibility for the decision and outcome of the 
good, both toward the group and the beneficiary. 
 The aim of this study is twofold. The first aim is to explore third-party 
cooperation, that is, to assess if cooperative decisions change as a function of 
whether the decision-maker is materially involved in the outcome or not. If there 
are differences depending on the role of the decision-maker, one possible outcome 
is that cooperation levels might increase when deciding on behalf of someone 
else. Reducing material involvement by deciding for a third-party might reduce 
self-interest. Studies on cooperation (for self only) have shown that the ability of 
people to focus on long-term benefits by overriding short-term self-interest 
induced higher levels of contributions (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). In line with 
previous studies on third-party showing less impulsive behaviour (Albrecht et al., 
2011; Kim et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2013), this suggests that third-party cooperative 
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decisions might result in higher contribution levels. Alternatively, third-party 
cooperative choices may show reduced contribution levels as a result of an 
aversion to take responsibility and risk for another (Charness & Jackson, 2009; 
Reynolds et al., 2009; Leonhardt et al., 2011). In a strategic game such as the PGG, 
the social uncertainty of reciprocation as well as the responsibility for deciding 
for a third-party might actually result in the avoidance of the risk of cooperating, 
and as a result in choices of the safer option to defect or free-ride. The second aim 
is to identify motives relevant for cooperation, and specifically for third-party 
cooperation, by examining whether peoples’ willingness to cooperate on behalf 
of a third-party is altered when varying the social context of the group. We 
examined cooperation for first- and third-parties, in a social context (e.g. affecting 
other human players) and in a non-social context (e.g. affecting purported 
computer players). This will help us decompose the fundamental motives that 
guide our preferences to cooperate, and test if third-party cooperation is driven by 
enhanced social preferences or rather triggered by other factors (e.g. risk 
preferences). 
 Based on previous literature on third-party decision-making, third-party 
cooperation decisions might increase with decreasing personal involvement. 
Decreasing personal involvement in the outcome of the decision for a third-party 
may reduce the impact of the uncertainty of reciprocation, and a preference 
towards outcomes that are beneficial for the collective. On the other hand, if 
cooperation levels for social as well as non-social players are the same, then this 
suggests that preferences for risk may play a more prominent role than social 
preferences in determining cooperation. In the second study therefore, we can 
isolate these motivations by exploring the willingness to cooperate for self and 
for third-party when playing against both human players (social context) and 
computer players (non-social context). 
 To answer the aforementioned questions, participants played multiple blocks, 
and within each block multiple rounds, of the PGG, under various different 
conditions. In the first study, we manipulated the personal involvement in the 
PGG, within-subjects: participants played a block for themselves (“Self”), a block 
for themselves and a third-party (“Shared”), and a block solely for a third-party 
(“Third-Party”). In the second study, participants randomly played the PGG with 
either human players (i.e. social condition) or computer players (i.e. non-social 
condition), in blocks for themselves (“Self”), and solely on behalf of a third-party 
(“Third-party”). 
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Materials and Methods Study 1
Participants
60 volunteers participated in the study. All gave written informed consent and 
received research credits for participation. Participants could earn a monetary 
bonus (between €0 - €10) depending on their performance in a selection of rounds 
that they played on their own behalf and rounds that another player played on 
their behalf. Experimental exclusion criteria were self-reported history of 
psychiatric disorders, regular use of marijuana, or use of psychotropic drugs. One 
participant (male) was excluded because of reported daily drug use. Data is 
therefore reported from 59 participants (Male = 17, M = 22.67 years, SD = 2.82). The 
study was approved by the local ethics committee. 
Design
We employed a modified version of the Public Goods Game (PGG; Fehr & Gächter, 
2000) to study cooperative decisions. Three PGG conditions were used; 1) 
participants played the task for themselves, in which case their total earnings 
from the public pot would then be paid out to them (Self), 2) participants played 
the task on behalf of themselves and a randomly selected, anonymous, player 
(‘partner’), in which case their total earnings from the public pot would be split 
between the participant and his partner (Shared), and 3) participants played the 
task on behalf of a randomly selected, anonymous, player, in which case the other 
player would receive the total earnings from the pot and the decision-maker did 
not receive anything (Third-Party). Participants were told that when they would 
be playing on behalf of another player, that another participant in turn would be 
playing for him/her. 
 At the beginning of the task participants were shown the beneficiary for 
whom they would play. Importantly, they did not know about the other conditions 
in advance, to avoid inducing use of a fixed strategy. Participants played all three 
conditions, with each condition consisting of 20 experimental rounds, and 60 
experimental rounds in total. Order of conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants, resulting in a total of 6 possible orders, distributed equally across 
participants. A total of 19 participants started in the Self condition, 20 participants 
started in Shared condition, and 20 participants in the Third-Party condition.
Procedure
After the instructions of the modified PGG, participants first filled in a 
questionnaire to ensure that they understood the task completely. At the 
beginning of the experiment, participants were told that their bonus would be 
paid out at the end of the entire study (i.e. when all participants had played the 
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game). Therefore, no feedback was given about the income of the pot and the 
outcome of each round the participants played for the respective beneficiary. 
Participants were told that they would play three blocks of the game, with some 
extra instruction given before the start of a new block. Because participants were 
not informed in advance that they would also be playing for different beneficiaries, 
all participants were told that in each block one round would be selected randomly 
and the total earned tokens in those rounds (i.e. tokens kept plus an equal share of 
the pot) would be converted to Euros and paid out at the end of the study. The 
conversion rate of a token was not announced in advance in order to avoid nudging 
players into merely adopting a profit-maximizing strategy (Andreoni, 1988).  
 At the start of the experiment participants saw the beneficiary they would 
be playing for. In the Self condition, a silhouette with the text “You” was 
highlighted. For both the Shared and Third-Party condition, one player with a 
random ID number was selected from a pool of 24 players at the start of the block, 
and was highlighted as the partner or other player, respectively. The selected 
player stayed the same throughout the block. 
 At the start of each trial (i.e. PGG round), participants saw a fixation cross 
(1000 ms), followed by a screen where a yellow box selected three other players 
randomly from the pool of the remaining 23 players. The selected players were the 
group players for that round with whom the participant would share the public 
pot. After the selection of the group players, a contribution screen was presented 
and participants had 8 seconds to indicate how much of their endowment, if any, 
they wanted to contribute to the public pot. If the endowment was 10 tokens, 
participants could indicate an amount between 0-10 (with steps of 1) to contribute 
to the pot. If they received 20 tokens as endowment, they could choose any 
amount between 0-20 (with steps of 2) (see Figure 1). The endowment amount per 
round was randomly determined. After confirming their choice, a screen 
indicating that their contribution was saved was presented and a new round 
began after a random time interval. If the participants did not confirm their 
choice within 8 seconds, the round ended with a warning message reminding 
participants to respond within 8 seconds. On each round three other players were 
randomly selected from the same pool of 23 players. 
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 At the beginning of each new block of the PGG, participants received extra 
instructions introducing the new beneficiary of that PGG, including the 
implications to the payoff of the pot. Each block began with 4 examples of possible 
scenarios, followed by 2 practice rounds; analogous to the instruction of the first 
condition they played. 
 In total, participants played 60 experimental trials, 20 trials per condition 
(Self, Shared, and Third-Party), per block. The task was presented in Psychophysics 
Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) running on MATLAB ® R2011b (The MathWorks). 
After finishing the PGG, participants completed a questionnaire online (Qualtrics 
Fig. 1  Modified Public Goods Game. Each round begins by randomly selecting 3 group 
players with whom the beneficiary will share the public good. Next, participants will see 
their endowment (tokens) and asked to indicate how many tokens they would be willing to 
contribute. After confirmation of the selected amount, the game round ends after which a 
new round starts. No feedback is given. A) The Self PGG. An example of a round played for 
the Self. B) The Shared PGG. At the beginning of the block, the partner for whom the 
decision-maker will choose to cooperate is selected, and stays the same over the entire 
block. C) The Third-Party PGG. Participants choose on behalf of another person, whom is also 
selected at the beginning of the block.
+ + + 
A) B) C) 
Selecting  
beneficiary 
(Beginning of block) 
Selecting   
3 players 
Decision 
Confirmation 
of decision 
”Shared-Contribution Game"  
”Other-Contribution Game"  
”Other-Contribution Game"  
”Shared-Contribution Game"  ”Your-Contribution Game"  
”Your-Contribution Game"  
”Your-Contribution Game"  ”Shared-Contribution Game"  ”Other-Contribution Game"  
”Other-Contribution Game"  ”Shared-Contribution Game"  
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Software, 2014) about the task, such as their expectations and beliefs, and 
demographics. All participants had to return to receive their payments. 
Analysis
In order to assess the level of cooperation per condition, we assessed the proportion 
of tokens contributed on each trial as the dependent measure (continuous variable 
from 0 – 1). We included four within-subject factors: ‘beneficiary by personal 
involvement’ (three levels: Self, Shared, Third-Party), ‘endowment’ (two levels: 10 
or 20 tokens), and also the start position of the contribution box ‘startposition’ 
(continuous variable of 11 positions from 0-10) and ‘block’ (Three levels: first, 
second, and third block). Reaction times were measured in seconds (fixed interval: 
0-8 seconds), and outliers were determined and excluded from analysis by means 
of the number of key presses that were at least 3 standard deviations from the 
median using Hampel identifier approach (14 trials with 14 key presses or more 
were excluded). All behavioural statistics were computed using the R statistical 
package (R Development Core Team, R version 3.1.2. (Pumpkin Helmet), 2014). A 
linear mixed effect model was performed, using the mixed function of the 
package (afex, v.0.12-135) for Analysis of Factorial Experiments (Singmann, 2014), 
running with lme4 (v.1.1-7) (Bates, Maechler, Bolker & Walker, 2014). The model 
contained the four within-participant factors to predict participant’s willingness 
to cooperate (continuous variable from 0 – 100%). To account for the repeat-
ed-measures of the data, a random adjustment of each participant was allowed to 
vary to the fixed intercept, by including a random intercept by subject in the 
model (e.g. Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). Within-unit random slopes for 
within-subject effects (i.e. ‘Beneficiary’ and ‘Endowment’) were included. 
Significance levels were calculated with the Kenward-Roger (KR) correction 
implemented in the mixed() function (Singmann, 2014) For all post-hoc pairwise 
multiple comparisons and descriptives (i.e. least-squares means, 95% confidence 
intervals (CI)), we used the lsmeans function of the lsmeans package (v.2.13) (Lenth, 
2014). 
Results Study 1
Cooperation levels by personal involvement: on behalf of Self, 
Partner (Shared), and Third-party
Participants on average transferred 49.7% of their endowment to the public pot. 
Of most interest to this study was whether the level of personal involvement in 
the outcome of the public pot (beneficiary) influences how much individuals 
would be willing to cooperate with other players, as defined by contribution 
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amounts. Indeed, personal involvement significantly affected cooperation levels 
(F(1, 54.04) = 5.44, p = .007). That is, the amount of cooperation was higher when 
there was no personal involvement in the outcome (i.e. Third-Party) (M Third-Party = 
0.561, CI = [0.489, 0.633]), as compared to when personal involvement was highest 
(i.e. Self) (M Self = 0.444, CI = [0.386, 0.503]; Cooperation Third-Party – Self  t(55.66) = 3.094, 
p = 0.009). Deciding on both the self and the third-party’s behalf (i.e. Shared) 
resulted in a marginally lower cooperation amount relative to the Third-Party 
condition (M Shared = 0.486, CI = [0.424, 0.549], Cooperation Third-Party – Shared t(55.44) = 
2.126, p=0.093), and a marginally higher cooperation amount relative to the Self 
(Cooperation Shared – Self  t(54.62) = -2.331, p =0.060) (Figure 2).
Participants contributed fewer of their tokens when endowed with 20 tokens (M20 
tokens = 0.485, CI = [0.430, 0.539]) as compared to 10 tokens (M10 tokens = 0.510, CI = 
[0.456, 0.564]) (F(1, 58.69) = 5.12, p = 0.03), which was the same for all conditions 
(F(2, 3270.55) = 1.85, p = 0.16). Furthermore, when examining cooperation in only 
the first block, that is between-subjects, cooperation amounts did not differ 
between conditions, F(1, 10.26) = 1.85, p = .21 (M Self = 0.400, CI = [0.235, 0.565]; M Shared 
= 0.454, CI = [0.353, 0.555]; M Third-Party = 0.549, CI = [0.445, 0.651]), demonstrating 
Fig. 2  Cooperation level across conditions of personal involvement. Error bars are one +- 
standard error of the mean.  . p <.10, ** p <.01
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no significant difference in cooperation between different levels of personal 
involvement.
Reaction times of cooperation: on behalf of Self, Partner (Shared), 
and Third-Party
We tested whether beneficiaries with different levels of personal involvement 
affected reaction times for decision to cooperate, which could imply a difference 
in difficulty in processing the decision for different beneficiaries. No differences 
in reaction time for Self (M = 3.242, CI = [3.008, 3.476]), Shared (M = 3.297, CI = [3.055, 
3.539]), and Other (M = 3.147, CI =[2.888, 3.407]) was observed, (F(2, 1252.14) = 1.39, 
p = .25. Participants became faster in decision-making over time (F(2, 98.8) = 22.93, 
p < .001; M block1 = 3.525, CI = [3.280, 3.770], M block2 = 3.218, CI = [2.973, 3.463], M block3 = 
2.943, CI = [2.698, 3.189]), which was the same for all beneficiaries (F(2, 105.35) = 
0.85, p = .50). 
Conclusion Study 1 
In this experiment we examined if cooperation levels were influenced by the 
extent of personal involvement in the public good. We varied the involvement in 
the public good, looking at when a participant decided how much he/she was 
willing to contribute for herself (i.e. standard PGG; Self), for a partner in which the 
decision-maker and partner split the payoff of the public good (Shared), and for a 
third-party in which the decision-maker was not involved in the outcome of the 
public good (Third-Party). Firstly, we found that participants contributed, on 
average, 50% of their own endowment, following closely with other studies of 
cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Participants were more willing to cooperate 
on behalf of a third-party as compared to cooperating for themselves. Moreover, 
when participants had to decide how much to cooperate on behalf of a third-party 
in which they shared the total income of the pot, participants contributed less as 
compared to not being materially involved in the public good (Third-Party). 
However, they still cooperated more in comparison to being directly involved in 
the payoff of the pot, that is, when cooperating with only themselves as the 
beneficiary. These results indicate that reducing self-related interests and 
enhancing focus on the other beneficiary’s payoff, by choosing on behalf of a 
third-party, increases cooperation. In other words, people potentially place more 
weight on social values when personal involvement is reduced. Moreover, 
preference to cooperate across personal involvement did not differ at the first 
block. That is, when no comparison between levels of involvement could be made, 
cooperation amounts were the same. This suggests that at first, people use a 
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“default” decision preference to cooperate, and when the situation changes to 
more or less involvement, the new situation is compared to the prior situation and 
decision preferences are updated. 
Study 2. Third-Party cooperation for social  
and non-social contexts
In the first study we investigated how reducing material involvement in the 
public good encourages cooperation. Decreased material involvement is 
hypothesized to enhance social preferences underlying cooperation, such as the 
preference to abide by social norms and rules (Fehr & Fischbacher et al., 2004a). 
However, the PGG used in Study 1 always contained a social component, that is, 
the group were always human players with whom the outcome of the public good 
was determined and shared. To examine whether increased cooperation on 
behalf of a third-party is driven by pure social motives (e.g. collective benefit) and 
not other self-related motives (e.g. risk or reputation), we included a non-social 
group (computer players) and a social group (human players). In addition, we 
compared only cooperative decisions for a third-party in which the decision-maker 
was not materially involved (Third-Party), with the standard PGG in which the 
decision-maker decides for themselves and is materially involved in the outcome. 
The rationale to examine only the two conditions is because these showed the 
largest differences in cooperation in the first study. In Study 2 we aimed to 
replicate the findings of Study 1, that is, enhanced cooperation on behalf of 
third-party, and additionally examine whether this is strongest for social or 
non-social groups.
Materials and Methods Study 2
Participants
47 volunteers participated in the study. All gave written informed consent with 
10, taking part for course credit while the remaining received €10 for participation. 
Participants could earn a monetary bonus (between €0 - €5) depending on their 
performance in a selection of rounds that they played on their own behalf, and 
rounds that another player played on their behalf. The average bonus paid was 
€1.33. Experimental exclusion criteria were a self-reported history of psychiatric 
disorders, regular use of marijuana, or use of psychotropic drugs, and elaborate 
foreknowledge about the nature of the experiment. One participant was excluded 
because she had just taken part in a similar public goods game study; one other 
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participant was excluded due to technical problems. Data is therefore reported 
from 45 participants (7 males, M = 21.33 years, SD = 2.45). The study was approved 
by the local ethics committee. 
Design
In this experiment we used a similar version of the PGG employed in Study 1. In 
Study 2 we investigated two conditions, “Self” versus “Third-Party”, as outlined in 
Study 1. Again, the other player was an anonymous other player who was 
randomly selected at the beginning of the game and remained the beneficiary of 
the participant throughout the experiment. 
 The critical addition to this experiment is the group composition (which we 
refer to here as context). Here, we directly compared cooperation decisions in 
social versus non-social contexts, by including a group of computer players (i.e. 
non-social context) in addition to the original paradigm with anonymous human 
players (i.e. social context) with whom the public pot was shared. Participants 
were told that the computer players followed ‘pre-programmed strategies’, and 
were presented as computer logos (see Figure.3).
Procedure
The procedure of Study 2 was similar to Study 1. Instructions of the task, and rules 
of bonus payment were similar and made clear from the beginning. Again, 
participants were told that the other human players were participants in the 
experiment who either already participated or still had to participate in the game. 
No feedback was given about the outcome of each round. 
 Participants were told that they would play two blocks of the task. Participants 
played one block only for the Self and one block only for a Third-Party, counterbal-
anced. The different group contexts (social and non-social) were randomized 
within each block. Brief instructions were given before the start of a new block. 
Similar to Study 1, participants were not informed in advance that they would be 
playing for different beneficiaries. 
 After the instructions participants performed four practice trials: with a 10- 
and 20-token initial endowment, and with a “Social” and “Non-social” group. In 
the same way as Study 1, participants first saw the beneficiary they would be 
playing for, either as a silhouette with the text “You” (Self condition), or as a 
silhouette with a random ID number (Third-Party condition), who was randomly 
selected from a pool of 24 players at the start of the block. Participant had to 
confirm that they understood they would be playing for this person throughout 
the experiment. 
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At the start of each trial (i.e. PGG round), participants saw a fixation cross (500 
ms). They were then informed about the composition of their group in the round 
to come. A non-social group was depicted by three computer logos, while in a 
Fig. 3  Modified Public Goods Game with social and non-social group context. Each round 
begins by randomly selecting 3 group players with whom the beneficiary will share the 
public good. Next, participants will see their endowment (tokens) and asked to indicate 
how much they would be willing to contribute. After confirmation of the selected amount, 
the game round ends after which a new round starts. No feedback is given. A) The Self PGG. 
An example of a round played for the Self in the social context (with human players). B) The 
Third-Party PGG. At the beginning of the block, the other person is selected for whom the 
decision-maker will choose to cooperate for multiple rounds. An example of a round played 
for the third-party in the non-social context (computer players) is shown.
+ + 
A) B) 
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social group there were three silhouettes with anonymous ID numbers randomly 
selected from a pool of other participants’ ID numbers. Upon a keystroke for 
confirmation, the contribution screen appeared. Participants could then indicate 
how much of the initial endowment, if any, they wanted to contribute to the 
public pot. The selection of amount was the same as experiment one. 
 Upon completion of the first block, participants were informed they would 
continue in a second block. They were introduced to the new beneficiary of the 
PGG and shown the rules of the game again. Importantly, participants did not 
know in advance that they would be playing on behalf of someone else if they 
had started in the Self condition, and vice versa. In total, participants played 80 
experimental trials, 40 trials per condition (Self, Third-Party), per block. Participants 
were endowed at the start of each round with either 10 or 20 tokens, randomly 
selected across trials, and participants shared the public pot with non-social 
groups and social groups (20 trials per group context in each block). The task was 
presented in Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) running on 
MATLAB ® R2011b (The MathWorks).
 After finishing the PGG, participants were shown the ID number of the player 
that had played on their behalf. Subsequently, they were asked to select six rounds 
out of all the rounds played, by means of six keystrokes while trial numbers 
randomly flashed on the screen, that would be used to calculate their bonus. Three 
of these rounds corresponded to the participant’s trials from the Self condition, 
while the three other rounds corresponded to trials from the anonymous person 
that had formerly played on the participant’s behalf in the Third-Party condition. 
Before the calculation of the bonus participants completed an online questionnaire 
(Qualtrics Software, 2014) about the task, similar to Study 1. 
 After the questionnaire, the bonus was paid out, which was based on six 
randomly selected rounds. Only rounds played with computer players were 
selected for payment, because not all the participants had participated yet. The 
average total balance of these six rounds determined whether participants 
received a bonus between €0 - €7.50. In total, the experiment lasted about an hour.
Analysis
In order to assess the level of cooperation, the proportion of tokens contributed on 
each trial was used as the dependent measure (continuous variable from 0 – 1). To 
predict participant’s willingness to cooperate, we included five within-subject 
factors: ‘beneficiary’ (two levels: Self, Third-Party), ‘group context’ (two levels: 
social, non-social), ‘endowment’ (two levels: 10 or 20 tokens), the start position of 
the contribution box ‘startposition’ (0-10) and ‘block’ (two levels: first and second). 
To account for the repeated-measures of the data, random adjustment of each 
participant was allowed to vary to the fixed intercept, and was included as a 
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random intercepts by subject in the model (e.g. Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). 
Within-unit random slopes for within-subject effects (for ‘beneficiary’, ‘group 
context’, ‘endowment’) were included. Behavioural analyses were computed 
identically to Study 1. Reaction times were measured in seconds (fixed interval: 
0-8 seconds), and outliers were determined and excluded from analysis by the 
same procedure as study one (trials with 12 key presses or more were excluded, in 
total 45 trials). For all post-hoc pairwise multiple comparisons and descriptives 
(i.e. least-squares means, 95% confidence intervals (CI)), we used the lsmeans 
function of the lsmeans package (v.2.13) (Lenth, 2014). 
Results Study 2
Cooperation levels with social and non-social groups: on behalf of 
Self and Third-Party 
Replicating results from Study 1, participants contributed significantly more 
tokens on behalf of a Third-Party than for themselves (Self), F(1,43.37) = 13.68, 
p < .001 (M Third-Party = 0.473, CI = [0.429, 0.516], M Self = 0.368, CI = [0.322, 0.414]). 
Cooperation amounts were not higher when playing with human players (social 
context) as compared to playing with computer players (non-social context), 
F(1, 44.01) = 1.54, p = 0.22,  There was a significant interaction observed between 
beneficiary and context of the group (F(1, 3346.24) = 19.15, p < .001) (Figure 4). That 
is, participants contributed more on behalf of the Third-Party with human players 
(social context) as compared to with computer players (non-social context) 
(M social-nonsocial = 0.066, t(47.70) = 2.089, p = 0.042), whereas contribution levels for 
oneself was not influenced by the group context (M social-nonsocial = 0.011, t(47.76) = 
0.342, p = 0.734). Furthermore, participants contributed more for the Third-Party 
relative to the Self in the social context, t(47.72) = 4.560, p < .001, and also more in 
the non-social context, t(47.77) = 2.662, p = 0.01 (see Figure 4). After the task, 
participants were asked to rate the importance of cooperation with humans and 
with computers (on a slider from 0-100). Participants rated the importance of 
cooperation with humans (M = 56.4) significantly higher than cooperation with 
computers (M = 35.5): t(91.558) = 4.205, p < .001.
 Participants’ initial contribution amount in the first block, on average, was 
the same irrespective of contributing on behalf of a third-party or the self (M Other 
= 0.429, CI = [0.366, 0.492]; M Self = 0.407, CI = [0.342, 0.472]), F(1, 42.98) = 0.021, 
p = 0.886. However, in the second block, when participants switched cooperative 
decisions by beneficiary (from Self to Third-Party, and Third-Party to Self) a 
significant change in cooperation levels was observed, F(1, 43.00) = 5.43, p = 0.025. 
Specifically, participants who started in the Self condition (and therefore had the 
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5Third-Party condition second, N = 23), cooperated 10.9% more for a Third-Party in the second block (i.e. Third-Party condition, M Self Block 1 = 0.407, CI = [0.342, 0.472], 
M Third-Party Block 2 = 0.516, CI = [0.454, 0.578], t(45.52) = 2.762, p = 0.04). The participants who 
started in the Third-Party condition (and had the Self condition second, 
N = 22) cooperated 10.1% less when then cooperating for the Self in the second 
block, which trended towards significance (M Third-Party Block 1 = 0.429, CI = [0.366, 
0.492], M Self Block 2 = 0.328, CI = [0.262, 0.394], t(45.46)=2.502, p = .073) (Figure 5).
 Participants contributed fewer tokens when endowed with 20 tokens 
(M20 tokens = 0.401, CI = [0.365, 0.437]) as compared to with 10 tokens (M10 tokens = 0.439, 
CI = [0.403, 0.475]), F(1, 43.93) = 14.93, p < .001, which was the same for all conditions, 
F (1, 3327.53) = 0.152, p = 0.697. 
Reaction times of cooperation: on behalf of Self and Third-Party
We tested whether the beneficiary for whom participants decided affected 
reaction times for decision to cooperate. Reaction times did not differ depending 
for whom participants were deciding (F(1, 42.99) = 0.50, p = .48). However, 
participants’ decisions were slower when playing with human players as 
compared to computer players (M Humans = 3.060, CIs = [2.811, 3.310]; M Computers = 2.928, 
CIs = [2.698, 3.158]), F (1, 43.90) = 8.00, p = .007. Participants were faster at making 
Fig. 4  Cooperation levels by personal involvement (Self and Third-Party) and group context 
(Social and Non-social). Error bars are one +- standard error of the mean. * p <.05, *** p <.001
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decisions in the second block as compared to the first block (M Block 1 = 3.258, CIs = 
[3.007, 3.508], M Block 2 = 2.730; CIs = [2.479, 2.982]), F(1, 42.99) = 33.59, p < .001. 
Moreover, decision times for each block were not influenced depending for whom 
the decision was made, F (1, 42.99) = 3.49, p = .07).
Conclusion Study 2
We again showed that varying the involvement in the public good by means of 
choosing either on behalf of oneself or for a third-party influenced the willingness 
to cooperate. Individuals contributed more on behalf of a third-party than 
when choosing for themselves. Notably cooperation amounts between Self and 
Third-Party only differed in the second block of the PGG. Specifically, participants 
who cooperated first for the Self in block 1 and then on behalf of a Third-Party in 
block 2, contributed 11% more on average when cooperating for another person. 
Participants whom cooperated first for the Third-Party in block 1 contributed 10% 
less when cooperating for the self in block 2. In other words, preference to cooperate 
Fig. 5  Cooperation levels by personal involvement (Self and Third-Party) per block. 
Participants whom began cooperating for the Self, then cooperated on behalf of a third-party 
in the second block, and vice versa. Error bars are one +- standard error of the mean. . p <.10, 
* p <.05
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
(p
ro
po
rti
on
) 
Block 1 Block 2 
0 
Third-Party Self Self Third-Party
*.
209895-L-bw-vermeer
103
THIRD-PARTY COOPERATION
5
across personal involvement did not differ at the first block, similar to Study 1. 
However, when personal involvement changed to more or less involvement, 
decision preferences were compared to the previous situation and updated 
accordingly. The social and non-social group context affected cooperation 
amounts on behalf of third-party, though not when participants played on own 
behalf. That is, participants contributed more tokens on behalf of a third-party 
when the public good was shared with other human players (i.e. social context) 
than when it was shared with computer players (i.e. non-social context). 
Furthermore, cooperation with humans was rated as more important than 
cooperation with computers, which was also reflected in reaction times. 
General discussion
The main question of interest in the current study was to examine whether the 
degree to which the decision-maker is affected by the outcome of a cooperative 
interaction would influence contribution amounts in a Public Goods Game. We 
examined this by comparing choosing for oneself as compared to choosing for a 
third-party, as well as an intermediate condition where both the decision-maker 
and their partner benefitted equally. Additionally, we examined whether 
willingness to cooperate is impacted by both social and non-social group contexts. 
Large-scale cooperative decisions are often made by individuals on behalf of other 
people (i.e. third-party), hence it is of immediate interest to understand how these 
decisions are made in comparison to standard individual cooperative decisions. 
 Results demonstrated clearly that cooperative behaviour was at its maximal 
when deciding on behalf of a third-party, as compared to when deciding for a 
third-party and being jointly involved in the public good, as well as when only 
deciding for oneself. In other words, when material involvement in the decision is 
reduced, self-related strategic interests are correspondingly reduced, and social 
preferences are thus enhanced which resulted in a greater extent of cooperative 
behaviour. This result suggests that people place higher value on social motives 
when personal involvement is reduced. Conversely, relative to choosing on behalf 
of a third-party, when choosing on one’s own behalf, the comparison between 
self-related and social motives may give strategic selfish motives higher value, 
thereby reducing cooperation levels. These results are in line with research 
demonstrating strong preferences for social norm behaviour, which are widely 
shared standards that are based on beliefs about how one should behave in a 
given situation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a). For instance, bystanders in a social 
dilemma game were highly motivated to punish players that did not behave in 
line with the social norm, known as so-called third-party punishment (Fehr & 
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Fischbacher, 2004b). Furthermore, motives to behave in line with social norms, 
were also demonstrated by third-party decisions in bargaining contexts (Corradi- 
Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). They showed that on behalf of a third-party (relative to 
self) receiving unfair divisions of money, correlated to neural activity in the AI, 
which has been associated to behaviours such as violating social norms. 
Conversely, they showed that neural activity in the mPFC correlated to receiving 
unfair offers on behalf of oneself, which has been found to also correlate to 
self-related emotions. The aforementioned studies and the current findings of the 
role of personal involvement on cooperation imply that social preferences for 
behaviour in line of social norms become more important when deciding on 
behalf of third-party.
 A potential mechanism via which third-party decisions enhance preferences 
for cooperation is by perspective taking. The process of taking perspective has 
been linked to enhanced activity in the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) and 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), areas also involved in making inferences 
about other people’s thoughts and feelings, commonly referred to as Theory-of-Mind 
(Frith & Frith, 2006). These processes have been linked to empathy (Singer et al., 
2006), socially salient stimuli (Decety & Lamm, 2007), and other-related 
preferences in decisions for third-party (Jung et al., 2011; Janowski et al., 2012). The 
ability to take perspective of others has shown to indirectly increase preferences 
for social behaviour. Studies on cooperation (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; McCabe et 
al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004) reported Theory-of-Mind processes to be involved 
when choosing to cooperate, suggesting that the ability to take another’s 
perspective plays an important role in cooperation (Stallen & Sanfey, 2013). Thus, 
third-party decisions may facilitate the individual to take the perspective of 
the other person. This may result in additional integration of social information 
when evaluating decision rules and thus lead to different preferences to when 
comparing and valuating choice options from ones own perspective. Thus, 
varying the degree of individuals’ involvement in the public good shift preferences 
for cooperation in favour of the collective benefit and away from personal 
cost-benefit strategies. Future studies could address this more specifically by 
studying if perspective-taking in the context of cooperation elicits activity in 
regions referred to Theory-of-Mind network, in particular TPJ, and examine 
whether this activity subsequently modulates other processes and networks (e.g. 
mPFC, AI and ACC; Stallen & Sanfey, 2013) correlating with pro-social decisions 
that match social norm-related behaviour.
 A potential alternative interpretation of the results reported here is that 
instead of increasing individuals’ preferences for social outcomes, third-party 
decisions may reflect a higher willingness to engage in social risk-taking when 
personal involvement is low. Prior work has reported increased risk-taking with 
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other peoples’ money in an investment game (Agranov & Bisin, 2011). However, 
our results in Study 2 suggest that higher cooperation is not driven by risk 
preferences, but driven by preferences based on social interests. Here, participants 
contributed more on behalf of a third-party when playing with humans than 
when playing with computer players (non-social context). Cooperation for oneself 
did not show a difference in contribution amounts for human or computer players, 
which suggest that preferences for self-related outcomes are more valued than 
social preferences. Nevertheless, in the non-social group context, third-party 
cooperative decisions were also higher than cooperative decisions for the self, 
which could potentially suggest a slight increase in risk for third-party. A possible 
explanation for the differences between self and third-party cooperation in the 
non-social context is due to an anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). As 
shown by the data, we find that people start off with a similar cooperation level 
independent of the extent of personal involvement. Once they have to cooperate 
for another beneficiary (either themselves or a third-party), their cooperation 
preferences shifts relative to their preferences for the previous beneficiary. 
Cooperation on behalf of a third-party with human players resulted in generally 
higher cooperation amounts as compared to cooperation for the self. Higher 
cooperation amounts for third-party may have provided an anchor for cooperation 
amounts at a higher level when playing with computers. Factors other than social 
preferences, such as lack of responsibility when ones’ own payoffs are not at risk, 
did not cause higher contributions. Participants decided to cooperate marginally 
more (relative to the self), when being both jointly involved and choosing on 
behalf of a third-party with whom they shared the payoff, thereby minimizing 
lack of responsibility and careless behaviour. That is, participants adjusted their 
cooperation amounts more in line with behaviour that benefits the group and less 
towards self-interest. In comparison, participants who were only responsible for 
the decision for a third-party, but not involved in the payoffs of the public good, 
showed cooperation levels that were somewhat higher. However, this difference 
was not significant as compared to choosing for a third-party and sharing the 
payoff from the public good. Thus, deciding to cooperate on behalf of a third-party 
enhances cooperation due to increased social preferences for behaviour in line 
with what is socially widely accepted (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a,b). 
 To conclude, the primary goal of the present study was to examine how 
choosing for either oneself or another, anonymous, participant could alter 
preferences for cooperation. In general it has been shown that in these social 
dilemmas people do not act out of pure self-interest, but also value social interests. 
We showed that reducing personal involvement in the public goods game, when 
choosing for a partner or third-party, enhances social interests, as shown by 
greater cooperation in social contexts as compared to non-social contexts. We 
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speculate that these higher cooperation amounts on behalf of a third-party are a 
result of taking the other’s perspective, leading to increased social preferences. 
Understanding which processes enhance cooperation is essential to the existence 
of public goods. The current study provides new insight into third-party decisions 
of cooperation, and moreover, how choosing on behalf of a third-party encourages 
people to be more cooperative.
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In this thesis I described how contexts alter the processing of social and non-social 
risk in situations where the decision-maker is affected by the choice outcome, and 
in situations when another recipient is affected by the choice outcome. More 
specifically, I examined how moment-by-moment changes in small monetary 
reward and punishment contexts affect risk processing and subsequent risky 
choice, how different positive and negative context types affect subsequent 
preferences for risk, and how agency affects preferences for social- and non-social 
monetary risk, in particular, how contexts differently affect decisions on behalf 
of a third-party as compared to decisions on behalf of oneself. 
Overview of the findings in this thesis
In the first empirical chapter (chapter 2) I investigated how gain and loss contexts 
prior to the risky choice affect risk preferences, within-subjects (i.e. framing 
effects). To investigate this, I examined the neural processes underlying 
inconsistent risk preferences while evaluating moment-by-moment changes in 
gain and loss contexts prior to the decision phase. I replicated the behavioural 
shift in risk preferences, similar to the classic framing effect and in line with 
previous literature (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1992; 
De Martino et al., 2006; Tom et al., 2007; Xue et al., 2011). That is, participants who 
had experienced a gain decided to subsequently choose the safer option (i.e. 
passing on the gamble), thereby showing a relative aversion to risk. In contrast, 
when participants were in a loss context, that is when they had just experienced 
a loss, they showed a shift in preference towards the risky gamble, exhibiting 
relatively increased risk-seeking tendencies. This was observed for real, 
consequential, choices. Furthermore, I found the vmPFC responding to a loss 
context when participants decided to take risk, and also to a gain context when 
participants subsequently decided to avoid risk. In other words, the vmPFC 
response reflected the observed preference shift in risk. This demonstrates that 
the vmPFC may integrate and represent the contextual value of a stimulus in 
light of subsequent choice. These findings show that a context that is independent 
of choice outcome, and thereby often ignored when studying decision-making, 
can have a strong impact on our risk preferences. It highlights the importance of 
disentangling different phases of the decision-making process to gain a better 
understanding of unstable risk preferences. 
 An interesting and open question emerged from this study, namely whether 
the behavioural effects for mixed monetary gambles observed previously was 
specific for the type of context, or rather the valence of context. That is, whether 
there were monetary gains/losses or the fact that an individual was successful or 
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unsuccessful in a task affected risk preferences. Chapter 3 investigated this 
question, by separating out the different contexts prior to gambling, and testing 
whether these shifts in risk were specific for context type. Additionally, the aim 
was to gain a better understanding as to whether these behavioural effects were 
primarily driven by one’s aversion to losses, or more driven by the valence of the 
context (positive/negative). I replicated the behavioural findings of chapter 2, that 
is, risk-taking behaviour was strongly affected by the gain or loss context of the 
decision, for contexts that involved monetary gains and losses based on task 
performance. This behavioural effect was strongest for randomly received 
monetary gains and losses, with an increase in proportion of gambles played after 
losing money (compared to gaining money). However, performance success and 
failure feedback, in an unrelated cognitive task, did not differently affect individuals’ 
risk preferences for subsequent mixed monetary gambles. This chapter showed 
that the observed risky preference shifts are primarily driven by the delivery of 
monetary gains and losses and not by success or failure in an unrelated task. This 
highlights the strong context dependence of risk preferences and choices, and 
demonstrates that valence per se does not affect risk preferences, but the type of 
context is an important moderator in the valuation of risk. Furthermore, these 
data suggest that loss aversion is enhanced for monetary mixed gambles in 
contexts that involve monetary gain/loss outcomes. Incompatible contexts, those 
that are inconsistent to the gamble outcome or goal to be achieved (winning 
money), do not affect loss aversion for mixed monetary gambles. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 aimed at exploring how social preferences for risky outcomes 
in social and non-social settings may change when actively choosing for a 
third-party. In chapter 4, I was particularly interested in examining how prior 
monetary gain and loss contexts influence risk preferences for identical choice 
sets when these do not directly affect the agent themselves, but rather are made 
on behalf of a third-party. Firstly, I replicated the behavioural finding of chapter 2 
and 3 when participants decided for themselves. Secondly, I found that prior gains 
and losses had less impact on the risk preferences of agents who decided for a 
third-party. This was shown for identical sets of mixed gambles. Furthermore, 
when increasing responsibility (personal involvement) of the agent towards the 
outcome of their actions, gain/loss contexts influenced risk preferences more 
strongly, as compared to agents with low responsibility. Finally, risk-taking across 
both gain and loss contexts did not differ between agents deciding for oneself 
or a third-party. These results indicate that deciding on behalf of third-party 
specifically alters the context-sensitivity of risk preferences. I speculate that when 
agents’ involvement in the outcomes of the task is reduced, emotional engagement 
in the task is reduced, therefore gain/loss contexts have a weaker bias on risk 
preferences. 
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 In the final empirical chapter (chapter 5), I continued an investigation on the 
role of the agent in social decisions concerning uncertain outcomes, in this case 
cooperative decisions in which the outcome also depends on other players. Firstly, 
I explored whether being personally involved, jointly involved, or not involved in 
the outcome of a public good influenced social preferences for cooperation (Study 
1). Moreover, assuming agency plays a role, I asked whether third-party decisions 
are more pro-social or more pro-self? Secondly, I attempted to specify which 
motives are important when cooperating for a third-party, by examining 
cooperative decisions with both anonymous other social (human) and non-social 
(computer) players (Study 2). In Study 1 I found an increased willingness to 
cooperate when deciding on behalf of a third-party (compared to the self), and 
most strongly when the individual was not personally involved in the distribution 
of the public good. These results suggested that third-party cooperation was 
motivated by social preferences. This is consistent with research demonstrating 
that individuals are willing to pay a cost to have the other person behave in line 
with what is deemed pro-social or fair, even when the individual themselves was 
not affected by the other’s selfish behaviour (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). In Study 
2 I found that cooperation levels on behalf of third-parties were higher when 
playing with humans (social) as compared to when playing with computers 
(non-social). On behalf of the self, cooperation levels were lower (compared to 
third-party), and were the same for social and non-social players. Together, the 
results of chapter 5 showed that reducing personal involvement in the public 
good increased cooperation. Additionally, this increase in cooperation was 
motivated by social preferences that match social norm-related behaviour. 
Cooperation on individuals’ own behalf was not based on social motives, at least 
not more than in non-social contexts, but seemed to be mainly motivated by 
self-related strategic concerns. Finally, the initial cooperation amounts were just 
below 50%, for both agency conditions, in line with prior literature (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Camerer, 2003). 
Differences in cooperation only occurred in the second block, when participants 
were able to compare the decision to a point of reference (how much they 
previously contributed). These findings suggest that changing the role of the 
agent causes people to also shift their preferences relative to a reference point. 
Shifting agency towards the third-person, by possibly taking the other’s 
perspective, may lead to positively value social preferences, whereas taking the 
decision from one’s own perspective may lead to positively value more selfish 
concerns. 
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Context-dependent preferences for risk 
The findings in this thesis showed that positive and negative contexts, prior to 
and unrelated of the gamble, shift reference points in a similar way as choices 
that are framed as either a gain or a loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Furthermore, 
the observed difference in risk-taking for mixed gambles following gain and loss 
contexts can be explained by the concept of loss aversion, in line with Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). That is, losses loom larger than equivalent 
gains, and because of this sensitivity to losses, people are highly motivated to 
avoid loss outcomes. Thus, when in a loss situation, the willingness to avoid this 
loss becomes so high that we are willing to override our risk aversion and take a 
gamble, whereas when in a gain situation, our existing loss aversion is enhanced. 
 Interestingly, the vmPFC evaluated risk preferences for identical risky 
gambles differently, depending on the prior context. Importantly, this finding 
provides additional evidence that the context has a large effect on ones’ risk 
preferences, not only behaviourally, but also in affecting the underlying brain 
processes that are involved in comparing and computing choice values and 
signalling the final choice option. Additionally, the results of this thesis extend 
our knowledge of the diverse but crucial role of the vmPFC in risky decision-mak-
ing, such as signalling expected value (Platt & Huettel, 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; 
Rangel & Hare, 2010; Tom et al., 2007), the final chosen option (Boorman et al., 
2009), predicting choice (Lebreton et al., 2009; Levy et al., 2011), and integrating 
contextual appraisals (Rosenbloom et al., 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012b). These 
results suggest that the vmPFC is a critical area in the ability to integrate multiple 
attributes in the assessment of risky choice preferences. 
 Brain mechanisms for context effects have been studied before. These studies 
however explored how the brain evaluates a gamble option when these are 
presented as either a gain or loss, with these framing effects correlating with an 
underlying emotional response (De Martino et al., 2006). In this thesis, I 
specifically explored how independent small gain/loss contexts, separately and 
prior to the same gambles, might influence how we value the context in light of 
playing the gamble or not. This shows that by changing the context at different 
phases, a similar behavioural response can have different effects on the 
underlying process of risky choice. 
 The contextual framing effect observed here is only apparent when it is 
compatible (i.e. monetary context) and possibly more relevant to the subsequent 
choice and goals (i.e. to earn money). These results postulate that the vmPFC 
might only be integrating those attributes that contain goal-relevant information. 
This is in line with observations in lesion studies, showing that the vmPFC is 
important in informing patients when risk should be inhibited (Sanfey et al., 
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2003; Shiv et al., 2005), and also in representing relevant preferences for the 
current choice option (Nicolle et al., 2012), and in goal-directed choice (Basten et 
al., 2010).  
 To summarize, seemingly relevant context outcomes seem to have a great 
effect on behaviour and it is important to take this into consideration when 
studying risk preferences. Moreover, the compatibility of the context relative to 
the choice itself would seem to be an important moderator in the valuation of risk 
preferences for the subsequent choice. This highlights the strong and specific 
context dependency of risk preferences and choice. Critical areas involved in 
anticipating reward/punishment and involved in emotional response to 
uncertain outcomes, guide choice behaviour consistent with minimizing losses 
and maximizing gains (i.e. Prospect Theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Agency and monetary risk
Living in a social environment involves interaction with other people and entails 
that the many choices we face are not always made on behalf of ourselves. Often 
a friend or even a stranger may ask you what you would do in their position, 
sometimes even asking you to actively decide for them. Integrating potential 
modulatory effects that others may have on our risk preferences and choices 
enriches current knowledge of decision-making. Several studies have attempted 
to examine whether deciding for others increases or decreases our tendencies to 
take risk, such as when investing other peoples’ money (Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2011), or 
when gambling with the total pot of money on behalf of ourselves and the entire 
group (Reynolds & Jackson, 2009). Different methodologies may have led to 
differences in results. 
 This thesis demonstrated that choosing on behalf of third-party decreases the 
sensitivity to prior gain and loss outcomes (i.e. reduced effect of context), which 
potentially underlies a reduced engagement of affective processes, that are 
known to bias decisions for gains and losses (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; De 
Martino et al., 2006, 2010; Canessa et al., 2013). Other studies examining 
third-party decision-making have also found evidence for a reduced emotional 
input while deciding for others, resulting in diminished loss aversion (Mengarelli 
et al., 2014; Polman, 2012), and concerning social preferences for fairness (Civai et 
al., 2010). Along these lines, responsibility or personal involvement is closely 
linked to self-referential emotions during decision-making (Berndsen, et al., 2004; 
Chang et al., 2011; Camille et al., 2004, 2010; Coricelli et al., 2007). These studies 
further support the idea that decisions made for a third-party, with decreased 
personal involvement, are less affect-biased, and therefore show attenuated 
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sensitivity to the context, whereas increasing personal involvement or 
responsibility increases the affective impact of gain/loss outcomes, resulting in 
a stronger shift in risk preferences. 
 The current research gives some insight into the debate about the role of 
agency or third-party effects on risk. Only when integrating different gain and 
loss contexts in studying risk preferences do we find that participants’ willingness 
to play identical gambles for a third-party was different as compared to playing 
for oneself. However, overall, across contexts, levels of risk-taking did not differ 
(chapter 4; Stone et al., 2002).
 
Agency in socially risky environments
The role of personal involvement in cooperative decisions has been understudied. 
There are many situations in which decisions affecting others are delegated, and 
when the decision-maker themselves are not affected (e.g. CEO deciding benefits 
for his employees). It is important to understand how these decisions are made, and 
whether these decisions are made with an interest for the collective in the long run 
(considering the risk involved) or rather influenced by self-related concerns. 
 One factor that seems to increase cooperation, and thereby potentially places 
more weight on social concerns, is the ability to take the perspective of others 
(McCabe et al., 2001). In a similar vein to chapter 4, taking the other’s perspective 
when considering contributing to a public good might reduce the value of 
individual outcomes, and increase value on outcomes that are beneficial in the 
long run (chapter 5). This is also in line with studies showing that third-party 
choices are less impulsive when deciding between sooner smaller rewards versus 
later larger ones (Albrecht et al., 2011; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012; Kim et al., 2013). 
 In chapter 5 pro-social behaviour for cooperative decisions increased 
particularly when first having made the cooperative decisions for oneself. In the 
case of people first deciding on behalf of others whether they should cooperate, 
and then next for themselves, cooperation is reduced. This highlights the 
importance of the context of the decision and shows that people weigh the 
decision to cooperate relative to a reference point, which is often observed to be 
somewhat less than half of the amount they can contribute. In other words, and 
similarly to gain and loss contexts in chapter 4, defecting or cooperating is 
observed relative to the reference point, which depends on the current context 
(i.e. first- or third-person). Due to the uncertainty of the behaviour of others, 
cooperation is a risky decision, with free-riding being an act that ensures the 
safest and highest outcome. If others do not cooperate and the individual does, 
then he will be worse off, and make a “loss”. However, previous literature, as well 
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as this thesis, showed that people are willing to take the risk and act partially 
pro-social by sharing some of the personal benefit (Camerer, 2003). Moreover, 
researchers are currently studying the use of incentives in increasing cooperation 
and reducing free-riding (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Using incentives when 
choosing on behalf of a third-party may actually be less helpful, as third-party 
choices are less affected by reward and punishment outcomes (chapter 4). 
 Together, third-party decisions affect risk preferences for monetary and social 
outcomes, for gain and loss contexts as well as for social and non-social contexts. 
Third-party decisions are not more risky than choices for oneself, for financial 
decisions as well as cooperative decisions. Agency shifts reference points, to 
which monetary gains and losses, and material self-interest and social interest 
are compared. The behavioural findings in this thesis indicate that affective 
processes that usually accompany gain and loss outcomes are less involved in 
third-party decisions. 
Challenges and future implications 
In this thesis some questions remained unanswered that, I believe, are interesting 
and meaningful for future studies. 
 To understand whether compatibility or goal relevance is a critical factor 
to influence risk preferences for monetary outcomes (chapters 2 and 3), future 
studies could examine whether the underlying mechanisms for incompatible 
contexts are altered. For instance, if only relevant contexts are integrated into 
the computation of stimulus value and choice, we would expect the vmPFC to 
be specifically sensitive to relevant and not to irrelevant contexts. To test this, 
the relevance of contexts needs to be clear and goals need to be testable to know 
whether specific contextual signals are necessary for goal achievement. 
In chapter 2 I did not have data to test how the integration of decision context 
(i.e. gain and loss) by the vmPFC may vary for the different expected values of 
gambles. This is an interesting open question for understanding a potential adaptive 
role of the vmPFC in combining different values in guiding risk behaviour. 
 It is important to integrate the context in studying decisions to better 
understand in which contexts peoples’ preferences are most susceptible. This 
knowledge may help to better regulate processes triggered by these contexts, in 
case unrelated contexts may result in unwanted behaviour; for example, brokers 
in the financial market may not always want to be influenced by prior losses or 
gains. Additionally, it would also be interesting to study whether cross-domain 
contextual effects exist for non-monetary choices involving risk, e.g. health-related 
decisions, which could provide knowledge and implications about context effects 
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for general uncertain choices. Currently, this thesis provides some insight into 
cross-domain contextual influences on risk preferences. Successful and 
unsuccessful performance feedback did not influence risk behaviour for monetary 
gambles, in line with earlier findings on compatibility effects (Slovic et al., 2002). 
Conversely, in different settings, unrelated, contextual influences do sometimes 
exist (Knutson et al., 2008; Stanton & Reeck, 2014). Examining underlying 
differences mediated by different context domains could provide more insight 
into how these different sources may affect our valuation of risky choice. 
 Future studies could examine how brain mechanisms compute values of 
outcomes and contexts when these are not personal, and how this shapes 
preferences for others. It is assumed that perspective-taking modulates the 
decision process for others. However, more research is necessary to understand 
how this would influence underlying processes of risk and non-risk choices in 
social and non-social risk settings. This could provide a better idea of whether 
cooperative decisions are experienced as being less risky or whether social 
preferences are valued higher. Perspective taking could reduce the disutility of 
non-reciprocation by others. It is known that societies with cooperative individuals 
work better than societies with selfish people. If solely changing perspectives 
enhances individuals to become more cooperative, this could have implications in 
understanding how to encourage social behaviour such as cooperation.
 A limitation in studying social decision-making is the games used to study 
cooperation. These tasks provide simple paradigms to examine social interactive 
choice. However, they often capture strategic behaviour more than social 
behaviour. Furthermore, the redistribution of the outcome in public good games 
do not resemble real public goods, where the outcome is often of a different 
commodity to that was put in, and of which the consumption often occurs at a 
later point in time. Simple paradigms that reflect real-life cooperation are required 
to gain a better understanding of the process underlying cooperation, e.g. 
paradigms in which cooperation requires real effort, or outcomes with varying 
time delays. Research on temporal discounting may give us information into how 
these decisions are made. Moreover, observations from third-party decisions for 
intertemporal choices imply that third-party cooperation may increase the ability 
to focus on long term benefits of cooperation, thereby optimizing social choice 
behaviour. Future work should attempt to investigate the temporal aspects of 
cooperative decisions and examine which mechanisms may also be important 
during third-party choices in social and non-social risk settings. Improving 
knowledge of these contextual influences and third-party choices may provide 
interesting opportunities for policy implications. For instance, adjusting the 
temporal aspect of the outcome or inducing people to take a different perspective 
might result in more cooperation.
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 In real-life situations we experience a constant stream of feedback from our 
own actions and from social interactions, but also from events that are beyond 
our control. For a more comprehensive understanding of risky decision-making, it 
is therefore important to include contexts as part of the experimental design, but 
to distinguish it from choice. As shown here, not separating the in-built task 
contexts from the choice itself can confound measures of risk preferences. 
Feedback from social interactions is often not given at all, because of confounding 
the measurement of “pure” social preferences. Using designs in which repeated 
interactions do not confound the measurement of social preferences is difficult, 
but can better inform and predict social preferences in risky dynamic interactive 
contexts. 
 Studying decision-making from a neuroeconomics perspective is both 
exciting and challenging at the same time. Firstly, integrating the different 
disciplines (economics, psychology and neuroscience) entails many different 
concepts that may not all mean the same in each discipline. Each discipline has its 
own preference for particular methodologies in answering questions of interest. 
Despite these challenges, the interdisciplinary approach in neuroeconomics 
provides a more comprehensive view and understanding of how and why 
individuals make specific decisions, and incorporates this knowledge to create 
more accurate models capturing decision-making behaviour in real-life settings. 
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have investigated individual and social preferences for social and 
non-social risk, by combining tasks and research from experimental economics, 
social psychology and neuroscience. I have argued the importance of context in 
the decision-making process. Integrating the respective decision context is 
essential in order to gain a comprehensive view of how preferences for risk are 
formed and influenced. Furthermore, this thesis has provided some additional 
insight into the relatively understudied field of third-party risk-taking. The main 
aim here is to improve the understanding of the neural and psychological 
processes that underlie decision-making under risk in social and non-social 
settings.
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Ons leven bestaat uit het nemen van tal van beslissingen, van dagelijkse keuzes 
omtrent hoeveel geld we willen sparen, tot aan complexere keuzes, zoals het 
kopen van een huis. Daarnaast bieden de meeste keuzes niet altijd een zekere 
uitkomst, maar bevatten een zeker risico. Volgens traditionele theorieën over 
besluitvorming zou men altijd de beste optie moeten kiezen en deze beslissing 
consistent na moeten volgen, zonder daarbij beïnvloed te worden door andere 
factoren. Onderzoek toonde aan dat mensen dit in de werkelijkheid niet doen. 
Wanneer mensen bijvoorbeeld een keuze hebben tussen het accepteren van een 
zekere 20 euro winst, of accepteren van een 50% kans op 40 euro winst en 50% 
kans op helemaal niks, kiest het merendeel voor de zekere 20 euro. Men is over het 
algemeen dus risicomijdend. Daarentegen, wanneer mensen de keuze hebben 
tussen een zekere 20 euro verlies accepteren of 50% kans op 40 euro verlies met 
50% kans op geen verlies, dan kiest het merendeel om een gok te wagen. Oftewel, 
we zijn nu risico-zoekend. Ondanks dat deze keuze in principe hetzelfde is, waarbij 
enkel de ene keer een winst kan worden gemaakt en de andere keer een verlies 
kan worden geleden vertoont men een andere voorkeur. De inconsistente voorkeur 
voor een riskante optie kan worden verklaard door onze aversie voor verliezen 
(‘loss aversion’). De aversie voor verliezen zorgt ervoor dat we een verlies erger 
vinden dan een gelijksoortige winst (wel ongeveer 2 maal zo erg), en hierdoor 
gemotiveerd zijn om een verlies te vermijden. In het geval dat een gok een kans op 
een verlies kan wegstrepen, kiest men hiervoor, ondanks dat eenzelfde grote kans 
bestaat dat ze een twee maal groter verlies kunnen maken. Onze keuzes worden 
dus beïnvloed door indirecte factoren, zoals de situatie of context waarin we op 
dat moment een keuze maken. Naast dat we continue keuzes maken voor onszelf, 
maken we onze keuzes ook binnen een sociale context, in dit geval beïnvloeden 
onze keuzes niet alleen onszelf maar ook anderen. Er wordt veel onderzoek gedaan 
naar hoe men risicovolle beslissingen neemt vanuit psychologie, economie en 
neurowetenschappen. Dat heeft geleid tot een interdisciplinair onderzoeksgebied 
genaamd Neuro-economie, die de kennis, modellen en technieken vanuit deze 
drie disciplines combineert om besluitvorming in mensen en dieren beter in 
kaart te brengen. 
 In dit proefschrift heb ik vanuit een neuro-economische benadering 
onderzocht hoe verschillende sociale- als niet-sociale contexten onze risicovolle 
beslissingen beïnvloeden. In hoofdstukken 2 en 3 heb ik onderzocht hoe 
veranderingen in de context, zoals het ervaren van financiële beloningen en 
straffen, het beslissingsproces en de uiteindelijke keuze beïnvloeden. Daarbij heb 
ik gekeken hoe de hersenen deze context verwerken terwijl we deze keuzes 
maken. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat deelnemers de zekere optie vaker kozen dan de 
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riskante optie nadat ze zojuist geld hadden gewonnen en dus risicomijdend 
werden, terwijl ze juist de gok waagden wanneer ze zojuist geld hadden verloren, 
en dus risico-zoekend werden. Oftewel, de keuze om risico te nemen werd 
beïnvloed door de winst en verlies context waarin ze de keuze maakten, waarbij 
we na verliezen bereid waren een risico te nemen op een eventueel groter verlies. 
Dit zagen we voor beslissingen waarbij telkens dezelfde financiële keuze werd 
voorgelegd, en echt geld te verdienen was. Daarnaast laat ik zien dat dit 
keuzegedrag samenhangt met hersenactiviteit in de ventromediale prefrontale 
cortex, een hersengebied dat betrokken is bij het berekenen van de waarde van 
keuze opties en het signaleren van de uiteindelijke keuze. Dit hersengebied bleek 
dus sensitief te zijn voor de contextuele informatie. 
 De resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 leverde een interessante vervolgvraag op, 
namelijk, of de gedragseffecten specifiek zijn voor de type context of voor de 
positieve of negatieve lading van de context. Met andere woorden, zijn de gedrag-
seffecten specifiek voor het feit dat ze net geld hebben gewonnen of verloren, of 
het feit dat de deelnemers goed of slecht presteerden in de voorafgaande taak. In 
hoofdstuk 3 heb ik dit onderzocht. De resultaten bevestigde de eerder gevonden 
verschillen in risicovolle besluitvorming. Dit gedrag werd enkel geobserveerd bij 
een context waar geld werd gewonnen of verloren, en niet zo zeer door positieve 
en negatieve feedback bij succes of falen van een taak. Deze resultaten suggereren 
onder meer dat onze beslissingen voor riskante financiële opties voornamelijk 
gedreven worden door een context waarbij geld winnen of verliezen een rol speelt, 
en dat deze context onze aversie voor verlies versterkt. Beiden hoofdstukken laten 
zien dat de context waarin een keuze zich afspeelt een belangrijke factor is op ons 
gedrag, hoewel deze objectief gezien niet relevant is voor de risicovolle keuze. 
 In hoofdstukken 4 en 5 van dit proefschrift heb ik de sociale invloed op ons 
keuzegedrag onderzocht. In een sociale samenleving beïnvloeden onze keuzes 
niet alleen onszelf maar ook anderen. Daarnaast maken we ook keuzes namens of 
voor een ander, zoals ouders voor hun kinderen. Ondanks de directe impact dat dit 
soort keuzes op ons hebben, is er nog geen eenduidig resultaat gevonden of we 
anders kiezen voor een ander dan voor onszelf. In de context van risicovolle 
beslissingen is dit interessant, aangezien eerder onderzoek en de vorige 
hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift laten zien dat deze beslissingen gemakkelijk 
worden beïnvloed door de context. In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik onderzocht hoe 
voorafgaande positieve en negatieve contexten onze keuze voorkeur voor risico 
beïnvloeden wanneer we deze keuze maken voor andere personen. Ten tweede 
onderzocht ik of het uitmaakt in hoeverre iemand verantwoordelijk is in de 
besluitvorming en uitkomst daarvan. De gedragsbevinding van hoofdstuk 2 en 3 
waarbij de deelnemers voor zichzelf kozen, werden hier gerepliceerd. Opvallend is 
dat voorafgaande winsten en verliezen minder invloed op de risico voorkeuren en 
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keuzes van de beslissers hadden wanneer diegene namens een ander koos. 
Bovendien, bij het verminderen van de verantwoordelijkheid (persoonlijke 
betrokkenheid) van de beslissers voor de uitkomst van hun acties, beïnvloedden 
de winst of verlies contexten de risicovolle keuzes minder, in vergelijking met 
beslissers met meer verantwoordelijkheid en diegene die voor henzelf kozen. 
Tenslotte namen de beslissers gemiddeld niet meer of minder risico voor een 
ander ten opzichte van beslissers die voor henzelf kozen. Deze resultaten geven 
aan dat wanneer we een beslissing nemen namens anderen, de context-gevoelig-
heid van onze voorkeur om risico te nemen specifiek verandert. Ik speculeer hier 
dat wanneer betrokkenheid van de beslissers in de uitkomsten van de taak 
vermindert, hun emotionele betrokkenheid voor de context in de taak reduceert, 
en vervolgens resulteert in een zwakker effect van de winst of verlies context op 
hun voorkeur om risico te accepteren.
 In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 5), vervolgde ik mijn 
onderzoek naar de rol van de beslisser in sociale keuzes met onzekere uitkomsten, 
in dit geval beslissingen om samen te werken ofwel te coöpereren, waarbij de 
uitkomst ook afhankelijk is van andere spelers. Een voorbeeld zijn grootschalige 
beslissingen omtrent samenwerking, die vaak worden gemaakt door individuen 
namens andere mensen (bijv. de overheid). In dit hoofdstuk heb ik onderzocht hoe 
persoonlijke betrokkenheid bij een publiek goed (bijv. schone lucht) samenwerking 
kan beïnvloeden. Ik vroeg mij af of sociale beslissingen namens anderen 
pro-socialer zijn of juist niet, en welke motieven ten grondslag liggen aan sociale 
besluitvorming namens anderen. Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien dat deelnemers het 
meeste samenwerken voor een publiek goed wanneer zij de beslissing namen 
voor een andere deelnemer, en niet persoonlijk betrokken waren bij de uitkomst 
en verdeling van het publiek goed, terwijl deelnemers het minste samenwerken 
wanneer persoonlijke betrokkenheid hoog was (d.w.z. namens henzelf kozen). De 
resultaten komen overeen met eerder onderzoek waaruit blijkt dat mensen bereid 
zijn om een prijs te betalen om andere personen zich meer in lijn van sociale 
normen te laten gedragen, zoals wat sociaal en eerlijk geacht wordt, zelfs wanneer 
het individu zelf niet getroffen werd door het zelfzuchtige gedrag van de ander. 
Ten tweede laat ik zien dat de keuze om meer bij te dragen aan het publieke goed 
namens een ander gedreven werd vanuit sociale motieven. De bijdrage in 
samenwerking leek aanvankelijk afhankelijk te zijn van de betrokkenheid van de 
beslisser. Verschillen in samenwerking traden alleen op wanneer de deelnemers 
hun huidige situatie konden vergelijken ten opzichte van een eerdere situatie 
waarin ze dezelfde keuze kregen. Wanneer we de beslissing over de mate van 
samenwerking namens onszelf veranderde naar dat namens een ander, lijken we 
meer te denken aan het sociale belang, wat resulteert in meer samenwerking. 
Anderzijds wanneer we de beslissing namens de ander nu vanuit eigen perspectief 
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nemen dan lijken we meer gemotiveerd te worden door ons eigen belang, wat 
minder samenwerking of zelfs ‘free-riding’ (ofwel ‘zwartrijden’: gebruik maken 
van het publieke goed zonder daar zelf in te investeren) tot gevolg kan hebben. 
Tezamen laten de resultaten van hoofdstuk 5 zien dat het verminderen van 
persoonlijke betrokkenheid in het publieke goed tot meer samenwerking leidt, en 
gedreven wordt door sociale preferenties, die in overeenstemming zijn met sociale 
normen. 
Relevantie & Conclusie
Het doel van dit onderzoek is om meer kennis te krijgen over hoe mensen tot 
bepaalde keuzes komen en door welke factoren keuzes worden beïnvloed, om 
vervolgens beter te voorspellen en te begrijpen hoe en welke beslissingen mensen 
nemen.
 In realiteit ervaren we een constante stroom van feedback van ons eigen 
handelen en van de sociale invloeden om ons heen, maar ook van gebeurtenissen 
die buiten onze controle plaatsvinden. Om beter te begrijpen hoe risicovolle 
keuzes gemaakt worden, is het daarom belangrijk om de context als onderdeel 
van de experimentele opzet te omvatten. De bevindingen in dit proefschrift 
dragen bij aan deze kennis, en laat zien dat onze beslissingen makkelijk beïnvloed 
worden door een voorgaande situatie. Zelfs wanneer de keuze hetzelfde is en de 
context objectief irrelevant is, kan het toekomstige beslissingen aanzienlijk 
beïnvloeden. Tevens geeft dit proefschrift inzicht in de sensitiviteit van onze 
keuzes voor verschillende contexten en wijzen erop hoe flexibel onze risico 
voorkeuren en keuzes zijn. Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift geeft meer inzicht in 
de neuronale mechanismen in context-afhankelijke en risicovolle besluitvorming. 
Daarnaast benadrukt dit proefschrift het belang van de sociale context van de 
beslissing en de rol van de beslisser in de keuze. Tevens wordt het belang van 
het bestuderen van de context van de keuze extra aangetoond in de discussie over 
de rol van de beslisser in risicovolle keuzes. Tot slot, laat ik zien dat subtiele 
veranderingen in de context, zoals wanneer mensen niet voor henzelf maar 
namens een ander kiezen om wel of niet samen te werken, effectief kunnen zijn 
om samenwerking te verhogen en eventueel verminderen van ‘free-riding’. Het 
vergroten van de kennis over de mogelijke invloeden van sociale en niet-sociale 
contextuele informatie op onze besluitvorming, besproken in dit proefschrift, 
kan interessante bijdragen hebben voor beleidsvorming.
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